





AN
ANALYTIC
AND
PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR.

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“ It is the business of grammar rightly understood, to teach two things ; first, the complete and undisguised construction of words in a sentence, and second, how far it is allowable to abridge or modify this structure in practice.”—*Cardell.*

5th ed.

SPRINGFIELD:
PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY
WOOD AND RUPP.

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1842.

PE 1103
C6

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1840,
By JOEL CHAPIN,
in the Clerk's office of the District Court of Connecticut.

4021

PREFACE.

IF it is asked why another Grammar is added to the multitude already extant, I answer, because another *is needed*.

Grammar has universally been considered '*a dry study*,' and there is none to which the scholar approaches with greater reluctance, or pursues with less profit. This fact so notorious, suggested the inquiry, Where is the difficulty? Is it in the *subject*, or is it in the *mode of treating it*? If it is in the subject, then it should be laid aside; if it is in the mode of treating it, then that should be changed. Reflection and experience convinced me that it could not be in the subject, for grammar is as interesting as history, and as profitable as mental philosophy. The difficulty, then was to be sought in the mode of teaching. And this was found to be in direct opposition to the most obvious principles of the mind. The natural law of procedure is from generals to particulars; but in grammar this order has ever been reversed. In Geography we first draw the outlines, and then fill up with more particular items according to capacity and opportunity. In History also we proceed from more important to less important items. In Botany too we take the same course, first examining the plant as a whole, and afterwards dissecting and examining its individual parts. Now it is well known that these are among the most interesting studies to which the learner attends; but this interest is

owing no more to the nature of the subjects than to the mode in which they are treated. It is an established and invariable fact that those studies which are pursued in the analytic method are interesting and pleasant, while those pursued in the synthetic order are abstruse and dry. This fact can be accounted for in no other way than that the latter course is in opposition to the principles of the mind. Why then should grammar be pursued in this way? Is it necessary thus to oppose natural principles? It appears to me that a unanimous response will be given in the negative. If an intelligent silver smith wished to learn an apprentice to construct a watch, would he begin by setting him to work upon the most minute and unimportant parts, proceeding upwards by slow degrees to those more important, without so much as showing him the object of a watch, or the combination of its several parts? or would he first show him a watch and tell him its purpose, then letting him see the combination of the several parts, point out to him their arrangement and the effect, and then beginning with the most important, name and describe the parts separately, showing the construction and use of each, and thus enable the learner to proceed intelligently and with pleasure? We see at once that the latter is the course of reason, yet grammar has always been taught in the former manner. In grammar the first thing the learner is taught, is, how many wheels there are in the watch, or in other words how many parts of speech there are. Now it must be obvious that the scholar does not care how *many* parts of speech there may be, if he does not know *what* they are; it is a matter of indifference whether there are ten, twenty, or a hundred, they are to him as so many nothings, so long as he does not understand them. But before he understands what a part of speech is, or indeed before he understands what the subject is he is studying, for he thinks it is grammar and not

language, he is put to learning the names of these nothings, and is told without any reasons being given, that they are Article, Noun, Pronoun, Adjective, &c. Then beginning with the *Article* he is led through all the dry technicalities of these nine parts of speech without so much as knowing the result or the benefits of all his wearisome labor. Is it surprising that under such circumstances the scholar often exclaims 'What good does it do?' 'I hate grammar,' &c. Is it surprising that grammar has become a loathing and an abhorring unto all pupils? It would be surprising if it was not, for no intellectual being will long voluntarily pursue a course from which it derives no present pleasure and sees no prospect of future benefit. We might as well expect that a person would be induced to stand and strike upon the ground with a stick constantly, day after day, by the plea that exercise is necessary to health, as that scholars would, under present circumstances, choose the study of grammar to enable them 'to speak and write correctly;' the value of the object is lost in the repulsiveness of the means.

By the synthetic mode of teaching grammar, the erroneous impression is conveyed that the study of grammar is not the study of the principles of language, but is merely a study of rules and of technical terms and definitions. Is not this the impression that nine in ten receive from the present manner of teaching? and is it not apparently the view which some authors have taken of the subject? If not, how can we account for the multitude of technical distinctions, and the pertinacious adherence to them which we find in many grammars?

Another error is that of beginning to study grammar when too young. It has become popular to set children from six to twelve years of age, to studying grammar, but it is a practice utterly opposed to reason, and arose from the above misapprehension of

the object and nature of grammar. In children of that age, memory is more active than judgment, hence studies which call into exercise the memory, are better adapted to them than those which exercise the judgment. But English grammar is not of that kind. If it consisted almost entirely, as many seem to suppose, of technical terms and distinctions, it would be ; but technicalities are of minor consequence, and constitute but a small part of what is truly grammar. The chief business of the learner is to construe or explain the sense of the piece, and that is an exercise requiring judgment rather than memory ; and no scholar, whatever may be his age, is prepared to enter upon the study of grammar until his reflective faculties are so far developed as to enable him to comprehend the meaning of compositions of ordinary difficulty. The usual course has been, as soon as the child is able to commit to memory, to set him to learning the theory of grammar, and to keep him upon it one, two or more seasons, until he can repeat the whole in parrot-like style ; and this with many, constitutes the sum total of their grammatical knowledge. But if at length they are put to parsing, they only apply the rules they have learnt, to the words before them, with the same parrot-like destitution of sense—they do it all *by guess*, without imagining that reason has any thing to do with parsing. Humbling as is this statement, it is but a true picture, not over-colored, of the grammatical attainments of the majority in our land.

The three errors,—that of commencing grammar in the reverse order of nature—that of making the theory constitute the whole or greater part of grammar—and that of commencing the study before the judgment is in any measure developed—have unjustly procured for grammar the opprobrium of ‘a dry study.’ Authors have been aware of the aversion scholars have to grammar, and many are the remedies that

have been devised, but they have all proved fruitless, because they were not aimed at these fundamental errors.

The main feature of the present work, and that wherein it differs from other Grammars, is the *analytic method*—it begins where others leave off, and ends where they begin. It proceeds upon the principle that the study of grammar is not the study of a *theory*, but the study of *language*. Hence it begins with language as we find it, considering it first as a whole, then in its largest natural divisions, and then in its subdivisions, proceeding from the most obvious distinctions downwards, until the subject is completely analyzed. The theory of grammar is not to be given first, but last; or in other words, technical terms are not to be learnt in a mass in advance, but only as in the process of analyzing they may *be needed*; they will then be received readily and retained easily. Making *practice the main part* in the study of grammar, and theory a secondary part, constitutes the second feature of the work. The third is that of having *few technical distinctions*, and those expressed in the fewest words precision will admit.

An Introductory Essay has been given to create an interest in the study, and to rid the learner of the common impression that in the study of grammar he must wade through a mass of dry, grammatical rules. It is partly historical and partly scientific, for the purpose of introducing the learner imperceptibly to the science of grammar, through the interest in the history. It may be objected that it is too lengthy for an introduction, and that an essay on language would be more appropriately placed at the end than the beginning of the work. In reply, I would say that although it is called an introduction, yet it is in fact a commencement of the grammar itself—it is a consideration of language as a whole, and that is essential to the plan proposed. It is true it may be dis-

pensed with, but in that case a partial substitute should be found in the teacher. In respect to the second objection, it should be remembered that the essay is not designed as a purely scientific and critical essay, if so, the objection would have a force that it now has not; and besides, to place the essay at the end would be to subvert the very purpose for which it was written.

In respect to the Theory—I have pursued straight forward, that course which the method proposed, required. In all the alterations, whether of addition or retrenchment, I have made none which I did not think *truth* and *utility* demanded. As I have often remarked in the course of the work, I take no pleasure in differing from established systems, and it has been no object of mine to produce a work whose only recommendation is that of being *novel*. But whenever I found in use, terms, definitions and principles which were indisputably gross errors, I did not feel at liberty to retain them, but felt it a duty which *truth* and the *public good* required of me, to change or reject them, whatever effect it may have upon my reputation or interest. Whatever I have found not *necessary* I have retrenched, rather than let it remain a pernicious burden to the scholar, and whenever there was a manifest deficiency I have presumed to make such additions of terms, &c., as the cases required, guided by the simple principle of truth and utility. But in these alterations I have not forgotten that it is often necessary and wise to consult custom and prejudice. At the suggestion of a learned friend I made the attempt to adapt the analytic method to the present systems, or in other words, to retain all the terms and definitions of the old grammars. In some particulars I succeeded well, but soon found that the plan could not be executed unless I relinquished a conscientious regard to truth. I therefore abandoned the plan, and as the best substitute I could consistently furnish, have

given the old nomenclature by itself, and subjoined in notes the reasons for the classification.

In regard to some important changes, if they are not fully justified by the reasons given in the notes and extracts, I shall despair of doing it.

Grammar has hitherto been an isolated study, perfectly 'sui generis;' but the analytic method and the terms that have in this work been adopted, restores it to a proper fellowship with its sister studies, Logic and Rhetoric, and renders the transition from one to another easy and natural.

The principles of the system have been tested by the author in his own school with satisfactory success. The work is now presented to the public for a more extended experiment.

TO INSTRUCTORS.

BUT a very small portion in this work is designed to be committed to memory, in the manner of set lessons. *Read, understand, and remember*, is the method. Part I, should be read over by the scholars either separately or in a class; they may then be questioned upon it, to ascertain with what attention they have read. They should then commence Part II, and at the same time be set to *analyzing*; a subject being selected from Part III, or from any other book. The successive steps, *sentences, propositions, subject, predicate, &c.* should each be thoroughly understood before proceeding to another. The definitions, &c. in large type may be committed to memory as the process of analyzing shall require.

CORRECTIONS.

- Page 67, line 9th, for *poets* read *parts*.
“ 101, last line, add *grave* before *discourse*.
“ 106, the five lines *preceding* the last line should *follow* it.

PART I.

INTRODUCTORY ESSAY.

GRAMMAR is the science of language; or the explanation and application of the principles of speech.

Its object is to give facility and accuracy in the use and interpretation of language. Language, like the arts, is founded upon and governed by principles; and it is necessary to understand these principles in order to become a proficient in it. Correct language is that which is in accordance with general practice; and grammar arises from an observation of this practice, together with the principles upon which it is founded. Hence grammar rules have no arbitrary power, but are merely *records of facts*. And all who wish to express themselves with ease, elegance, and precision, will avail themselves of the important aid which may be derived from them.

“All science arises from observations on practice. Practice has always gone before method and rule; but method and rule have afterwards improved and perfected practice in every art. We every day meet with persons who sing agreeably without knowing one note of the gammut. Yet it has been found of importance to reduce these notes to a scale, and to form an art of music; and it would be ridiculous to pretend that the art is of no advantage because the practice is founded in nature.”—*Blair*.

And it is as absurd to think that grammar is of no importance because some who have not studied it are able to speak correctly. There is no art which men are not capable of practicing to a certain extent, without a knowledge of the scientific principles upon which it is based. Yet we do not for that reason consider science as valueless. It enables us to carry art to greater perfection. And there is as much difference between science and empiricism, *i. e.* art without science, as there is between certainty and conjecture.

This remark applies with as much force to grammar as to any other science. If a person unacquainted with grammar should be asked *why* an expression he had used was correct or incorrect, he would be unable to tell. Such an inability cannot but be discreditable to a person of the present day and privileges.

Grammar is in one sense the basis of all the other sciences, and yields to none in the amount of pleasure and profit its study affords. It is a description, or history of language, as it was and is. So that the study of grammar is only the study of language; and is as important, if not as interesting as the study of geography or history. Its importance is in exact proportion to the importance of the subject upon which language is employed; hence in many cases it is of superlative moment.

It should be every person's aim to employ language so that it cannot possibly be misinterpreted. It is a very different thing to use language the meaning of which may be *guessed* out, from that whose meaning *cannot be mistaken*. Inattention to grammar often occasions an entire perversion of the person's meaning. A few illustrations of which will be given.

. 1st. Josephus in speaking of what Darius did in behalf of the Jews at their restoration says, "He prohibited his deputies and governors to lay any

king's taxes upon the Jews; he also permitted that they should *have all that land which they could possess themselves of without tributes.*" Now does he mean that Darius would give them what land they could *possess without tributes*; or that he would permit them to *have* without tributes, what land they could possess? Undoubtedly he *meant* the latter, yet he *says* the former.

2d. "It would puzzle a man to keep flies which buzz in August, through the winter." To say 'flies buzz in August through the winter' is a ridiculous absurdity, yet it is what the sentence most naturally indicates; but if it was said, as no doubt it was meant, that it is difficult 'to keep through the winter, flies which buzz in August' such a ludicrous mistake would have been avoided.

3d. "Are these designs, which any man, who is born a Briton, in any circumstances, in any situation, ought to be ashamed or afraid to avow?" This sentence, although written by Lord Bolingbroke, is only a mass of grammatical blunders. Instead of asking, as undoubtedly he intended, whether the designs were such as any Briton ought to be ashamed or afraid *to avow in any circumstances, or in any situation*, he inquires, if the designs were such as any Briton *born in any circumstances, in any situation*, ought to be ashamed or afraid to avow; which is a very different thing from the other. And besides by an improper use of *which*, he makes the sentence to mean nothing at all. For in consequence of using 'which' instead of 'such as,' he makes 'are these designs,' an independent clause, and so far as the meaning is concerned might be thrown out; but any one will see that the rest of the sentence has no meaning. It should have been, "Are these designs, such as any man who is born a Briton ought to be ashamed or afraid to avow in any circumstances or in any situation?"

4th. In the 14 chapter of Genesis, 18, 19, and 20 verses, through faulty expression, it is said that Melchizedeck blessed Abraham and *paid him tithes of all*; and we should not know to the contrary, did not Paul tell us that instead of Melchizedeck's paying tithes to Abraham, Abraham paid them to Melchizedeck.

Grammatical errors are of immense consequence, in the Scriptures, and especially in law cases, where we are bound by the 'strict letter' and not by any 'probably intended meaning.'

As a knowledge of grammar can be obtained only by a knowledge of language, that, therefore, will be the subject of our consideration.

LANGUAGE.

Language is the communication of ideas. It is of four general kinds; gestic, symbolical, spoken, and written.

Gestic language is the expression of ideas by looks, gestures, and expressive cries.

Symbolical language is the expression of ideas by characters representing *ideas* or *objects*.

Spoken language is the expression of ideas by uniform sounds called words.

Written language is the expression of ideas by characters representing *sounds*.

Language is either *natural* or *artificial*. Natural language is that which is dictated by nature, and such as all persons would instinctively use in like circumstances. It is common to man and the brutes. The natural modes of expression are such as laughing, crying, looks, gestures and motions of any kind, either with or without the voice. Artificial language is the communication of ideas by *artificial signs* representing *natural expressions*. A person wishing to communicate something respecting a cat, a dog, or a sheep,

would by nature first mew, bark, or bleat, and then, by such motions and signs as nature would dictate, make known his ideas. But in the artificial mode, instead of mewling, barking, or bleating, he would direct attention to the animal by calling it by its name, cat, dog, or sheep, and then by other words further express his ideas. The words cat, dog, and sheep are artificial signs to represent the same thing with mewling, barking, &c. And we should understand as readily by the one mode as the other what animal was meant.

The *Gestic* is the only language that is purely natural; the three other kinds are artificial. All of them are *universal*, that is, all mankind employ them in communicating their ideas. But men, not being guided by the universal regulator, nature, in naming and representing objects and ideas, would adopt different names, words, and characters, according to their different circumstances. Accordingly we find that different nations and tribes, have different names for the same thing, and different words and characters to represent the same idea. Hence artificial language is subdivided into many different kinds, properly called tongues or dialects, but frequently languages: as the Chinese, Hebrew, Greek, Latin, French, Spanish, &c. languages. Hence grammar, which is the science of language, is of two kinds, *universal* and *particular*. Universal grammar explains those principles of language which are common to all nations; and particular grammar, such as are common to a particular nation. A Latin grammar explains the principles of the Latin language; a French grammar, of the French language; an English grammar, of the English language. As we are descended from the English, and speak the same dialect or language, the grammar of our language is also called English grammar. Our business then will be to consider the English language.

The province of particular grammar is to treat of *written* and *spoken* language only, and chiefly of writ-

ten language. But as these are materially modified by the *gestic* and *symbolical*, it is necessary in order to fully understand the principles of a particular language, to be well acquainted with universal grammar, or the principles which govern all language. We will therefore begin with considering the "rise and progress of language."*

In the present refined state of the world, the facilities of communication are so great, and we have become so accustomed to them, that, like the common elements upon which we subsist, we forget what they are or whence they came. Gestic language is scarcely named; symbolical is almost entirely disused, and the power of speech is carried to such a state of cultivation, and we are so familiarized to it, that we seem to imagine that spoken and written language are perfectly natural; that there never was any other, and that men could always speak and write as well as they now do. A vague impression seems to pervade the minds of many, that, as man, by the fiat of his almighty Creator, was sent into the world in full *corporeal* stature, so his *mind* was endowed with all the powers and cultivation it possesses in this late, enlightened age; and that man in respect to personal ability has for six thousand years been like a horse upon the wheel, continually stepping, but making no head-way.

"But carry your thoughts back to the first dawn of language among men. Reflect upon the feeble beginnings from which it must have arisen, and upon the many and great obstacles which it must have encountered in its progress; and you will find reason for the highest astonishment on viewing the height which it has now attained. We admire several of the inventions of art; we plume ourselves on some discoveries

* The copious extracts found between this and page 38 are from Blair's Rhetoric. Without intending any injustice to the author, we have taken the liberty to insert and modify as best suited our purpose.

which have been made in latter ages, serving to advance knowledge, and render life comfortable ; we speak of them as the boast of human reason. But certainly no invention is entitled to any such degree of admiration as that of language ; which, too, must have been the product of the first and rudest ages, if indeed it can be considered as a human invention at all. ” “ If we should suppose a period before any words were invented or known, it is clear that men could have no other method of communicating to others what they felt, than by the cries of passion, accompanied with such motions and gestures as were farther expressive of passion. For these are the only signs which nature teaches all men, and which are understood by all. One who saw another going into some place where he himself had been frightened, or exposed to danger, and who sought to warn his neighbor of the danger, could contrive no other way of doing so than by uttering those cries and making those gestures which are the signs of fear ; just as two men at this day, would endeavor to make themselves understood by each other, who should be thrown together on a desolate island, ignorant of each other’s language. Those exclamations, therefore, which by grammarians are called interjections, or exclamations, uttered in a strong and passionate manner, were beyond doubt, the first elements or beginnings of speech.” But we are informed by sacred history, that Adam as one of his first acts, *conversed* with his Maker, and gave names to all the beasts of the field and fowls of the air. Cain also *talked* with Abel. Therefore we conclude that Adam did not acquire language wholly in the inductive manner, but that he was created with, in some degree at least, the power and knowledge of vocal communication. And we have no intimation that the exercise of this faculty was intermitted during a space of nearly two thousand years. At the end of this period, we read that “ the whole earth was of one language and of one speech.”

But if there never was a time when man used the gestic language only; if there never was a time when he had the *whole* art of speaking to acquire, there was, undoubtedly, a time when he was extremely limited in the privilege of holding 'sweet converse.' "For supposing language to have a divine original, we cannot suppose a perfect system of it was all at once given to man. It is much more natural to think that God taught our first parents only such language as suited their present occasions, leaving them, as he did in other things, to enlarge and improve it as their future necessities should require. Consequently those first rudiments of speech must have been poor and narrow."

But whatever may have been the communicative powers with which man was created, or whatever advancement he may have made in the first seventeen hundred years of his existence, it matters not essentially. As, at that time, we are informed that men, actuated by an unholy design, commenced building a tower whereby to perpetuate their name and social existence. In consequence of which their Creator "*confounded their language*, and scattered them abroad upon the face of the whole earth." By that event, mankind were reduced to a state of infancy in regard to communication. For whatever knowledge they may have had previously, it was of no avail to them now, as they were 'unable to understand one another's speech.' Consequently the only resource left them was the gestic language. Therefore, assuming this as the starting point, we will trace the progress of language upward through its several degrees of gradual improvement to the refined state in which we now find it.

The dispersion of men, in consequence of the building of Babel, was the origin of the many different languages now prevalent in the world. That event placed *individuals* in the same relation to each other, in regard to language, as *nations* are in now.

In order to hold communication, each had to learn the other's mode of expression. At first they would have to depend entirely upon gestic language; but having associated together for a time, they would be enabled to substitute some sign which would be briefer and more easily made, yet sufficient to make known their ideas. These signs would probably be accompanied by certain sounds of the voice; which sounds being naturally uniform, would gradually be formed into words which should stand as the names or signs of the object to which they were applied. The manner in which men proceeded in the formation of words or names "was undoubtedly by imitating, as much as they could, the nature of the object named, by the sound of the name which they gave it. As the painter who would represent grass, must employ green color; so in the beginning of language, one giving a name to any thing harsh or boisterous, would of course employ a harsh or boisterous sound. He could not do otherwise if he meant to excite in the hearer the idea of that thing which he sought to name. To suppose words invented, or names given to things in a manner purely arbitrary, without any ground or reason, is to suppose an effect without a cause. There must have always been some motive which led to the assignation of one name rather than another; and we can conceive no motive which would more generally operate upon men in their first efforts towards a language, than a desire to paint by speech the objects which they named. Wherever objects were to be named in which sound, noise, or motion were concerned, the imitation by words was abundantly obvious. Nothing was more natural than to imitate by the sound of the voice the quality of the sound or noise which any external object made, and to form its name accordingly. Thus in all languages we find a multitude of words that are evidently constructed on this principle. A

certain bird is termed a cuckoo from the sound which it emits. When one sort of wind is said to *whistle* and another to *roar*; when a serpent is said to *hiss*, a fly to *buzz*, and falling timber to *crash*; when a stream is said to *flow*, and hail to *rattle*, the analogy between the word and the thing signified is plainly discernible."

But in the progress of society, when men's ideas became more numerous and more refined, there would be some things which could not be represented by the sound of the name; yet it is thought by many, that as some words are formed from others, the names given to such objects are formed from those whose sound does in some degree correspond with the object signified. ["Thus words containing as their radical the letters *Fl*, denote fluency; *Cl*, a gentle descent; *R*, what relates to rapid motion; *C*, to cavity or hollowness. Words formed upon *St*, always denote stability, firmness, strength: as stand, stay, stop, staff, stout, steady, stake, stamp, stately, &c. Words beginning with *Str*, intimate violent force and energy; as, strive, strength, strike, stripe, stress, struggle, stride, stretch, strip, &c. *Thr*, implies forcible motion: as throw, throb, thrust, through, threaten, thralldom. *Wr*, obliquity or distortion: as wry, wrest, wreath, wrestle, wring, wrong, wrangle, wrath, wrack, &c. *Sw*, silent agitation, or lateral motion: as sway, swing, swerve, sweep, swim. *Sl*, a gentle fall, or less observable motion: as slide, slip, slay, slit, slow, slack, sling. *Sp*, dissipation or expansion: as spread, sprout, sprinkle, split, spill, spring. Terminations in *a-s-h*, indicate something acting nimbly and sharply: as crash, gash, rash, flash, slash. Terminations in *u-s-h*, something acting more obtusely and dully: as crush, brush, hush, gush, rush, push, blush, &c. &c."]

"This principle, however, of a natural relation between words and objects, can only be applied to lan-

guage in its most simple and primitive state. Though in every tongue some remains of it, as shown above, can be traced, it were utterly in vain to search for it throughout the whole construction of any modern language. As the multitude of terms increase in every nation, and the immense field of language is filled up, words, by a thousand fanciful and irregular methods of derivation and composition, come to deviate widely from the primitive character of their roots, and to lose all analogy or resemblance in sound to the things signified. In this state we now find language. Words, as we now employ them, taken in the general, may be considered as symbols, not as imitations; as arbitrary, or instituted, not natural signs of ideas. But there can be no doubt, I think, that language, the nearer we approach to its rise among men, will be found to partake more of a natural expression. As it could be originally formed on nothing but imitation, it would, in its primitive state, be more picturesque; much more barren indeed, and narrow in the circle of its terms, than now, but as far as it went, more expressive by sound of the thing signified."

The order in which men, in the earlier stages of society, uttered and arranged their words was different from that we now use. When they were thirsty, instead of saying, as we do 'give me some drink,' they would say 'drink give me;' because drink being the exciting object, and that to which their attention was chiefly directed, it would naturally be uttered first. We sometimes at the present day, though rarely, hear such expressions as, 'a fine day this,' 'a beautiful stream that,' &c. It is on the above principle; and is a more animated mode of expression than that we usually employ.

"After words, or names of objects began to be invented, the mode of speaking, by natural signs could not be all at once disused. For language, in its infancy, must have been extremely barren; and there

certainly was a period among all rude nations, when conversation was carried on by a very few words, intermixed with many exclamations and earnest gestures. The small stock of words which men as yet possessed, rendered these helps absolutely necessary for explaining their conceptions; and rude, uncultivated men, not having always at hand even the few words which they knew, would naturally labor to make themselves understood by varying their tones of voice, and accompanying their tones with the most significant gesticulations they could make. At this day, when persons attempt to speak in any language which they possess imperfectly, they have recourse to all these supplemental methods, in order to render themselves more intelligible. The plan, too, according to which it has been shown, that language was originally constructed, upon resemblance or analogy, as far as possible, to the thing signified, would naturally lead men to utter their words with more emphasis and force, as long as language was a sort of painting by means of sound. For all those reasons it may be assumed as a principle, that the pronunciation of the earliest languages was accompanied with more gesticulation, and with more and greater inflections of voice, than what we now use; there was more action in it; and it was more upon a crying or singing tone." "To this manner of speaking necessity first gave rise. But we must observe that after this necessity had, in a great measure ceased, by language becoming, in process of time, more extensive and copious, the ancient manner of speech still subsisted among many nations; and what had arisen from necessity, continued to be used for ornament. Whenever there was much fire and vivacity in the genius of nations, they were naturally inclined to a mode of conversation which gratified the imagination so much; for an imagination which is warm, is always prone to throw both a great deal of action and a variety

of tones, into discourse. Upon this principle, Dr. Warburton accounts for so much speaking by action, as we find among the Old Testament prophets, as when Jeremiah breaks the potter's vessel in sight of the people; throws a book into the Euphrates; puts on bonds and yokes; and carries out his household stuff; all which, he imagines, might be significant modes of expression, very natural in those ages, when men were accustomed to explain themselves by actions and gestures. In like manner among the northern American tribes, certain motions and actions were found to be much used as explanatory of their meaning, on all their great occasions of intercourse with each other; and by the belts and strings of wampum, which they gave and received, they were accustomed to declare their meaning, as much as by their discourses."

"With regard to inflections of voice, these are so natural, that to some nations it has appeared easier to express different ideas by varying the tone with which they pronounced the same word, than to contrive words for all their ideas. This is the practice of the Chinese in particular. The number of words in their language is said not to be great; but in speaking, they vary each of their words on no less than five different tones, by which they make the same word signify five different things. This must give a great appearance of music or singing to their speech. For those inflections of voice which, in the infancy of language, were no more than harsh or dissonant cries, must, as language gradually polishes, pass into more smooth and musical sounds; and hence is formed what we call the prosody of a language. Both in the Greek and Roman languages, this musical and gesticulating pronunciation was retained in a very high degree."

"The case was parallel with regard to gestures; for strong tones and animated gestures always go to-

gether. Action is treated of by all the ancient critics, as the chief quality in every public speaker. The action both of the orators and the players in Greece and Rome, was far more vehement than what we are accustomed to. Roscius would have seemed a madman to us. Gesture was of such consequence upon the ancient stage, that there is reason for believing that on some occasions, the speaking and the acting part were divided, which, according to our ideas, would form a strange exhibition; one player spoke the words in the proper tones, while another performed the corresponding motions and gestures. We learn from Cicero, that it was a contest between him and Roscius, whether he could express a sentiment in a greater variety of phrases, or Roscius, in a greater variety of intelligible significant gestures. At last, gesture came to engross the stage wholly; for, under the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, the favorite entertainment of the public was the pantomime, which was carried on entirely by mute gesticulation. The people were moved and wept at it, as much as at tragedies; and the passion for it became so strong, that laws were obliged to be made for restraining the senators from studying the pantomime art. Now, though in declamations and theatrical exhibitions, both tone and gesture were doubtless carried much farther than in common discourse; yet public speaking of any kind, must, in every country, bear some proportion to the manner that is used in conversation; and such public entertainments as have now been mentioned could never have been relished by a nation, whose tones and gestures, in discourse, were as languid as ours."

"Our plain manner of speaking, expresses the passions with sufficient energy, to move those who are not accustomed to any more vehement manner. But, undoubtedly, more varied tones, and more animated motions, carry a natural expression of warmer

feelings. Accordingly, in different modern languages the prosody of speech partakes more of music, in proportion to the liveliness and sensibility of the people. A Frenchman both varies his accents, and gesticulates, while he speaks, much more than an Englishman. An Italian, a great deal more than either. Musical pronunciation and expressive gesture, are to this day the distinction of Italy."

"As the manner in which men first uttered their words, and maintained conversation, was strong and expressive, enforcing their imperfectly expressed ideas by cries and gestures; so the language which they used, could be no other than full of figures and metaphors, not correct indeed, but forcible and picturesque. First, the want of proper names for every object, obliged them to use one name for many; and of course to express themselves by comparisons, metaphors, allusions, and all those substituted forms of speech which render language figurative. Next, as the objects with which they were most conversant, were the sensible, material objects around them, names would be given to those objects long before words were invented for signifying the dispositions of the mind, or any sort of moral or intellectual ideas. Hence, the early language of men being entirely made up of words descriptive of sensible objects, it became of necessity extremely metaphorical. For, to signify any desire or passion, or any act or feeling of the mind, they had no precise expression which was appropriated to that purpose, but were under the necessity of painting the emotion or passion which they felt, by allusion to those sensible objects which had most relation to it, and which could render it, in some sort, visible to others. Accordingly, the style of all the most early languages, among nations who are in the first and rude periods of society, is found, without exception,

to be full of figures; hyperbolical and picturesque in a high degree."

"As language in its progress began to grow more copious, it gradually lost that figurative style, which was its early character. When men were furnished with proper and familiar names for every object, both sensible and moral, they were not obliged to use so many circumlocutions. Style became more precise, and of course, more simple. Imagination, too, in proportion as society advanced, had less influence over mankind. The vehement manner of speaking by tones and gestures, began to be disused. The understanding was more exercised; the fancy less. Intercourse among mankind becoming more extensive and frequent, clearness of style, in signifying their meaning to each other, was the chief object of attention. In place of poets, philosophers became the instructors of men; and in their reasonings on all different subjects, introduced that plainer and simpler style of composition which we now call prose. The ancient metaphorical and poetical dress of language was now laid aside from the intercourse of men, and reserved for those occasions only, on which ornamental was professedly studied."

Thus far we have confined our attention to gestic and spoken language; having traced their progress from the time that the former was the prevalent, if not the only language, down to the present time, in which we find it almost lost by being blended with the latter. We will now consider the symbolical and written languages.

"Next to speech, writing is, beyond doubt, the most useful art which men possess. It is plainly an improvement upon speech, and therefore must have been posterior to it in order of time. At first, men thought of nothing more than communicating their thoughts to one another when present, by means of words, or sounds they uttered. Afterwards, they de-

vised this farther method, of mutual communication with one another, when absent, by means of marks or characters presented to the eye, which we call writing. Written characters are of two sorts. They are either signs for things, or signs for words. Of the former sort, signs for things, are the pictures, hieroglyphics, and symbols employed by the ancient nations; of the latter sort, signs for words, are the alphabetical characters now employed by all Europeans. These two kinds of writing are generically and essentially distinct."

"Pictures were, undoubtedly, the first essay towards writing. Imitation is so natural to man, that in all ages, and among all nations, some methods have obtained, of copying or tracing the likeness of sensible objects. Those methods would soon be employed by men for giving some imperfect information to others, at a distance, of what had happened; or for preserving the memory of facts which they sought to record. Thus to signify that one man had killed another, they drew the figure of one man stretched upon the earth, and of another standing by him with a deadly weapon in his hand." We find, in fact, that when America was first discovered, this was the only sort of writing known in the kingdom of Mexico. By historical pictures, the Mexicans are said to have transmitted the memory of the most important transactions of their empire. These, however, must have been extremely imperfect records; and the nations who had no other, must have been very gross and rude. Pictures could do no more than delineate external events. They could neither exhibit the connections of them, nor describe such qualities as were not visible to the eye, nor convey any idea of the dispositions or words of men.

To supply, in some degree, this defect, there arose, in process of time, the invention of what are called hie-

roglyphical characters; which may be considered the second stage of the art of writing. Hieroglyphics consist in certain symbols, which are made to stand for invisible objects, on account of analogy or resemblance which such symbols were supposed to bear to the objects. Thus, an eye, was the hieroglyphical symbol of knowledge; a circle, of eternity, which has neither beginning nor end. Hieroglyphics therefore, were a more refined and extensive species of painting. Pictures delineated the resemblance of external visible objects. Hieroglyphics painted invisible objects by analogies taken from the external world."

"As writing advanced, from pictures of visible objects, to hieroglyphics, or symbols of things invisible; from these latter, it advanced, among some nations, to simple arbitrary marks which stood for objects, though without any resemblance or analogy to the objects signified."

"Of this nature was the method of writing practiced among the Peruvians. They made use of small cords, of different colors; and by knots upon these, of various sizes, and differently ranged, they contrived signs for giving information, and communicating their thoughts to one another. Of this nature also, are the written characters which are used to this day, throughout the great empire of China. The Chinese have no alphabet of letters, or simple sounds, which compose their words. But every single character which they use in writing, is significant of an idea; it is a mark which stands for some one thing or object. By consequence, the number of these characters must be immense. It must correspond to the whole number of objects, or ideas, which they have occasion to express; that is, to the whole number of words which they employ in speech; nay, it must be greater than the number of words; one word, by varying the tone with which it is spoken, may be made to signify several different things. They are said to have seventy thou-

sand of those written characters. To read and write them to perfection, is the study of a whole life ; which subjects learning, among them, to infinite disadvantage, and must have greatly retarded the progress of all science."

"We have one instance of this sort of writing. Our ciphers, as they are called, or arithmetical figures, 1, 2, 3, 4, &c. which we have derived from the Arabians, are significant marks, precisely of the same nature with the Chinese characters. They have no dependence on words ; but each figure denotes an object, denotes the number for which it stands ; and, accordingly, on being presented to the eye, is equally understood by all the nations who have agreed in the use of these ciphers ; by Italians, Spaniards, French and English, however different the languages of these nations are from one another, and whatever different names they give, in their respective languages, to each numerical cipher."

"As far, then, as we have yet advanced, nothing has appeared which resembles our letters, or which can be called writing, in the sense we now give to that term. What we have hitherto seen, were all direct signs for things, and made no use of the medium of sound, or words ; they were either signs by representation, as the Mexican pictures ; or signs by analogy, as the Egyptian hieroglyphics ; or signs by institution, as the Peruvian knots, the Chinese characters, and the Arabian ciphers."

"At length, in different nations, men became sensible of the imperfection, the ambiguity, and the tediousness of each of these methods of communication with one another. They began to consider, that by employing signs which would stand, not directly for things, but for the words which they used in speech for naming these things, a considerable advantage would be gained. For they reflected farther, that though the number of words in every language

is, indeed, very great, yet the number of articulate sounds, which are used in composing these words, is comparatively small. The same simple sounds are continually recurring and repeated; and are combined together, in various ways, for forming all the variety of words which we utter. They bethought themselves, therefore, of inventing signs, not for each word by itself, but for each of these simple sounds which we employ in forming our words; and by joining together a few of these signs, they saw that it would be practicable to express, in writing, the whole combinations of sounds which our words require."

"The first step, in this new progress, was the invention of an alphabet of syllables, which probably preceded the invention of an alphabet of letters, among some of the ancient nations; and which is said to be retained to this day in Ethiopia, and some countries of India. By fixing upon a particular mark or character for every syllable in the language, the number of characters, necessary to be used in writing, was reduced within a much smaller compass than the number of words in a language. Still, however, the number of characters was great; and must have continued to render both reading and writing very laborious arts. Till, at last, some happy genius arose, and tracing the sounds made by the human voice to their most simple elements, reduced them to a very few vowels and consonants; and by affixing to each of these the signs which we now call letters, taught men how, by their combinations, to put in writing all the different words, or combinations of sound which they employed in speech. By being reduced to this simplicity, the art of writing was brought to its highest state of perfection; and in this state, we now enjoy it, with all the countries of Europe.

To whom we are indebted for this sublime and refined discovery, does not appear. Concealed by the

darkness of remote antiquity, the great inventor is deprived of those honors which would be still paid to his memory by all the lovers of knowledge and learning. It appears from the books which Moses has written, that among the Jews, and probably among the Egyptians, letters had been invented prior to his age. The universal tradition among the ancients is, that they were first imported into Greece, by Cadmus the Phenician; who, according to the common system of chronology, was cotemporary with Joshua; according to sir Isaac Newton's system, cotemporary with king David. As the Phenicians are not known to have been the inventors of any art or science, though, by means of their extensive commerce, they propagated the discoveries made by other nations, the most probable and natural account of the origin of alphabetical characters is, that they took rise in Egypt, the first civilized kingdom of which we have any authentic accounts, and the great source of arts and polity among the ancients. In that country, the favorite study of hieroglyphical characters, had directed much attention to the art of writing. Their hieroglyphics are known to have been intermixed with abbreviated symbols, and arbitrary marks; whence, at last, they caught the idea of contriving marks, not for things merely, but for sounds. Accordingly Plato (in *Phaedo*) expressly attributes the invention of letters to Theuth, the Egyptian, who is supposed to have been the *Hermes*, or *Mercury* of the Greeks. Cadmus himself, though he passed from Phenicia to Greece, yet is affirmed by several of the ancients to have been originally of Thebes in Egypt. Most probably Moses carried with him the Egyptian letters, into the land of Canaan; and these being adopted by the Phenicians, who inhabited part of that country, they were transmitted into Greece." "The alphabet which Cadmus brought into Greece, was imperfect, and is

said to have contained only sixteen letters. The rest were afterwards added, according as signs for proper sounds were found to be wanting. It is curious to observe, that the letters which we use at this day, can be traced back to this very alphabet of Cadmus."

"The Roman alphabet, which obtains with us, and with most of the European nations, is plainly formed on the Greek, with a few variations. And all learned men observe, that the Greek characters, especially according to the manner in which they are formed in the oldest inscriptions, have a remarkable conformity with the Hebrew or Samaritan characters, which, it is agreed, are the same with the Phenician, or the alphabet of Cadmus. Invert the Greek characters from left to right, according to the Phenician and Hebrew manner of writing, and they are nearly the same. Besides the conformity of figure, the names or denominations of the letters, alpha, beta, gamma, &c., and the order in which the letters are arranged, in all the several alphabets, Phenician, Hebrew, Greek and Roman, agree so much as amounts to a demonstration, that they were all derived originally from the same source. An invention ^{so} useful and simple was greedily received by mankind, and propagated with speed and facility through many different nations."

"The letters were originally written from the right hand towards the left; that is, in a contrary order to what we now practice. This manner of writing obtained among the Assyrians, Phenicians, Arabians and Hebrews; and from some very old inscriptions appears to have obtained also among the Greeks. Afterwards, the Greeks adopted a new method, writing their lines alternately from the right to the left, and from the left to the right; which was called *Boustrophedon*; or, writing after the manner in which oxen plough the ground. Of this, several specimens still

remain ; particularly, the inscription on the famous Sigeian monument ; and down to the days of Solon, the legislator of Athens, this continued to be the common method of writing. At length, the motion from the left hand to the right being found more natural and commodious, the practice of writing in this direction prevailed throughout all the countries of Europe."

"Writing was long a kind of engraving. Pillars, and tables of stone, were first employed for this purpose, and afterwards, plates of the softer metals, such as lead. In proportion as writing became more common, lighter and more portable substances were employed.

The leaves and bark of certain trees were used in some countries : and in others, tablets of wood, covered with a thin coat of soft wax, on which the impression was made with a stylus of iron. In later times the hides of animals properly prepared and polished into parchment, were the most common materials. Our present method of writing on paper, is an invention of no greater antiquity than the fourteenth century."

Thus, as in the former case, we see the more ancient language, of symbols, gradually giving place to, and finally becoming almost lost in, the modern written language. Gestic language is to spoken, what symbolical is to written. They both are primitive languages, and both in the progress of man's civilization have gradually been merging into a more refined mode of communication. And so far have they become absorbed in the two kinds of language to which they have gradually given place, that, in common nomination they have lost their names ; and all language is now frequently, though improperly, classed under the two generic terms, 'spoken' and 'written.'

As has been said, men in their rudest state were restricted to the meagerness and poverty of the gestic language ; but impelled on in their course of improvement by the demands of necessity, and the ardent

aspirations of immortal mind, they could not long have remained satisfied with so limited means of communication. Inspired and guided by that inventive genius bestowed upon rational creatures, they would not only find means for the improvement of their language then possessed, but would invent and perfect, as their necessities should require, other and more convenient modes of expressing and communicating their thoughts. The progress and improvement of language must ever keep pace with the progress and improvement of society. So that, the state of a nation's language shows the degree of its civilization. The scale of civilization corresponds to the following order of the languages, viz. gestic, spoken, symbolical, and written. Wherever we find written language in its highest state of cultivation, there we find the greatest degree of social refinement. The symbolical language, though less important than the spoken, yet requires a more advanced state of society for its origin. While the gestic and symbolical languages can never be dispensed with entirely, but must ever remain distinct and important modes of communication, the spoken and written languages will be those the most employed, the most useful, and the most cultivated and adorned. And of these each has its peculiar advantages and excellencies.

“ The advantages of writing above speech are, that writing is both the more extensive and a more permanent method of communication. More extensive, as it is not confined within the narrow circle of those who hear our words, but by means of written characters, we can send our thoughts abroad, and propagate them through the world; we can lift our voice so as to speak to the most distant regions of the earth. More permanent also; as it prolongs this voice to the most distant ages; it gives us the means of recording our sentiments to futurity and of perpetuating the instructive memory of past transactions. It likewise af-

fords this advantage to such as read above such as hear, that, having the written characters before their eyes, they can arrest the sense of the writer. They can pause and revolve and compare, at their leisure, one passage with another : whereas, the voice is fugitive and passing ; you must catch the words as they are uttered, or you lose them forever.

But, although the advantages of written languages are so great that speech, without writing, would have been very inadequate for the instruction of mankind ; yet we must not forget to observe, that spoken language has a very great superiority over written language in point of energy and force. The voice of the living speaker, makes an impression on the mind much stronger than can be made by the perusal of any writing. The tones of the voice, the looks and gesture, which accompany discourse, and which no writing can convey, render discourse when it is well managed, infinitely more clear, and more expressive, than the most accurate writing. For tones, looks and gestures, are natural interpreters of the sentiments of the mind. They remove ambiguities ; they enforce impressions ; they operate on us by means of sympathy, which is one of the most powerful means of persuasion. Our sympathy is always awakened more by hearing the speaker, than by reading his works in our closet. Hence, though writing may answer the purposes of mere instruction, yet all the high efforts of eloquence must be made by means of spoken, not of written language."

We have been thus lengthy upon the subject of the 'rise and progress of language,' not only to add interest to the study of grammar, but also to draw attention to the modifications our present language receives from those which have become obsolete in name but not in force.

Having traced language through the progressive

stages of its formation and improvement, we are now prepared to consider the genius or idiom of language in general, and of the English language in particular.

You will, upon observation, find, not only that the gestic and symbolical languages are constantly blending with, and modifying the spoken and written, but that there is a regular gradation in language, from the lowest to the highest qualities. Not only are our numeral figures and algebraic or geometrical signs symbolical; but our commas, semicolons, periods, interrogation and exclamation points, parentheses, asterisks, &c., also are remnants of the same language. Passing upwards from these, we find those signs of emotion, used in exclamatory expressions, such as, O, Ah, Alas! &c. These, too, are symbolical characters; or in other words, symbolical representatives of gestic language. They are characters representing emotion, and for their expressive qualities depend entirely upon the manner of their utterance. They are obviously distinct from spoken or written language in correct acceptation, and hence many grammarians have denied them a place among the 'parts of speech.' But, whatever may be said of them in respect to their nature or importance, they are, notwithstanding, language, and language that is frequently used by persons of weak mind or ardent temperament. Passing from the highest order of these to the lowest order of words proper, the transition is slight, and the division line scarcely perceptible; as, *alas, indeed, aha, avast, avaint, ahoy, halloo, hail, 'oyes' raca, selah, amen, yes, no, never, &c.* And from these, we may still proceed: as, *the, this, thus, so, how, what, that, I, he, it, &c.*, until we arrive at words of the highest order.

Words, as we have said, are founded upon analogy. And so important is this principle, and so universal in its prevalence, that it hardly seems exaggeration to say, analogy is both the base and the superstructure,

the material and the cement of language. This analogy consists in three particulars. First, in the resemblance in sound, of the word, to the object signified; second, in the resemblance to each other, of the objects named; and third, the resemblance in formation and meaning, of one word to another.

At first, words were formed and applied to things upon the analogy of the name to the thing signified; but in the extensive multiplication of ideas, this method became impracticable, and then they were applied upon the analogy of one thing to another; of the thing to be named, to a thing already named. In modern times, words are mostly formed by joining to different bases, some given word or syllable; hence so far as they correspond in structure, they correspond in signification.

I. Of words founded upon the resemblance of the name to the thing named, we have already spoken sufficiently.

II. Words and expressions founded upon the analogy of one thing to another, demand a full and careful consideration. It will furnish us with a key to the genius and nature of language, and open to us its beauties and its defects.

In the progressive formation of words, one word from another, and another from that, and so on, the analogy which at first was obvious, gradually becomes less and less distinct, and finally dies away in vanishing shades; so that the last word in the series may have no resemblance to that from which it originated, though it will undoubtedly be analogous to those immediately preceding it.

Our word candidate, means one who stands to be elected to an office. It is derived from the Latin, *candidatus*, having the same meaning, and that from *candidus*, meaning 'shining white.' But candidate has not, in meaning, a particle of analogy to *candidus*. Candidate is taken directly from *candidatus*, and applied to precisely the same thing, but from an

entirely different reason. *Candidatus* was applied to one seeking an office, *because* in Rome, those who sought preferment wore a *white* robe, made *shining* by the art of the fuller, as a *signal that they were solicitous of office*. Hence the name and strong the analogy.

Again, our word 'sincere' comes from the Latin 'sincerus,' and that from 'sine,' without, and 'cera,' wax. But what has 'without wax,' to do with sincerity? Not the least. But 'cera' was wax that they used for making wax-figures, and painting their persons. Now, a wax-figure is not a genuine person, but a counterfeit; and painting is a deception. Therefore 'sine' 'cera,' or sincerus, means, '*without deception*;' precisely what our word sincere means.

A person is 'candid,' who receives with unbiased mind whatever may be communicated to him; a person is 'open,' who makes known the secrets of his heart, or tells his whole mind without reserve; a person is 'sincere,' who uses no deception. These terms are applied to persons from analogy. 'Sincere,' from the cause mentioned above; 'open,' probably from allusion to a mansion with its doors thrown open so that any one may readily enter and view the whole interior; 'candid,' in allusion, probably, to clear white paper or surface, whereon you may inscribe whatever you please without its being obscured by pre-existing marks.

Language contains multitudes of words, of which the above will serve as specimens. It abounds in such expressions as the following; a *clear* head, a *sound* judgment, a *penetrating* mind, a *whole* soul, a *hard* heart, 'white as snow,' 'dark as Egypt,' &c.

The delicacy of analogical expressions and terms, depends upon the refinement of mind of those who originate and use them. Persons, in the rude states of society, or of rude, uncultivated minds, will make coarse, vulgar comparisons.

Meat that is raw, uncooked, is unpalatable, unfit

for use ; vegetables, that are green and growing, are full of juice and sap ; hence, by comparison, young persons that display awkwardness, immaturity and inexperience, are called ‘raw,’ ‘green,’ ‘sappy,’ &c.

But such expressions are called vulgar ; and why vulgar ? Because they are not used by persons of refined taste. The very term ‘vulgar’ explains itself when we know the analogy upon which it is founded. It is from the Latin ‘vulgus,’ meaning the rabble, the common people, the uneducated. Wellerisms and many proverbs are but vulgar comparisons : as ‘what is one man’s meat, is another man’s poison.’ ‘Every one to their liking, as the old woman said when she kissed her cow.’ Such should by all means be avoided.

But analogical comparisons may be obvious, yet chaste ; distinct, yet delicate ; and when such, especially if prolonged, they are called ‘figures of speech,’ and constitute one of the highest beauties of language.

A recent writer, having shown that the preservation of science through the dark ages, was owing to christianity, says, “Thus, the flickering and almost extinguished light of science was kept alive until the dawning of a better day. And even at a later period, when the vital spark of piety had departed, and the inanimate form of Christianity was discovered by the Reformation, she was found, with maternal solicitude, clasping to her lifeless bosom, this first born offspring of her fondest affection.” Nothing could be more expressive and beautiful. The comparison of science in those days of darkness, to a lamp in the shades of night, which, with difficulty, is kept burning until day dawn, is striking and elegant. But when it is compared to an infant child lingering upon the verge of death, and Christianity is represented as a fond mother watching over it, with all the strength of maternal feeling, until her own frame is exhausted by anxious care, yet even then, rather than relinquish her fond

offspring, she stills holds it clasped in her dying embrace, we feel a beauty in the simile, which words cannot express.

The event of 'sunset,' when the evening star alone is seen above the horizon, is, by W. G. Clark, thus beautifully expressed :

"Then sundown
Hung her curtain round,
And pinned it with a single star."

And Morning, by Thompson, thus :

"The meek eyed morn appears, mother of dews,
At first faint glimmering in the dappled east ;
Till, far o'er ether spreads the widening glow ;
And from before the lustre of her face,
White break the clouds away. With quickened step,
Brown night retires ; young day pours in apace,
And opens all the lawny prospects wide.
The dripping rock, the mountain's misty top,
Swell on the sight, and brighten with the dawn."

Analogical figures are the essence of poetry, and the spice of prose.

"As the tempest brings calm, as the hoar frost that springs,
As the dawning disperses in day,
So the sun and the shade of vicissitude, flings
A beautiful light on our way.
Life's briar and roses—its gladness and gloom,
Do they vanish together? Oh, no !
The *flowrets* we pluck, and condense their perfume,
The *weeds*, to the desert we throw.
Like the bee, thoughts fly o'er the field of the past,
Finding sweets wheresoever they roam !
They wander through sunshine and storm, and at last
Stow naught but the honey at home."

JOHN BOWRING, Esq.

"Then the earth shook and trembled ; the foundations also of the hills moved and were shaken, because he was wroth. There went up a smoke out of his nostrils, and fire out of his mouth devoured ; coals were kindled by it. He bowed the heavens also, and came down : and darkness was under his

feet. And he rode upon a cherub and did fly; yea he did fly upon the wings of the wind. He made darkness his secret place: his pavilion round about him were dark waters and thick clouds of the skies. At the brightness that was before him, his thick clouds passed, hailstones and coals of fire. The Lord also thundered in the heavens, and the Highest gave his voice; hailstones and coals of fire. Yea he sent out his arrows, and scattered them; and he shot out lightnings and discomfited them. Then the channels of waters were seen, and the foundations of the world were discovered, at thy rebuke, O LORD, at the blast of the breath of thy nostrils." Ps. 18.

"But if no danger is to be apprehended while the thunder of heaven rolls at a distance, believe me, when it collects over our heads, we may be fatally convinced, that a well-spent life is the only conductor that can avert the bolt." KIRWAN.

But we shall treat of figurative language more fully in the sequel.

Owing to analogy, the same word or phrase comes to mean several different things, and those too, which have no resemblance: and this constitutes an important idiom of language.

We say a certain color is *green*; we call corn and other vegetables when not ripe, *green*; we call an awkward, inexperienced person *green*; and we say paint that is not dry, is *green*, &c. Now a paint that is green, and a green paint, that is, a paint that is not dry, and a paint of a green color, have no resemblance; nor is a person that is green analogous to a green color; nor need green corn be of a green color, any more than ripe corn; for the kernel is scarce ever of a green color, whether ripe or green. But plants that are juicy or succulent, are usually of a green color; and when they become ripe and dry, the color often changes; hence green often means, moist, succulent, without having any reference to its proper signification of color. Accordingly we find that some green plants are white, or brown, or red; and so of other things. Hence you see that the same term is applied to different things which are

analogous, but the analogy may not, and often does not, consist in the particular quality indicated by the name, but in something usually found in connection; as in most of the above cases, the resemblance is not in the quality, color, but in the attendant circumstance of succulency. When the quality named is usually connected with *several* attendant circumstances, the analogous things to which the same term is applied, may be exceedingly numerous and very various. For, one thing may take the name from its resemblance to one of the attendant circumstances, and another from another, and so on. There are numerous cases to illustrate this, but I will mention only one.

Mouth is the aperture in the head of an animal, between the lips, by which he utters his voice, and receives his food. From resemblance in form, the entrance or opening of a cavern, well, or vessel, is called its mouth; and because the mouth of a vessel, is that by which its contents are discharged, so the part of a river, where its waters are discharged, is called its mouth. And as the mouth is the instrument by which we speak, so a person acting as spokesman for others, is called their mouth, (Ex. 4: 16.) The term is also put for a person; as 'The mouth of the just, bringeth forth wisdom.' 'The mouth of the foolish, is near destruction.' 'Out of the abundance of the heart, the mouth speaketh.' It is also used for the words uttered, (Job 19: 16,) and for the particular things spoken; viz. for testimony; Deut. 17: 6, 7; for desires, necessities, Ps. 103: 5; for force of argument, Luke 21: 15; for boasting, vaunting, Judges 9: 28; and for reproaches, calumnies, Job 5: 15, 16. *To mouth*, means to utter with a voice affectedly big or swelling; *to make mouths*, to distort the mouth; and hence, to pout, to deride or treat disdainfully. *To shut the mouth* is to close it, or to keep silent. *To stop the mouth* signifies to confound, silence, put

to shame. *To open not the mouth* is not to speak. (Is. 53 : 7.) And *to open the mouth wide* signifies to ask great blessings, &c. &c.

When a stone or other hard body has a jagged, uneven surface, we call it *rough* ; and when the surface of water is uneven, we call it *rough* ; and when a voice is loud and harsh, we say it is a *rough* voice ; and we say that a person who is rude and coarse in his behavior, is *rough* in manners. Now, wherein is the analogy of these things ? The term probably was first applied to a hard, uneven, substance as a stone. Now if you look at a stone, it *looks* rough, and if you draw your hand across it, it *feels* rough. So if you look at water when it is agitated, it *looks* rough, but if you feel of it, it does not *feel* rough ; yet we call it rough, because it resembles the stone in *looks*. Again, when we draw our hand across a rough body like a stone, it produces an unpleasant sensation ; so if a person speaks to us, in a harsh voice, or behaves towards us in a rude, coarse manner, it makes us *feel* unpleasantly. Hence, a voice or manner is called *rough*, because, like the stone, it produces an unpleasant *feeling*. But you will see that there is no resemblance between rough manners or voice, and rough water. For if one looks rough, the other does not ; and if the one produces a rough feeling, the other does not. To be analogous, they both should look alike, or both should produce upon us, a similar feeling.

And here, I am led to remark that, “ we derive our knowledge of the external universe, from our senses ; hence, by marshalling under each of our five senses all the information that the sense reveals to us, our knowledge of the external universe becomes divided into five classes. Every information that is revealed to us by hearing, is called a sound ; every information that is revealed to us by seeing, a sight ; every information that is revealed to us by feeling, a feel ; every

information that is revealed to us by smelling, a smell ; every information that is revealed to us by tasting, a taste.”*

Some things are known to us as sights only : as a rainbow, the sun, moon, stars, &c. ; some only as feels : as air, wind, cold, heat, &c. But usually our knowledge of a thing is obtained by means of two or more of our senses : as, for instance, *glass*, we can see it, we can feel it ; but we cannot smell it, nor taste it, nor hear it. The term *glass*, therefore, names only a sight and a feel. The same may be said of gold, silver, marble, quartz, &c. Flour, salt, water, &c. we can see, feel, and taste, but cannot hear or smell them ; therefore they are names of a sight, a feel, and a taste. Again, we can see, feel, taste, and smell an orange, an apple, tobacco, cheese, bread, &c. but can gain no knowledge of them, by the sense of hearing ; these, therefore, are names of a sight, a feel, a taste, and a smell.

These facts, which we shall have occasion to use as we proceed, have been mentioned here, that you may be better enabled to detect the point wherein the analogy of particular things consists. For, two or more things may be analogous in respect to sight only ; or in respect to feel, or taste, or smell alone ; or they may be analogous in respect to two or more of these, at the same time, either separately or combined. In the case of roughness, mentioned above, the stone is an object of feel and of sight ; the water is also an object of feel and sight, but the two are analogous in sight only. But suppose the water to be frozen in its rough state, the two would then be analogous in both sight and feel ; that is, they both would look rough, and feel rough. They may, notwithstanding, differ very essentially in other respects. The question is not whether the two things are alike

* A. B. Johnson's Essay on Language.

throughout, but whether they agree in that single point, so that we may with propriety apply the term rough to both. And we find that they do.

“Water is fluid, air is fluid, quicksilver, light, blood, electricity, lightning, ether, magnetism, fused iron are all fluid. The word is correctly applied, for they possess the homogeneity which justifies the application to them, of the word fluid.”

“A thought strikes my mind, a project strikes my imagination, a sound strikes my ear, a light strikes my eye, an odor strikes my olfactory nerves, a stone strikes my hand, the wind strikes my face, lightning strikes a house, a hat strikes my fancy, a pain strikes my shoulder. These are only a few instances of the word, strike. We discover in the objects referred to, a sufficient conformity to make the word strike appropriate to them all.”

Again, “a thread passes through the eye of a needle, a bullet passes through a board, light and colors pass through solid crystal, sound passes through a block of stone, electricity passes through a bar of iron, a thought passes through the mind, a pain passes through our head, a bird passes through the air, and perspiration passes through the pores of your hand. These expressions refer to diverse existences, yet they possess a sufficient analogy or homogeneity to make the phrase, ‘pass through,’ applicable to them all.”

“My hand is in my glove, the moon is in the sky, hardness is in iron, heat is in the fire, sweetness is in sugar, color is in grass. The word *in* is employed differently in each of the above cases. When I say my hand is in my glove, the ‘in’ names a feel; when I say the moon is in the sky, the ‘in’ names a sight; and when I say, heat is in the fire, the ‘in’ names a feel, which is different from the feel to which I refer when I say my hand is in my glove.”

“A perfect language should, perhaps, not use one

word, to express so many different sensible revelations. It should possess a different word for each. Such, however, is not the nature of our language. We apply a word to numerous cases which we deem homogeneous or analogous." And, indeed, this may be considered, upon the whole, an excellence rather than a defect. Imperfect beings as we are, a perfect language would not be so well adapted to our use as that which we now enjoy. A language founded upon analogy, is more brief and more expressive, though less precise, than one founded upon arbitrary principles. And, in a vehicle of communication, for common use, brevity and expressiveness are the highest points of excellence; and it is only in nice subtle disquisitions, that we require the precision of arbitrary signs. Hence, language would be based upon analogy for the reason that it would be better adapted to the wants and capacity of those forming and using it. For mankind have ever found it easier to communicate a new truth, by comparing it to something already known, than by inventing for it a new term, which itself would require an explanation. And further; we have but one means of acquiring new truths, and we have but one means of communicating them. We can acquire them, only by *experience*, that is, by consciousness, or one of the five senses mentioned above; and we can communicate them, only by *analogy*. For instance, a blind person can obtain no idea of color; because color is an object of sight, and a blind person being destitute of the sense of seeing, cannot obtain a knowledge of what is known only by that sense.* A person destitute of the sense of feeling, if we may suppose such, could never know any thing about cold, or heat, or pain, because they are names of feels, and can be known only

* 'A blind person being asked what idea he had of the color *violet*, said he thought it resembled the sound of a bugle.'

through the sense of feeling. We know nothing about what thinking is, except from our own consciousness. On the other hand, let a person be in the full possession of all his faculties, we should find it impossible, except by analogy, to impart to him a knowledge of that of which he had no experience. For instance, if a person never had tasted salt, you could not convey to him any idea of the taste, for there is nothing to which you could compare it that would give any conception of it. You might weary yourself in saying that it was saline, or brackish, or this, or that, but to him it would all amount to this, 'salt is salt.' So of any thing else. But if he had tasted salt, and you then should tell him that sea-water was salt, he would at once have an idea of its taste, though he never had tasted it.

Hence, you see, language is of *necessity* founded upon analogy. That language, in consequence of this principle, is more brief and expressive, you will easily perceive.

When we say, "Washington was the *father* of his country," we, by this brief sentence, convey that which pages, and even volumes of other words cannot express. All a father's love, providence, and watchful care rises up to our minds, instantaneously, upon its mention. Or, if we say, 'Arnold was a Judas,' instantly, we conceive of all the treachery, cupidity and baseness of the ancient traitor.

But not to multiply instances, I will refer you back to the case cited from Pres. Wayland, for an illustration of expressiveness; and for brevity, to what was said respecting 'in,' 'strike,' 'fluid,' 'pass through,' simply adding that, was it not for the use of analogy, we should be obliged to apply a distinct and arbitrary name to every different taste, every different sight, every different feel, every different smell, every different sound, and every different consciousness; which I need not say would be impossible. Thus

you may perceive that our language, though it has some defects, is in the main, the best possible.

The chief defect in an analogical language, is indefiniteness, want of precision. The indefiniteness arises from the analogy of the objects named not being clearly understood, or, rather, from that which constitutes the analogy being liable to be combined with connected circumstances that form no part of the analogy.

If we say, two and two make four, or four times four are sixteen, or that the whole of a thing is greater than a part, or that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, it is impossible to mistake our meaning; for there is nothing with which the simple idea conveyed by the language can be associated so as to produce confusion. But if a person acquainted with the phrase, 'pass through,' only as applied to a thread's passing through the eye of a needle, or a bullet's passing through a board, should be told that light and colors pass through solid crystal, he would conceive that the crystal was perforated, like the needle, or that, like the bullet, light and colors made a passage for themselves, in passing through. And from the mistake into which his associations had led him in regard to the meaning of pass through, he would, upon being shown a piece of crystal through which light was said to have passed, deny the fact, saying that there was no *hole* through which it could have passed.

Again, if he was acquainted with the term 'fluid', only as applied to water, and should be informed that magnetism was a fluid, he would at once imagine that magnetism was in appearance similar to water; and if you proceeded further, explaining to him the properties of magnetism, first, he would be confused and utterly at a loss to comprehend you, and next, he would positively deny that it was a fluid. And this, because he did not understand fully the property which

constitutes fluidity, and from not abstracting it from the attendant circumstances with which he had been accustomed to find it connected.

So, again, if a person knowing the term 'green,' only in its proper signification, as the name of a color, should be told that varnish just put on was green, he would deny it, and warmly engage in refuting so preposterous a statement. And both parties after having tried zealously, but in vain, to convince the other of the falsity of his position, would, undoubtedly, separate in a passion. And this is precisely the case with a greater portion of the controversies that afflict the world and disgrace the disputants.

In entering upon an argument, the first thing to be done, is to settle the meaning of terms; to determine whether a word is to be used in its abstract, or in its analogical sense; and if in the analogical, to point out to what particular thing, it is to be considered analogous; and not only show the points wherein it agrees, but wherein it differs from the said thing. If persons would thus be careful to understand what they were going to dispute about, in nine cases out of ten, by the time the terms were settled, the controversy would be at an end. For in matters of fact, if persons can agree as to the meaning of terms, they will agree as to the rest.

The ambiguity of language is very extensive, and we shall have occasion from time to time as we proceed, to further point it out.

III. The third order of analogy in language is, we have said, the analogy of one word to another in structure and meaning.

The words in modern languages, and especially the English, are mostly composed of two or more ancient words blended together in form, but each retaining its distinct signification. Hence, so far as they are analogous in syllabic formation, they are analogous in signification. A few examples only will be necessary, for illustration.

Such words as wooden, golden, linen, woollen, brazen, &c. have a like termination of *en* and a like signification of *made of, composed of*. Those words that have the like termination *ive*, have the like signification of *ability, power to do, or doing*; as, creative, executive, legislative, indicative, &c. Another sort of words, terminating in *ful* or *ous*, alike denote *abundance*; as plentiful, bountiful, merciful, bounteous, ponderous, silicious, &c. And so other words that have a correspondent syllable, whether at the beginning, middle or end, have a signification, in so far, correspondent. This analogy, however, does not always hold, for owing to the carelessness of writers, it has been exceedingly perverted, much to the injury of language. But, where the component parts of words are longer, the analogy is more obvious, and the signification *invariably* correspondent: as geology, astrology, zoology, geography, biography, cosmography, barometer, thermometer, gaseometer, ærostatics, pneumatics, hydrostatics, &c. &c.

We come now to treat more particularly, of the meaning or import of words, and the manner of their use.

But first, we will again revert to the influence which natural language has upon them. Tones and inflections of voice, are not, as many suppose, properties of spoken, or written language, but belong to the gestic; for they existed before words were, and are common to brutes that have no words. Now, a little observation will show you, that a great part of the expressiveness and meaning of words, depend upon the tone and inflection of voice with which they are uttered. For instance, if we utter the monosyllable *no*, without emotion, it has its proper signification of negation. But we may utter it so as to ask a question; or by looks and tone of voice we may make it, equivalent to a positive command. In like manner, and with like ease, we may turn it into an humble supplication,

or convert it into a mark of surprise. And thus we may do with any word in our language.* In confirmation of this, I may appeal to your own observation and experience, or refer you to what has been said respecting the Chinese. And if you think that is not sufficient, turn to the introductory chapter of some work on the 'art of reading,' and count the different ways in which the simple question, "Do you ride to town to day?" is asked. Or, better, observe for a time, the varied accents, the significant motions, and expressive looks which persons in conversation employ; witness the difference in effect, of the same word when coming from the lips of a lifeless drone, and when uttered by some energetic spirit; see, if the meaning of a word is the same when accompanied by a look of withering scorn, as when attended with a placid smile! But if you still doubt, ask some Walpole who has sat under the sarcasm of a Pitt, or felt the thunder-bolts of a Brougham.

But to return. It is a truism, to say that words mean that for which they stand; but it leads us directly to the question, for what do they stand?

Suppose a person unacquainted with words, wished to communicate to his companions the fact respecting two men who were a little distant, that one of them had struck the other. He would first adopt some means to gain attention, then point to the man who struck,

Various significations of 'Pooh!'—'Pooh!' said Lady Delmour, turning away her head. Now, that pooh is a very significant word. On the lips of a man of business it denotes contempt for romance; on the lips of a politician, it rebukes a theory. With that monosyllable a philosopher massacres a fallacy; by those four letters a rich man gets rid of a beggar. But in the rosy mouth of a woman, the harshness vanishes, the disdain becomes encouragement. 'Pooh!' says the lady, when you tell her she is handsome; but she smiles when she says it. With the same reply she receives your protestation of love, and blushes as she receives. With men it is the sternest, with woman the softest exclamation in the language.

Bulwer's Godolphin.

then imitate the action of striking, and then point to the man who was struck. Now here are three or four several particulars, each of which, upon the formation of words, would require to be indicated; the pointing, the action, the persons concerned in the action, and perhaps the means the man employed to fix attention.

As men would naturally form words, first, to represent those things, the most necessary to be represented, and after that, those the most easy to be represented, we may reasonably conclude that words would first be formed to name objects, next, to name actions connected with those objects, next, to represent or correspond to pointing, and lastly, when necessary, to perform the office of gaining the attention. For, in the above case, which in this respect may be considered the representative of all other cases, if the men were out of sight, the communicator would be unable to make his fact known, unless he had some means of designating them; but he could imitate the act of striking, as well when the men were absent, as when present, and thus be able to succeed, if he had a word or words to signify the men only. Consequently his first word, whatever it may be, would be equivalent to our word, *man*. His next word would be equivalent to our word, *struck*. He then would have a sign for the objects, and a sign for the action connected with them: as 'Man struck man.' As the objects in this case are alike, one sign, 'man,' answers for both; but if they were different things, as man and a horse, two signs would be required instead of one, yet the case would not be otherwise altered. Hence, for illustration, we may substitute names or signs of other objects and other actions; as Man shot bird, Man killed snake, Dog bit horse, &c.

Though these expressions appear so naked and simple, and sound to our ears so strange, that, to some, it may seem the result of imagination merely, to assert that this was ever a current mode of expres-

sion, yet we know that it was so, or at least, that it is so at the present day, among rude, ignorant people.

Next in the order of formation, would be words to supply the place of pointing. Several analogous things having one name appropriated to them in common, it would be necessary, when speaking of any one in particular, to have some means of pointing it out. If the objects spoken of were in sight, the act of pointing would be sufficient; but when they were not, words would have to be invented for the purpose.

Words correspond to pointing, either directly or indirectly. Of the former, are such as, *the, this, that, there, they, he, she, it, I, so, such, &c.* Of the latter, are words descriptive of the objects, to which, they are applied; such as, *large, small, round, square, short, long, white, red, black, green, heavy, hollow, and the like.* Words of this kind correspond to pointing, inasmuch as they serve to designate the particular thing spoken of. Words representative of actions, are more easily formed than those to perform the part of pointing. The reason is, the latter require greater discrimination and effort of the mind than the former. We can name things without having much, if any understanding of their nature. We can call a certain thing a stone, or a tree, without knowing scarce any of its properties or qualities; but to point out some particular stone, or tree, we must use a term that will distinguish it from others. But for that, it is indispensable that we have a knowledge of the properties and qualities, not of that individual only, but of many others. An oak tree differs manifestly from an elm, and an elm from a pine, and a pine from a poplar, yet it would require a long process of observation, abstraction and comparison, before the terms oak, elm, pine, &c. could come to be applied. It is easy to call certain things stones, but before we can call some *hard* stones, and others *soft* stones, we must first know what constitutes hardness

and softness, a thing which is very difficult. It is perfectly easy and natural to say, water roars, flies buzz, sheep bleat, but, to point out a particular sheep or fly, is a thing so difficult that, no single word in language, will do it. To say, green fly, brown fly, large fly, does not accomplish the purpose; or to say, this fly, or that fly, is equally vain, unless we, at the same time, perform the act of pointing.

It may seem a little remarkable that though we have words that correspond to pointing, yet we have none that are equivalent to it. Pointing determines definitely what person or thing is meant; but if we say, *the* man, or *this* man, or *that* man, it is not known any more precisely, what man is meant, than if we say simply *man*. In all cases, when we use the words which most nearly correspond to pointing, such as, the, this, that, he, she, it, &c. we likewise have to perform the act of pointing, unless some thing previously said or subsequently added, determines the particular thing referred to. ‘*That man*’; what man is meant may be determined by looking or pointing towards him, or by something previously said; or words may be added expressly for the purpose: as ‘*That man with a blue coat*’; or if more words should be necessary, ‘*That man with a blue coat and drab hat*.’ If that even did not distinguish the individual from others, still more words would be necessary, ‘*That tall man dark complexion, with a blue coat, drab hat and white handkerchief on*.’

Open almost any book, in any place, and you may see the truth of the above, exemplified.

“*That* writer would deserve the fame of a public benefactor,” (what writer?) “who could exhibit the character of Hamilton, with the truth and force that all who intimately knew him conceived it.”

“Yes, Athenians, I repeat *it*” (what?) “you, yourselves are the contrivers of your own ruin.”

“*They* came to *the* highlands.” Who came? and what highlands?

Words which correspond to pointing form a very numerous, and notwithstanding the above apparent defect, a very important class of words.

With respect to words invented to perform the office of gaining attention, it may be said that, few if any are formed expressly for that use, because they are not necessary; other words or other means being used for that purpose. Frequently no special means are necessary; and when there is, the most common method is to address the person by name. Yet there are a few words that appear to be of this character; as *o'yes, hear, hail, halloo, ahoy, &c.*

It has, without doubt, already been observed, that words, in their use, are of two kinds, *significative* and *definitive*.

Significative words are such as signify a certain thing independently of any thing else. Definitive words refer to some particular thing, for the purpose of pointing it out, or making known some circumstance respecting it. Of the former kind, first, are names of *objects*. 'A four legged animal with split hoofs, covered with wool, and chewing the cud,' is called a *sheep*; which name is always significant of such an animal. A large plant having a firm woody stem springing from woody roots and spreading above into branches which terminate in leaves, is called a *tree*; and this name is always significant of a like thing. A large stream of water, flowing from the highlands to the ocean, is named a *river*; and this term, likewise, always signifies a similar thing. And so all names are significant of the object to which they are applied, insomuch that, whenever the name is mentioned, the object signified is known without entering into a detail of its distinctive properties.

Second, the names of *actions* are significative. *To love* signifies to exercise a certain affection; *to hate*, a

contrary affection. *To kill* means, to deprive of life, and the term always signifies the same, by whatever agent, or with whatever instrument, the act may be performed. So all names of actions, like names of objects, are always significant of a certain thing, independently of anything else.

But definitive words, instead of directing the mind to that for which they stand, transfer their signification to something else, for the purpose of designation. If we mention the names, sheep, tree, or river, the name, at once, suggests to us the kind, or general characteristics of the object intended; but it does not make known any particulars respecting it. It may be a *white* or *black* sheep; a *horned* or *hornless* sheep; it may be an *oak* an *elm* a *pine* or a *chestnut* tree; it may be a *large* or *small* tree, *tall* or *low*, &c. A river may be *long* or *short*, *deep* or *shallow*, *navigable* or *fordable*. We may love or hate *ardently*, *intensely*, *moderately*, *slightly*, *wisely*, or *rashly*, &c. The words in italic, and such like, are employed to define the particulars of that to which they refer. They usually refer as above, to names of objects or actions.

The significative words are sometimes distinguished by the term *primary*, and the definitive, by *secondary*, in allusion to their relative importance and order of formation.

To prevent mistake, it may be proper to remark, that definitive words often are significative; as *white* and *black*, above, signify a certain quality we call color; *horned*, *oak*, *short*, &c. signify a certain property; *navigable* and *fordable*, a certain state or condition; *ardently*, *intensely*, &c. degree or manner.

But, it will be borne in mind, that we were speaking of the *use* of words. And we have seen that, while some words are significative only, others, though they are significative, yet their use is to refer or transfer their signification to something else for the purpose of designation, hence are definitive.

In speaking of words, we have considered them as of three kinds only; names of objects, names of actions, and words to supply the place of pointing, that is, definitive words. These indeed are the three grand divisions. But there are a few words which originally were used purely as definitive, but have now become, in customary use, significative. Such are *I, we, they, thou, he, her, it, &c.* As they are of a peculiar nature, and very important, they are separated into a class by themselves.

Again, there are other words, such as *to, at, of, by, with, &c.* which were formerly of those classes, but have at length become appropriated to a distinct and peculiar use, hence constitute a class by themselves, making five classes; and to these may be added, those words used in exclamatory expressions; making in all, six classes of words, as we shall see when we come to the subject of classification.

Words in respect to their impartation of meaning, are *emissive* or *transmissive*. A thing is emissive when it sends forth something from within itself; and transmissive when it permits something extraneous to pass through it. The sun, or a lamp, or a fire *emits* light and heat; glass *transmits* them. In the former, light and heat come from the things themselves as the source; but in the latter, they come not from the glass, but from some other body.

In like manner, some words send forth a meaning which comes from them as the source, while others only permit the meaning coming from other words, to pass through them. Such words as *man, house, mountain, well, ill, black, happy, calmly, roughly, &c.* have an inherent meaning which they emit or impart. But such as *the, this, these, those, so, as, such, who, which, it, &c.* have no *inherent* meaning, they merely transmit the meaning of other words. It may be asked, what is the use of words that have no meaning? The question may, with equal propriety, be asked,

what is the use of glass that does not impart light but only transmits it? But glass is an exceedingly useful article, and relatively, transmissive words are equally useful.

But if glass cannot emit heat, it can create it; for, if it is of a certain construction, it will concentrate the rays of the sun, and cause an intense heat, where otherwise there would be only moderate warmth. So, transmissive words, though, of themselves, they have no meaning, yet they have the power of concentrating to a focus the meaning of many other words, and pouring it, with increased effect, upon some single object. Thus—"The clear conception, out-running the deductions of logic, the high purpose, the firm resolve, the dauntless spirit speaking on the tongue, beaming from the eye, informing every feature and urging the whole man onward, right onward, to his object, *this, this* is eloquence; or rather it is something greater and higher than all eloquence—it is action, noble, sublime, god-like action."—WEBSTER. In this sentence, the *this* concentrates the force of all the preceding words, and pours it upon *eloquence*.

"It is not fit that the land of the Pilgrims should bear the shame longer" (of the slave traffic). "I hear the sound of the hammer, I see the smoke of the furnaces, where manacles and fetters are still forged for human limbs. I see the visages of those who, by stealth and at midnight, labor in this work of hell, foul and dark as may become the artificers of such instruments of misery and torture. Let *that* spot be purified, or let it cease to be New England."—WEBSTER. The force of all the preceding words is brought to a focus upon *spot*, by the concentrative power of *that*.

A common burning-glass, by converging the rays of the *sun*, will set wood on fire; but by converging the rays from a *lamp* or a *fire*, will produce no perceptible effect. The effect depends upon the power of that

which is transmitted, and not upon the lens. So the effect of transmissive words, depends upon the power of those whose force is transfused into them. In the above extracts, there are many transmissive words besides *this* and *that*; but their effect is comparatively, mild. In the last one, beginning at the parenthesis they stand in the following order; I, the, the, I, the, the, where, I, the, those, who, this, as, the, such, that, it. Some having more, and some less effect. In the following sentence, ‘Solomon built the temple,’ the effect of *the* is very slight. But when the prophet Nathan came to David, and told him of an enormous and inhuman transaction that had occurred, and by artful narration had wrought up his feelings to the highest pitch of abhorrence and detestation of the deed, when he brought all its aggravations to a focus by ‘Thou art *the* man,’ David withered under its scorching stroke.*

“In heaven there is nothing that defileth, or is unclean. All *that* remains without.” *Baxter*. “For God *so* loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him, should not perish, but have everlasting life.” The importance of the truth conveyed through *so*, is *infinite*; and can never be fully comprehended, until our undying souls have entered eternity.

We come now to notice some other particulars in language.

ELLIPTICAL LANGUAGE. { Language was instituted as a vehicle for the interchange of thoughts and feelings. Growing out of necessity, and having its origin in nature, we naturally and not in vain, expect to find it wisely adapted to the end designed. In a medium for communication, the two main points to be consulted are *precision* and *brevity*.

* See remarks on the ‘Article,’ in the Preface.

The first thing is to make our thoughts known ; the next is to do it in the most concise manner possible. And when we look at our language as it is, we cannot but be impressed with the prominence of these traits. Of precision, it is not our purpose, at present, to speak. Brevity, as involved in elliptical language, will be briefly considered.

It being the dictate both of necessity and nature, to use no more words than are absolutely necessary to express clearly what we wish, we, therefore, find that when any connected or collateral circumstance or means serves to make known the intended meaning, those words which otherwise would be necessary, are universally omitted. In such cases, the language is said to be *elliptical*, and the omission is called an *ellipse*.

"That same day, three thousand () were added to the Lord." There being no danger of mistake, the word persons, is omitted, for the sake of brevity.

"Some () were in favor of one thing and some () of another ()." If this was written out in full, it would be, Some of the persons were in favor of one thing, and some of the persons were in favor of another thing.

All the tedious labor and unpleasant monotony arising from the insertion of needless words, is, by ellipsis, entirely avoided without any inconvenience. The titles of books, chapters, subjects, &c. are elliptical expressions usually stripped of every thing but the simple name ; yet they are readily understood, without the verbose insertion of words, which the mind supplies for itself, with the quickness of instantaneous thought. 'For sale here.' This sentence, when taken by itself, is completely senseless ; but when written upon a block of anthracite coal lying by the side of a store, or written beneath an advertisement tacked upon the wall, becomes perfectly intelligible and very expressive. The connected circumstances suggest at once, its meaning and application.

“The power of delicacy, is chiefly seen in discerning the true merit of a work ; the power of correctness (is chiefly seen) in rejecting false merit.”

“Delicacy leans more (than correctness does) to feeling ; correctness (leans) more (than delicacy does) to reason and judgment.”

“The Lord reigneth, let the earth rejoice.” The Lord reigneth, *therefore* let the earth rejoice ; or let the earth rejoice, *because* the Lord reigneth.

“Ask the hero, ask the statesman, whose wisdom you have been accustomed to revere, and he will tell you.” Who is meant by ‘the hero,’ ‘the statesman,’ and to whom the ‘you,’ refers, and what it is ‘he will tell you,’ is not made known by the sentence, nor, indeed, is it told by the words of the whole discourse ; yet the mind, by referring back and forth to different parts, and taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was spoken, gathers the true meaning without difficulty, and the whole operation is instantaneously performed.

There is scarcely a sentence in language, but what is elliptical, or that is not modified and explained by others with which it is in connection. The mind is constantly referring back and forward, to this, and to that, collecting, comparing, and combining ; and it needs not but brief hints, to enable it to catch the whole truth.

It is no part of words to make known that which the mind can obtain without. To express by words what the mind can supply for itself, is like getting out of a rail-road car to go a-foot, because you are in a hurry. Yet for our bodies to be always borne ‘on the wings of the red-hot wind ;’ ‘driven on by heated air,’ will not answer many of the purposes of life, to accomplish which,

“We’re doomed *on foot* to go,
Or jog o’er dislocated ways,
A dozen miles a day.”

So, our thoughts are not always permitted to fly with a speed, compared with which, "the tempest itself lags behind," but are obliged to get into verbal go-carts to transport themselves. But thoughts disdain to use their vehicles, words, except when, and so far as they are compelled by the nature of the case; hence originates elliptical language, by which the mind skips along, like an ostrich, half running and half flying. Words arranged in sentences, are not like a continuous pavement, but like stepping stones placed at suitable distances, for the mind in passing, to step from one to another. This leads us to our next particular, viz. *abruptness*.

We had occasion, on a previous page, (54,) to remark the nakedness and apparent stiffness of such expressions, as, Man killed snake, Dog bit horse, &c. But upon analyzing language, and looking at it more closely, it will be perceived that in reality, most of our expressions are as abrupt as those, and that it is custom, principally, which renders them seemingly smooth and flowing. We say, Man eats food; William gathered straw-berries; Thomas carried news-papers; John rides post; It rains, &c. without noticing anything stiff or unpleasant; yet they are as truly so as the others, custom only making the difference.

'A man killed a snake' is thought to be not only a softer, but a more full expression than, man killed snake. But it is neither softer nor more full. There is not a single iota added to the idea of the latter, by the use of *a*. It is true that, by the insertion of *a*, we protract the measure, and render it more accordant with our *dronish spirits* and dull comprehension, but do not render it more harmonious to our *ears*; which will be perceived by laying stress upon the *a*; A man killed *a* snake. It is true, some words are harsh and difficult to utter, on account of the particular combination of their letters, but such exceptions do not apply to the present case, as we are speaking of *abrupt-*

ness rather than *harshness*; and of *thought*, rather than *sound*.

Take the expressions, 'Shoes for sale here,' 'Reward of merit,' 'William rode from New York to Boston.'

An impression too commonly prevails, that these sentences, and their like, contain one idea only, or if they contain different ideas, that the *words* are of *such a nature* as to blend them all in one. But if we analyze them, we shall see that each word contains a distinct idea, and that the different ideas are not blended together by the *words* but by the *mind*. We have said previously that *to*, *at*, *of*, *for*, *from*, &c. are modified words, taken from the three grand divisions; and these sentences will serve to illustrate it.

For means *cause*; by cause, is included motive, purpose, reason. Now, if we substitute *cause* for *for* in the first sentence, we shall get a true insight into its nature. The *here* properly should be transposed: as '*Shoes here cause sale*,' i. e. Shoes are here, the *cause* of their being here, is sale. The sentence has exactly the same meaning, and is as perfect in the one case as the other, but the veil which custom has thrown over the usual form being removed by the change, we see how *abrupt* is the transition from one word to another. The mind goes by hitches or steps; yet familiarity would render it smooth and flowing as the other.

Of means *offspring*, taken in its widest sense; anything that springs or proceeds from another, whether by extraction, abstraction, consequence or result. Making the substitution, in the second sentence, we have, Reward offspring merit. Here are three *names*, embodying three distinct ideas, which may or may not be blended together, just as the mind sees fit. And the case is precisely the same, if we say 'Reward of merit;' except that when we use *of* we *always do* blend

them together ; and this constitutes the only difference between *of* and a *name*.

From means *beginning* ; *to* means *end*. Making the substitution, in the third sentence, we have, William rode beginning New York end Boston. Here the mind is directed first to *William*, the object ; then to what William did, *rode*, the action ; next to the place where he *begun* his ride, *New York* ; and lastly where he *ended* his ride, *Boston*. Nothing is said about the *middle*, because, as a matter of consequence, if there is a beginning and end there must be a middle ; and as it is the *length* of the ride, and not the incidents of it, that concerns the narration, nothing need be said about the middle. For, if in comparing any extended motion, with any known distance, we give the beginning and end, we give the whole distance. If New York is mentioned as the starting point and Boston as the goal, the mind, unavoidably, comprehends the intervening space. Is it said that ‘ William rode beginning New York end Boston ’ is an awkward and senseless expression ?—Its awkwardness arises from our not being accustomed to use those words, in such a connection ; and as to its being senseless, it is as much so and no more than, William rode *from* New York *to* Boston. *From* and *to* differ from *beginning* and *end*, only in so far as that, when the former are used, we always unite the embodied ideas of the associated words, and in the latter we do not. And it is this peculiar use of *for*, *from*, *to*, *at*, *of*, *with*, *by*, &c. that caused their distinction into a separate class. But this familiar use of them does not alter the real nature of the case, but only blinds us to a perception of it. And although from custom, the words in the sentence, William rode from New York to Boston *seem* to flow together, there is, in *reality*, as great discretion, and as abrupt transition of the ideas as in the sentence, William rode beginning New York end Boston. In no case, have *words* the power of uniting ideas ; that is always an act of the *mind*.

So far as the union of ideas by *words* is concerned, words may all be separated by commas without any detriment: as shoes, here, cause, sale. The mind can group them all together again, if it pleases. And, indeed, many cases occur, where the words are separated, while the ideas are united by the mind:

“How poor, how rich, how abject, how august,
How complicate, how wonderful is man.”

Young.

“If poets allure thee, think how Bacon shined
The wisest, brightest, meanest, of mankind.”

Pope.

As the transition from one *word* to another is abrupt; so is it, likewise, from one *sentence* or part of sentence to another. The abruptness with which the following sentences commence, is strikingly obvious.

“He begins generally with a regular exordium. His method is clear; his arguments are arranged with great propriety. We find every thing in its proper place; he never attempts to move, till he has endeavored to convince. No man knew the power and force of words, better than Cicero. He rolls them along with the greatest beauty and pomp. He is a great amplifier of every subject; magnificent, and in his sentiments, highly moral.”—*Blair*.

It is commonly though erroneously supposed that, by throwing in between sentences, such words as *and*, *but*, *except*, *wherefore*, *because*, &c., we break the abruptness and render the transition more easy. But that does not obviate the difficulty, as we shall see from analysis; custom has blinded us to a perception of the truth. *And* means *to add*. Two *and* two make four. Two *add* two make four. Four shillings *and* sixpence, of some currency, make a dollar. Four shillings *add* sixpence make a dollar. Now, we will make the application.

1. “But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed,

came where he was: and when he saw him, he had compassion on him—and went to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, and set him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn, and took care of him. And, on the morrow, when he departed, he took out two pence and gave them to the host and said unto him, ‘take care of him: and whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again I will repay thee.’”

2. “But a certain Samaritan as he journeyed, came where he was: add when he saw him, he had compassion on him, add went to him, add bound up his wounds pouring in oil add wine, add set him on his own beast, add brought him to an inn, add took care of him. Add on the morrow when he departed, he took out two pence, add gave them to the host, add said unto him, ‘take care of him: add whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again I will repay thee.’”

3. “But a certain Samaritan as he journeyed, came where he was: when he saw him he had compassion on him—went to him, bound up his wounds pouring in oil and wine—set him on his own beast—brought him to an inn—took care of him. On the morrow, when he departed he took out two pence—gave them to the host—said ‘take care of him: whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again I will repay thee.’”

Is the last example more abrupt and stiff than the preceding, and consequently than the first? Plainly not. Custom will render even a harsh sound, not unpleasant; and although *and* from containing the letter *n* has a more liquid sound than *add*, yet if in reading, stress is laid upon it, it will sound nearly or quite as harsh as *add*. In order to balance familiarity against novelty, we in justice should, in reading these three examples, lay stress upon *and* in the first, touch *add* in the second lightly, and at the ellipse in the third, suspend the voice, a length of time, equal to

the pronouncing of *and*. If this should be done by a skillful reader, the second and third examples would then appear less abrupt and stiff than the first ; which plainly proves that the difference lies in familiarity. The remarks that have been made upon *and*, are applicable to other words interposed between sentences or parts of sentences, consequently further remarks upon the subject are unnecessary. We have seen that words *in sentences*, as well as singly, are representatives of *discrete* ideas that are united or not, at the pleasure, and *by act of the mind*. Hence there is little truth or propriety in calling some words ‘ conjunctions.’

Our next topic is the *latitude of language*. This subject leads us to an investigation of the principles by which language is governed, and to inquire how far and when a departure from custom and philosophic accuracy is admissible in language.

We have said that language is intelligible from the uniformity of its use ; and that in consequence of this uniformity, certain rules have been established, showing the principles upon which language is conducted. Now, as grammatical rules have no control over language, but are dependent upon it for their very existence, it is obvious that the same authority which established them, can annul or change them at pleasure.

Why we communicate our thoughts by one form of expression, and not by another, or by certain words, and not by others, is because men in general have, for certain reasons, determined that such and such words shall stand as representatives of such and such ideas or objects ; and that such and such ideas shall be expressed in this or that form or manner.

‘ *Reputable, national, present usage*’ being the authority upon which the regulation of language depends, it follows that a departure from *custom* is admissible, *whenever any new reason or motive arises to*

change the popular will. In accordance with this principle, we find that many words formerly in use are now obsolete, that many new words are coming into use, and that some in use are being employed in a different manner from their first use. We have illustrations of this in the pronouns. *We* was originally used in the plural only, it is now occasionally used in the singular. *You*, formerly plural, is now used irrespectively, either as singular or plural. *Thou* and *Ye* were formerly the sole representatives of the second person, but now they are almost superseded by *You*. Other words have undergone like changes. And however grammarians may cry out against any change, as being destructive of the principles of language (their theories rather,) the 'voice of the people,' will still prevail.

A departure from *philosophic accuracy* is allowable in language. 1st. When the imperfection of our nature necessitates us to do it. 2nd. When language may, in consequence, be abbreviated, without causing a liability to mistake. 3d. When, though a liability to mistake should thereby be caused, yet the advantage gained by brevity, more than counterbalances that defect. The latter two of these points, are so obviously in accordance with the very nature and design of language, that they need scarce any remarks. For, as has already been observed, brevity is, in language, an object of the first and highest consideration, and except in legal cases and the like, is ever paramount to philosophic precision. It is on this principle that we use, and justly too, the expressions, 'the sun rises and sets,' 'the sun and moon stood still,' 'the pot boils,' 'he is driving plough,' &c. "The earth was without *form* and *void*." While this, perhaps is the most expressive language that could be used, and therefore perfectly admissible, it is plain to see that it is not philosophically correct, for nothing can exist without having some form. 'Wind is air

put in motion.' The 'trade-winds,' it is said, *blow* from east to west. Now it is well known that, in the case of the 'trade winds,' it is not the *air* that is in motion, but the *earth*. Yet it is allowable to say, the 'trade winds' *blow* although it is absolutely no more correct than it would be to say, while riding along, that the trees and other fixed objects *move* in an opposite direction.

On the first point, it may be remarked, that man, being an imperfect being, and of limited powers of conception, his mind is not able, in many cases, to comprehend the exact truth. And language being a type of the mind, and partaking of its imperfections, oftentimes is not an exact expression of truth, but the nearest approximation to it, which the imperfect mental powers of man permit him to make. For instance, it is said 'The earth revolves upon its *axis* daily.' This is admissible, but not strictly true; for the earth has no *axis*, upon which, it revolves. It is said that the *axis* is an *imaginary* line, but the earth turns on no imaginary line; for if the line is *imaginary* how can the earth turn *on* it. Where there is nothing for it to turn upon, it can turn upon nothing. If it is said, that 'axis' means simply the center of motion, around which 'it revolves;' it has no center of motion *around* which it revolves; for the earth is a solid, hence some part of it must be *in* the center of motion, therefore, it cannot be said of the earth as a whole, that it revolves *around* or *upon* anything as its axis.

Again, Locke says, "Color and smell are produced by insensible particles operating on our senses." It is easy to perceive the intended meaning of this proposition, and as easy to see that it is not philosophically true. For the meaning of insensible is, 'not affecting the senses,' therefore, if the particles are *insensible* they cannot *affect the senses*, and thereby produce color and smell. We speak of *infinites* and

infinitessimals, but how any thing can be *infinite* in the absolute sense, is beyond human conception. Yet it is admissible, on the principle for which we are contending, to use language in this way, whether strictly correct or not. On the same principle, it is perfectly justifiable to use the expressions, 'quite perfect,' 'very perfect,' 'more perfect,' 'most perfect,' &c. Yet the conceited pedant will cry out against them, exclaiming, 'How can a thing that is *perfect* be *more perfect* or *most perfect*?' But he forgets that nothing on earth is *absolutely* perfect, (except himself). It is only *relatively* that this term or any other is compared. And the term perfect, as it is generally used, is as properly compared as white, black, or any other word. For *white* taken absolutely, means *perfect whiteness*; for if it was any degree less than that, it would be only *whitish*, and not *white*. So of black, blue, or any other color, quality, or quantity. Hence, we maintain that language is and must be in accordance with the constitution of our beings, and not with any ideal perfection.

GRAMMAR.

PART II.



SENTENCES, PROPOSITIONS, AND CLAUSES.

Grammar is the science of language ; or the explanation and application of the principles of speech.*

Language is made up of sentences.

A *sentence* is an assemblage of words, expressing a complete sentiment, and followed by a full pause.

A sentence is called a *period*, when regard is had to the *structure* only ; the attention being directed to the *collocation of the words*, without reference to the *idea*. A sentence is called a *proposition*, when the mind is directed to the *idea*, without reference to the *words*. A sentence in its common acceptation, includes both the *idea* and the *words*, without *especial* reference to either.

The full treatment of *periods* belongs to rhetoric ; of *propositions* to logic ; of *sentences* to grammar.

But, while grammar mainly treats of sentences, it partially notices periods and propositions.

Proposition, from *propono*, to propose, to

* Applicable to written and spoken language only.

set or place before, means that which is placed before the mind, for consideration.

The difference between a sentence and a proposition, may be seen by the following : 'Thou shalt have no other gods before me.' 'Thou shalt have other gods before me.' By leaving out the little word, 'no,' we do not materially alter the sentence, but we entirely change the proposition. The one proposition is, that we shall worship the true God ; the other, that we shall worship idols.

'Passion produces effects,' is a correct sentence and a *true* proposition. 'Passion produces excellent effects,' is also a correct sentence, but a *false* proposition.

Sentences are long or short, correct or incorrect ; propositions are true or false, absurd or rational.

A *proposition* is any number of words which collectively express some thought, as birds fly ; the wind blows ; not to advance is to go back.

A sentence may consist of one proposition, or of two or more propositions connected together, as 'Man is mortal,' (1 prop.) 'Life is short, but art is long,' (2 prop.) 'He is poor and always has been poor, though he might have been rich,' (3 prop.)

A sentence consisting of one proposition, is called a *simple* sentence.

A sentence consisting of two or more propositions, is called a *compound* sentence ; and the propositions of which it is composed are called *members*, or *clauses*.

A proposition consists of a *subject* and *predicate*.

The *subject* of a proposition, is that of which something is affirmed or said.

The *predicate* is that which is affirmed or said.

Thus, 'Birds fly;' 'birds' is the subject, and 'fly' the predicate. 'The wind blows;' 'the wind' is the subject, and 'blows' the predicate. 'Not to advance is to go back;' 'not to advance' is the subject, and 'is to go back' the predicate; because it is said of 'birds,' that they 'fly,' and of the 'wind,' that it 'blows,' &c.

Sometimes the subject is placed between parts of the predicate: as '*Of all vices profane swearing is the least excusable*;' 'Profane swearing' is the subject, and the other words the predicate. Sometimes one proposition is contained within another: as '*Intemperance, a vice which is common*, is very destructive in its effects.'

Clauses thus thrown in are not always propositions; as 'Men, *speaking perverse things*, will arise among you;' because 'speaking perverse things' is not, by itself, a complete thought. But the following interjectional clauses are propositions. 'How many instances of injustice, oppression and cruelty are furnished by slavery;' *i. e.* How many instances of injustice are furnished by slavery, how many instances of oppression are furnished by slavery, and how many instances of cruelty are furnished by slavery. When propositions are thus abbreviated, they are called *elliptic* propositions. See page 61.

A *clause* is a distinct group of words having a mutual constructive connection and appendance.

Clause is often taken in the general sense of *member*.

“The passion for praise, which is so very vehement in the fair sex, produces excellent effects in women of sense.” In this sentence there are six clauses, or distinct *groups* of words; as you will see upon its analysis and synthesis.

Analysis is the separating of a thing into its component parts or elements; and synthesis is the re-construction of it from those elements.

‘The passion produces excellent effects,’ is, you see, one group of words, though separated in collocation, yet united in construction.* ‘The passion *for praise*, produces excellent effects;’ is two clauses; ‘The passion for praise, *which is so very vehement*, produces excellent effects;’ three clauses. ‘The passion for praise, which is so very vehement *in the fair sex* produces excellent effects;’ four clauses. ‘The passion for praise which is so very vehement in the fair sex, produces excellent effects *in women*;’ five clauses. ‘The passion for praise, which is so very vehement in the fair sex, produces excellent effects *in women of sense*;’ six clauses, and the complete sentence.

What is meant by ‘*mutual constructive connection and appendance*,’ will be seen upon examining either of the clauses, especially the third; for you will

* *Collocation* has reference to the position which words occupy in a sentence.

Construction has reference to the connection which words in a sentence have to each other, in respect to sense.

“For forms of government, let fools contest.” Here in collocation, ‘let fools contest’ comes last, whereas in construction, it comes first; as ‘Let fools contest for forms of government.’

“Condemned in business or in arts to drudge.” ‘To drudge,’ though last in collocation, in construction follows ‘condemned.’ Condemned to drudge in business or in arts.

When it is said that a word *precedes* or *follows* another, it is meant *in construction*; but when it is said to be *placed before* or *placed after*, *position* is meant.

perceive that they cannot be separated in construction, without destroying the sense or sentence. For instance, if in the third clause, we omit some of the words, thus, 'The passion for praise, *which*—produces excellent effects,' we destroy the *sentence*; it leaves it incomplete. Or thus, 'The passion for praise *which is*—produces excellent effects,' it destroys the *sense*. Or thus, 'The passion for praise *which is so very*—produces excellent effects,' also destroys the sense. And if we leave them out at the beginning; as 'The passion for praise,—*so very vehement*, produces excellent effects,' it will have a like effect if we do not, in our minds, supply the words wanting. If you attempt to separate one of the clauses, and attach part of it to one of the other clauses, and a part to another, the mutual connection will become exceedingly obvious. You will clearly perceive that the words are inseparable in construction, though in collocation they may, as in the first clause, be placed asunder.

This sentence affords good illustrations of the difference between a sentence, a proposition, and a clause. It is but *one sentence*, as it expresses but *one complete sentiment*. It contains *two propositions*, for it *expresses two aggregate ideas*. It contains *six clauses*, as we have seen, for there are six distinct groups of words which have a mutual connection with each other, and a mutual appendance to the other groups.

The proposition which contains the essential part of a sentence, is called the *main proposition*; and those appended to furnish some additional idea, are called *appendant propositions*.

In this sentence, 'The passion for praise produces excellent effects in women of sense,' is the main proposition; for it contains the substance of the sentiment advanced, and of itself would make a complete

sentence. But another proposition is appended, for the purpose of expressing an additional idea, yet this addition does not alter the sentiment already advanced, nor does it add a *new sentiment*, and thus produce two sentences. For, 'which is so very vehement in the fair sex,' is not by itself a complete sentiment, but only an additional *idea*; consequently, is an appendant proposition.

We will begin now with the *base* of the sentence, and rear the superstructure.

Friend B. I will tell you my sentiment. '*Passion produces effects.*' Undoubtedly. '*Passion produces excellent effects.*' False. I say, '*The passion produces excellent effects.*' What passion? '*The passion for praise, produces excellent effects.*' In whom? '*The passion for praise, produces excellent effects, in women.*' In all women? 'No;' '*the passion for praise, produces excellent effects, in women of sense.*' Do you mean any particular passion for praise? 'I mean that,' '*which is so very vehement.*' So very vehement in whom? '*Which is so very vehement in the fair sex.*' Well, what of it all? 'I say that' '*The passion for praise, which is so very vehement in the fair sex, produces excellent effects in women of sense.*' Ah, that's your sentiment, is it!

You will readily perceive the change of the propositions, upon the addition of each modifying clause. By the successive additions, there are no less than seven different propositions produced; yet when the sentence is completed, there are but two. You will also perceive from what has been said, that a proposition may be a sentence, or may not be; and that a clause may be a proposition, or may not be. But, if a proposition was the same as a sentence, then there would be as many sentences as propositions; or if a clause was the same as a proposition, then there would be as many propositions as clauses. But this you

perceive is not the case, therefore, a proposition differs from a sentence, and a clause, from a proposition.

A *phrase* is an *idiomatic clause*; that is, several words customarily used in connection, with a peculiar meaning attached to them; as

“I will that thou give me *by and by*, in a charger, the head of John the Baptist.”

“Or shrink myself almost to nothing *at all*.”

“Which, *by the way*, is nothing uncommon.”

When we wish to single out for consideration, a word or two in a sentence, we designate them by the term ‘phrase.’

WORDS.

All sentences are composed of words. Words are not all alike; nor are they all entirely different from each other. They have many different forms and no two words are exactly alike in meaning; but we find that many words agree in the object of their use. Hence, they are divided into *classes according to their use*.*

To illustrate the classification of words, we will compare them to animals. We give the term ‘word’† to the symbols of vocal sounds, by which we communicate our ideas. We apply the term, ‘animal,’ to all creatures endowed with life and the power of voluntary motion. Now, these terms are very general, and include other terms under them. As the term, ‘animal’ includes all living creatures, we have to divide animals, into several classes, in order to distin-

* This is the only principle upon which words can properly be arranged in classes.

† *Word* is the term for either a significant vocal sound, or the symbol of that sound.

guish them. Animals that live in water, and have fins and scales, we call 'fish'; animals that have feathers, and fly, or have wings, we call 'fowls'; fourfooted animals are called 'beasts'; those that creep are called 'reptiles'; animals endowed with reason and the power of speech come under the term 'man,' &c. Thus all animals are arranged in different classes, according to their distinguishing marks. So *words* are divided into different classes, but not, like animals, according to their form, or quality, but according to their *use*. Some words are used *to name* things; some are used *to define*, or describe things, and some *to tell* what things do, or what is said of things, &c.

The number of words in our language is about seventy thousand, yet we have not but *six classes* of words technically called 'parts of speech.'

1st. Those words used in naming things, such as, David, man, tree, river, air, &c. are called 'names.' In grammar, they are called 'nouns.'

Noun means a name, and the term, 'noun,' is used instead of 'name,' in order to prevent any confusion of the word in its common use, with its grammatical use. We do not say, 'David is the *noun* of a person,' but 'the *name* of a person.' But if we say 'David is a noun,' we know what is meant; it means that it is a *name grammatically considered*.

When a word is used not in common language, but in the arts and sciences only, it is called a *technical* word. Sometimes a word that is used in common language is used in the arts or sciences with a *different meaning*. The two meanings are then distinguished by calling one of them, the *technical* meaning, and the other, the *common* meaning. For example, The *common* meaning of *taste*, is the power of ascertaining the quality of a thing by the tongue; the *technical* meaning is the power of perceiving and relishing the beauties of nature and art. The names which are given to the 'parts of speech,' are either technical words, or have a technical use.

Nouns form the largest and most important class of words. Names were the first proper words employed by man, (Gen. 2 : 19, 20.) and without them, we should

not be able to hold conversation with one another, nor to express a single idea vocally.

2nd. In speaking or writing, instead of often repeating a name, we use another small word to denote the same thing. Instead of saying, 'Jane is John's sister, John loves Jane, and Jane loves John ; we say, 'Jane is John's sister ; *he* loves *her* and *she* loves *him*.' The words 'he,' 'her,' 'she,' 'him,' and other words that are used instead of nouns, are called *pronouns*.

From 'pro' meaning *for*, and 'noun.'

This class of words is small, containing about thirty or thirty-five words only.

3d. In speaking of some particular thing, we often have to point it out more particularly than barely to call it by name. We then, for this purpose, use other words to *define* what we mean : as, 'a good man' 'a large man,' 'the black horse,' 'the bay horse,' 'two or three very large oak trees,' 'he was hurt badly, &c. Words used to define others, are called *definers*.*

To *define* means to limit, to point out, or describe. *Definer* is that which defines.

4th. We frequently speak of things, relatively, that is, in respect to something else. One thing may be situated, in relation to another, either, 'above it,' or 'below it,' 'in it,' 'without it,' 'near it,' 'by it,' 'from it,' 'over it,' &c. The words 'above,' 'below,' 'in,' &c. with others that denote the *relation* of one thing to another, are called *relatives*.†

* They have been called *adjectives*, (*i. e.* joined to), because they are joined to the words they define.

† They have been named *prepositions*, (*pre* before, and *posi-*
tion), because they are usually placed before a noun.

5th. Not any, nor all of the words which have been named, can be made to form a sentence; because, they do not *express* any thing. Therefore when we wish to express any thing, either in speaking to, or of any person or thing, or in telling what another did, we use a different kind of words; as 'David *killed* Goliah;' 'Birds *fly*;' 'go and *get* your book;' 'will you *bring* some wood;' 'I *will*;' 'the letter *is written*;' 'the birds *are singing*.'

If we leave out such words from a sentence, we destroy the sense. 'David Goliah' 'you some wood,' and as many more words as you have a mind to put together, would not make a sentence, or convey any meaning, without some *expressing word*. Hence, such words as do express what is said, constitute a class, and are called *predicatives*.*

To predicate is to utter forth, to express, or declare. *Predicate* is some thing predicated, i. e. said or expressed. And *predicative* is the predicating word or words.

In mentioning some of the classes of animals, man was included. Man is an animal, and all human beings come under the class, 'man;' but sometimes, for greater distinction, we subdivide the class 'man' into smaller classes: as *man, woman, child*. Here though 'woman' and 'child' or 'women and children' are terms for two smaller classes or subdivisions, they still come under the general class 'man.' In like manner the class of words called, 'predicatives,' is subdivided into two smaller classes, called *nominal predicatives* and *predicals*.

The *nominal predicatives*, such as 'to go,' 'to do,' 'to be,' 'to improve,' 'to have,' &c. are so called, because they have the nature of nouns and predica-

* The term *verb* has, by common usage, come to mean the same as predicative, hence, may be substituted for it.

tives. They are formed by prefixing 'to' to a pure predicative.

Predicals are derived from predicatives, usually by adding to them the termination 'd,' 'ed' or 'ing': as walk; *walked, walking*; bathe; *bathed, bathing*; kill; *killed, killing*. They possess the property of a predicative, together with that of a noun, or a determiner.*

Predical means belonging to, like, or derived from a predicative.

The predicatives form a class of words next in size and importance to nouns. With nouns and predicatives together, without other words, we can converse with one another, but with either of them alone, or with any other words we cannot.

6th. The last, and least important class of words are *exclamatives*:† as O! or Oh! Ah! Alas! &c.

They are used by writers and speakers, to denote some emotion. They do not *name* or *describe* the emotion, nor do they *express* it; they only denote that there is emotion, and leave it for the inflection of the voice, or something else to express that emotion.

The above six classes comprehend all the words in our language.

From the foregoing, we derive the following

ABSTRACT.

Words are divided into six classes, called parts of speech; viz. nouns, pronouns, de-

* Predicals have for this reason been called *participles*.

† This class of words have been called *interjections*, from the manner in which they are thrown into a sentence.

finers, relatives, predicatives, and exclamatives.

From the predicatives two subdivisions are made: viz. nominal predicatives, and predicals.

All the parts of speech take their name from their office.

1. *Nouns* are words used to name things.

2. *Pronouns* are words uniformly used instead of nouns, to denote the same thing.

3. *Definers* are words used to define other words.

4. *Relatives* are words used to show the relation of one thing to another.

5. *Predicatives* are words used to predicate, i. e. to express some fact, command, or request.

Nominal predicatives are a species of predicatives which partake of the nature of nouns and predicatives.

Predicals are words derived from predicatives, and possess the property of a predicative, together with that of a noun or a definer.

6. *Exclamatives* are words used to denote emotion.

THE OLD NOMENCLATURE.*

1. *Articles*—the two definers, *a* and *the*.

2. *Nouns*—words used to name things.

3. *Pronouns*—words used instead of nouns.

* For remarks upon the 'parts of speech,' see notes under the respective classes.

4. *Adjectives*—words joined to *nouns* to define them.
5. *Verbs*—words used to predicate.
6. *Adverbs*—words joined to *verbs* to define them.
7. *Prepositions*—words showing relation between things.
8. *Conjunctions*—(some) words that connect sentences.
9. *Interjections*—exclamatory words.

Owing to the imperfect nature, and the latitude of language, often the same words are used irrespectively, in two or more classes; as we say, ‘a *walk*,’ or ‘I *walk*;’ ‘walk’ being, in the one case a noun, and in the other a predicative. So, ‘a *fight*,’ ‘they *fight*;’ *ballot*, a vote, *ballot*, to vote; *sum*, the amount, *sum*, to reckon up, &c. A *red* paint, *red*, a showy color;—red in the one case is a definer, in the other a noun. And so of other words and other classes. In such cases, the rule of naming them according to their use, holds. When they have the use of predicatives, they are to be called predicatives, and when of nouns, nouns, and when of definers, definers, &c. But when words *commonly* belonging to one class are only *occasionally* used in another, they may be denominated by applying to them their common name, and telling their present use. For example, ‘The *Parsons* family;’ ‘The *Smith* boys;’ ‘*Connecticut* militia;’ ‘*Ohio* men.’ *Parsons*, *Smith*, &c. may be denominated *nouns used as definers*. ‘Providence rewards the *good*, but punishes the *bad*.’ ‘The *wicked* flee when no man pursueth, but the *righteous* are as bold as a lion.’ *Bad*, *good*, *wicked*, &c. are *definers used as nouns*.*

If the definer in the case of an ellipse is not preceded by *a* or *the*, it is not ‘a definer *used* as a noun;’ but it is referred to the noun which it defines, or is disposed of by saying, ‘it is a definer *parsed* as a noun, the noun to which it refers being omitted.’

* An error is prevalent with some authors, of calling definers

In ascertaining to what class a word belongs, the thing to be sought, is, What is its *use*? Is it to *name*, to *define*, to *predicate*, or to *show relation*? &c. Having determined which, the class is ascertained.

When predicatives are used in the manner of commanding; as, '*Go and get your hat*;' '*Give me a*

substitutes, when the noun or proposition which they define is omitted.

"Adjectives are often used as substitutes for the names of men and things which they describe by their qualities; as, *few* were present; the *wise* are respected; the *bravest* are not always victorious." Webster's Grammar, Rule 14.

Now it must be evident that such definers are not *pronouns* or *substitutes* as stated, for if they are, then they stand for some noun, and when the noun for which they stand is used, they themselves will not be needed. But that is not the case. What nouns are the above used instead of? None. And besides, when such definers are used, the noun also must be supplied, or else there will be no sense. 'There were only *few* there.' Unless the noun is supplied, there is no sense in the proposition, for we do not know whether is meant a *few men*, a *few birds*, a *few cattle*, a *few sticks*, or a *few stones*. 'You may take *this*, and I will take *that*.' *This* and *that* what? The answer to this question must be known before there can be any sense to the expression. From these and other examples, it is plain that the definer is not *substituted* for any thing; because the noun and definer *both* must be either expressed, or understood.

A like error prevails respecting words of other classes also, and especially the auxiliary predicatives: as 'I shall not *see the man before his departure*, but James *will*.' Here *will* is said to be a *substitute* for the whole clause in italics; but what is more obviously false. It is no more a substitute for a clause than *you* is in the following. '*I can walk a mile as quick as you*.' But who will pretend that *you* is a substitute for 'can walk a mile.' They both must be used at the same time.

Says Webster—"In every case where the *antecedent* word or sentence is not obvious, so that the mind instantly applies the substitute to its principal, the use of a substitute is a fault." This discloses plainly the fallacy of calling definers or auxiliaries, substitutes, showing that in all such cases the mind supplies what is not expressed. He would have uttered the truth if he had said that when the omission of a noun or clause after a definer occasions obscurity, the ellipse is not admissible.

book;' '*Do let me alone;*' '*Let me have it;*' they are distinguished by being called imperative predicates, or briefly, *imperatives*.

Imperative does not mean merely commanding from official authority, but from any other authority, as *imperious necessity*, and the like. Hence *urgent entreaty* and *supplication* are clothed in the language of command.

Some definers, as wherefore, therefore, however, moreover, likewise, &c. seem to stand for a whole clause, and are used to define clauses instead of words; hence they are called *clausal definers*.

Words, of whatever class they may be, which imply the connection of one proposition with another, are denominated *connectives*;* as, "Blessed is the

* For excluding *conjunctions* as a 'part of speech,' and employing the term *connective*, as it is used in rhetoric, the following are our reasons.

"A conjunction is a part of speech that is chiefly used to connect sentences; so as out of two to make one sentence." This definition, given by Murray, embodies, essentially, the commonly received opinions upon the subject. But let us look into the truth of it. Take a case; "I will go *if* he will accompany me." This is a plain case, and *perhaps* easily disposed of by an opponent. But we will suggest an inquiry or two. Are here *two* sentences united into *one*? If so, what constitutes a sentence? If a proposition makes a sentence, then there are *two* sentences as much after their connection, as before; for the two propositions still remain distinct. If a proposition does *not* make a sentence, then the *one* sentence is not made of *two*. Is it said, that the sentence might be separated into its propositions, and thus become two; as, 'I will go,' 'he will accompany me?' The reply is, the speaker never said thus; the truth of the latter proposition he did not know nor declare. 'I will go, *and* he will accompany me;'—if simply connecting two propositions together makes them one sentence, then should not this sentence be the same as the other? For the two propositions, or sentences, as our opponent has it, are the very same in both cases, and are connected in the same order; must we not then conclude that the two sentences are the same? Yet they are not. But take another case. "I rest *then* upon this argument;" *then* is here a conjunction, says

man *who* feareth the Lord, *and* keepeth his commandments." "A true aristocracy is not a separate in-

Murray. What two sentences does *then* connect into one? Does our opponent say that the sentence, 'I rest upon this argument,' is connected by *then*, to another not expressed? Admit it; but are the two afterwards *one*? Take the following: "The trees went forth on a time to anoint a king over them; *And* they said to the olive-tree, Reign thou over us. *But* the olive-tree said to them, Should I leave my fatness, with which by me they honor God and man, and go to be promoted over the trees? *And* the trees said to the fig-tree, Come thou and reign over us. *But* the fig-tree said to them, Should I forsake my sweetness, and my good fruit, and go to be promoted over the trees? *Then* said the trees to the vine, Come thou, and reign over us. *And* the vine said to them, Should I leave my wine, which cheereth God and man, and go to be promoted over the trees? *And* then said all the trees to the bramble, Come thou and reign over us. *And* the bramble said to the trees, *If* in truth ye anoint me king over you, then come, and put your trust in my shadow: *and if* not, let fire come out of the bramble, and devour the cedars of Lebanon." What grammarian has the audacity to say that this is but *one sentence*? yet it must be said, if the above definition is correct. In this extract there are thirty propositions, and consequently *thirty sentences are made one*! Procul, O procul! este profani!

But it is not because conjunctions have not been rightly defined, that we reject the term, but because their *purpose* is not *to connect*. Startling as this proposition may be, we think it fully sustained by the following. We admit that it is true, in one sense, that conjunctions do connect; but the same is true of verbs, pronouns, prepositions, and adverbs; Hence if the bare fact that the words connect, is sufficient to authorize *some* words that connect, being called conjunctions, it is sufficient to authorize *all* words that connect, being called conjunctions. Hence if a *part* only of the words that connect, are called conjunctions, it must be because the sole or chief purpose of those is *to connect*. But if to connect is their sole purpose, then one conjunction is as good as a hundred; and all the conjunctions except *and*, may be excluded from the language. But let us see; "Rome was enslaved *because* Cesar was ambitious." Will *and* supply the place of *because*? No. "*Though* he was often reformed, *yet* he did not reform." Here are two conjunctions, so called, but are they needed *to connect*? Query—what does *though* connect?

Mr. Harris in his 'Hermes,' 'a philosophical inquiry concerning universal grammar,' gives the following definition which

terest in the state, or separable from it. *It* is an essential integrant part of any large body rightly consti-

he adopts from Aristotle "Now the definition of a conjunction is as follows—a part of speech, void of signification itself, but so formed as to help signification, by making *two* or more significant sentences to be *one* significant sentence."

Now, if conjunctions are 'void of signification,' then their sole purpose must be to connect; and consequently it makes no difference what one we use to connect any two sentences. But substitute *and* for *yet* in the above sentence; "Though he was often reprov'd *and* he did not reform." We see at once that the sense is gone; but why? *And* is allowed by all to connect the most effectually of any of the conjunctions, hence, should well supply the place of *yet*; but it does not. How can this difficulty be removed, upon the ground that conjunctions are devoid of a signification, or that their chief purpose is to connect? But take the following:

"The moon intervenes *therefore* the sun is in eclipse."

"The moon intervenes *if* the sun is in eclipse."

"The moon intervenes *or* the sun is in eclipse."

"The moon intervenes *and* the sun is in eclipse."

"The moon intervenes *though* the sun is in eclipse."

"The moon intervenes *yet* the sun is in eclipse."

"The moon intervenes *while* the sun is in eclipse."

"The moon intervenes *because* the sun is in eclipse."

"The moon intervenes *when* the sun is in eclipse."

"The sun is in eclipse *because* the moon intervenes."

If any one, after a consideration of these several propositions, can say that conjunctions are 'void of signification,' or that their chief purpose is to connect, he is welcome to his reasoning powers. (But do not, for the world tell any one that there are *adverbs* among them, figuring, with all the eclat of *conjunctions*.)

If our opponent still insists that conjunctions do connect, again we admit it; but so do other words.

Murray says, "the conjunction copulative serves to connect or to continue a sentence *by* expressing an addition, a supposition, a cause, &c." Prepositions connect words *by* showing relation between them. Is there not then, as much reason for calling the latter conjunctions, as the former? We have seen, above, that *adverbs* connect as effectually and in as good style as conjunctions. And *pronouns*, according to the confession of our opponents, serve to connect sentences, as well as conjunctions. Says Murray, "A relative pronoun possesses the force both of a pronoun and a connective. Nay, *the union by relatives is rather closer*, than that by mere conjunctions. The latter may form two or more sentences into one; but by the former, sever

tuted.”* “I certainly have very good wishes for the place of my birth. *But* the sphere of my duties is my true country.”

al sentences may incorporate in one and the same *clause* of a sentence. Thus, “thou seest a man, *and* he is called Peter,” is a sentence consisting of two distinct clauses, united by the copulative *and*; but “the man *whom* thou seest is called Peter,” is a sentence of one clause, and not less comprehensive than the other.”

To this the testimony of other grammarians corresponds. The following is the language of Mr. Harris. “Light is a body, *and* it moves with great celerity. If in the place of *and it*, we substitute *that* or *which*, saying, Light is a body *which* moves with great celerity, the sentence still retains its *unity* and *perfection*, and becomes, if possible *still more compact than before*.” Now what conclusion can we draw from such language? Either that pronouns are conjunctions, or that some words are called conjunctions not because they *connect*. Is it said in reply, that other words that connect, have another use which determines their classification? Admit that, and it is all we wish; for it is on that very principle that we have placed the words called conjunctions, under other classes according to their *respective uses*; and we have seen that they *have* uses besides to connect. But does not the reply tacitly admit, what is probably the truth, that conjunctions were so called because, not knowing their true natures, they knew not what else to do with them.

We have said enough to convince the candid, and too much to be lost on the prejudiced. But we cannot leave the subject without saying a few words respecting *disjunctive conjunctions*. Ludicrous as is this combination of terms, yet it is not as much so, as the reasoning upon it. In the ‘Hermes’ we have the following. “The difference between these (copulative and continuative conjunctions) is this:—The *copulative* does no more than barely *couple* sentences; and is therefore applicable to all subjects whose natures are *not incompatible*. *Continuatives*, on the contrary, by a more intimate connection, consolidate sentences into *one continuous whole*, and therefore are applicable only to subjects which have an essential coincidence.”

“If we say every number is even *or* odd—every proposition true *or* false—nothing seems to *disjoin* more strongly than the *disjunctive*, because no things are in nature more *incompatible than the subjects*.” What reasoning! A thing is *powerfully disjunctive*, because something else does the work of disjoining! or, it is *very strongly disjunctive*, because it does not unite what

* Newman’s Rhetoric, p. 147.

N O U N S.

A noun is a name : as James, man, air, mountain, vice.

Names or nouns are either general, or particular.

Genus a class of objects having the same essential properties. *General*, belonging to a genus, or the individuals of a genus.

So called because they *particle* or single out the individual, from others of the like kind.

N. B. *Individual* means a single object, whether person or thing.

A general noun is a name common to all individuals of the same sort, or genus : as man, tree, ship, iron.

A particular noun is a name applied particularly to an individual : as William, Connecticut, Homer, America.

cannot be united ! Vague ideas. "But if we say, That object is a triangle *or* figure contained under three right lines—the *or* in this case hardly seems to disjoin, or indeed to do more than *distinctly* to express the thing first by its *name* and then by its *definition*. So if we say, That figure is a sphere *or* a globe *or* a ball, the disjunctive in this case tends no farther to disjoin than as it distinguishes the *several names* which belong to the *same thing*." Why call it disjunctive then? Are such the *philosophical conclusions* of a *philosophical inquiry*, by a *philosophical mind*? Does not the disjunction in all cases lie in the *nature of things* and not in the *conjunction*? When we say, It is round *or* spherical; it is black *or* white—we mean that it is *the one or the other*; and in the first case the two things being *alike*, it is consequently *both*; but in the latter, the two things being *opposites*, it consequently cannot be *both*, but only *one* of the two. And this distinction is in the nature of the things, and not in *or*. The first case is on the principle that two things being equal to each other, are respectively equal to the third; and the latter is the converse of it. *Or* always denotes *one* of *two* things; and if *both* are included, it is by induction from the nature of things, and not from a change in *or*.

Particular nouns may become general, by using *a* or *the* before them : as He was the Cicero of his age. The twelve Cesars. The Smiths. Washington was a Fabius ; Arnold a Judas.

The attributes of nouns are number, person, gender and case.

Attribute signifies the thing bestowed upon or assigned to another.

NUMBER.

Number is the form of the noun which denotes whether it represents a single object or more : as man, men ; fly, flies.

There are two numbers ; the singular and plural.

The singular number denotes not but one : as boy.

The plural number implies more than one : as boys.

Some nouns are used only in the singular form : as, wheat, pitch, gold, pride, &c.

Others only in the plural form : as scissors, shears, lungs, bellows.

Some nouns have no number ; the form being the same whether implying one, or more : as sheep, deer, swine.

FORMATION OF PLURALS.

Words ending with i, s, z, x, y not preceded by a vowel, sh, ch not like k, o not preceded by a vowel nor sounded like oo, their plural *regularly* is formed

by the addition of *es*, as Alkali, Alkalies; Glass, Glasses; Box, Boxes; Copy, Copies; Bush, Bushes; Church, Churches; Hero, Heroes. But there are exceptions to this, Canto, Cantos; Solo, Solos; Quarto, Quartos.

Words ending with any other letter, with *y* preceded by a vowel, *ch* like *k*, *o* preceded by a vowel or sounded like *oo*, are *regularly* made plural by the addition of *s* only: as, Pampa, Pampas; Lamb, Lambs; Arithmetic, Arithmetics; Land, Lands; Horse, Horses; Life, Lives; Hoe, Hoes; Trough, Troughs; Flask, Flasks; Ball, Balls; Drum, Drums; Fan, Fans; Cameo, Cameos; Nuncio, Nuncios; Cuckoo, Cuckoos; Two, Twos.

When *f* is the last consonant in a word, it is changed to *v* in the plural; as Wife, Wives. If *y* preceded by a consonant ends the word in the singular, it is changed to *i* in the plural: as Fly, Flies; Holy, Holies.

Words are *irregularly* made plural, by the changing of letters, as man, men; mouse, mice; foot, feet; goose, geese; by adding *en*, as ox, oxen; by adding *ren*, as child, children; by adding *x*, as beau, beaux; by changing *i* of the last syllable into *e*, as crisis, crises; by changing *on* to *a*, as phenomenon, phenomena.

Some words have both a regular and irregular plural; as brother, brothers or brethren; die, dies or dice; penny, pennies, or pence; calx, calxes, or calces; calyx, calyxes, or calyces; focus, focuses, or foci; pea, peas, or pease; cherub, cherubs, or cherubim, or cherubims; seraph, seraphs, or seraphim, or seraphims. The plural of letters and numbers, has an apostrophe, *d's*.

PERSON.

The term *person* is applied to the distinc-

tion between the person speaking, spoken to, and spoken of.

When the person speaking introduces his own name, it is said to be of the first person : as *I, Paul*, the prisoner of Jesus Christ.

The name of the person spoken to is of the second person : as *William* lay aside your book.

The name of the person or thing spoken of is of the third person : *William* is here. *Fish* swim.

GENDER.

Gender is that property of nouns which indicates a distinction of sex.

Hence nouns are divided into three kinds, masculine, feminine and neuter.

Masculine, pertaining to a male, *feminine*, to a female, *neuter*, neither.

A *Masculine* noun is a name denoting a male, as man, horse, ox, king, &c.

A *feminine* noun is a name denoting a female, as woman, queen, hen, cow, &c.

A *neuter* noun is a name that does not indicate either a male or female : as tree, book, virtue, victim, companion, friend, servant, parent, &c.

There are three different ways of indicating the sex.

First, by special words ; as man, woman ; husband, wife ; brother, sister ; king, queen ; boy, girl ; buck, doe.

Second, by adding *ess*, a contraction of the Hebrew *essa*, a female, to the masculine noun suitably modified; as prophet, prophetess; actor, actress; elector, electress; governor, governess. Sometimes, instead of *ess* by adding *ix*, or *ine*, or dropping *er*; executor, executrix; hero, heroine; widower, widow.

Third, by prefixing to a neuter noun, a word of determinate gender: as man-servant, maid-servant; male-child, female-child; he-goat, she-goat.

In figurative language, things without sex, are represented, either by masculine or feminine nouns, as the conceived analogy may direct. (See Blair's Rhetoric, page 84.)

CASE.

Case is the condition or situation in which a noun is, in respect to some other word or words.

Case means condition, situation, circumstance.

There are four cases, Subjective, Objective, Relative, and Independent.

The Subjective case, is the state of the noun when any thing is predicated of it: as *Men die. Animals move and breathe.*

The Objective case is the state of the noun when it follows a relative or predicative; as, I went to *Boston*. He was at *home*. He ordered *James* to stop. John ran a *race*. John ran the *horses*. They slept a *sleep*. He was offered an *offering*. He offered an *offering* unto God.

The noun in the objective case after a predicative, may be

either the name of the *action* or the name of the *result*, or the name of the *object*, as he run a *race*. He made a *pen*. He caught a *fish*. In the last example, 'fish' is the *object* upon which the action 'caught' terminates; and is therefore, in the objective case proper. In the second example, 'pen' is not the *object* of the action, but the name of the *result*, or that produced by the action. But the action must have had some object, or there would have been no result. The object of the action was a quill, and the result a pen. Therefore 'pen' is in the objective case, both because it is in the situation of the objective case, and because it implies an object. In the first example, 'race' is not the name of the *object*, nor of the *result* of the action, but is merely the *name* of the *action*, and does not in the least like 'pen' imply an object, therefore it is in the objective case merely on account of its position.

Webster is a statesman. John was a blacksmith. Henry will be president. Here, statesman, blacksmith, and president, are not in the objective case; for though they are placed after the predicative, they do not *follow* it. They only serve to explain the other noun, just as we say, John the *Baptist* was beheaded; or Herod beheaded John the *Baptist*. So, Webster, a *statesman* is; John, a *blacksmith* was; Henry, *president* will be; John and Baptist in the first example, are both in the subjective case; in the second, both are in the objective case, for John was beheaded; the Baptist was beheaded. Or, Herod beheaded John; Herod beheaded the Baptist. Because, they both being one, if one was beheaded, the other was; therefore John and Baptist must be in the same case. The same remark applies to the other examples. John was; a blacksmith was. John, a blacksmith was. John was a blacksmith.

Hence the rule: A noun explaining another noun representing the same thing, is in the same case. Apply it to other examples. John ran a race. We cannot convert this sentence, because 'a race' represents a different thing from John. It is not predicated that a race ran John; but it is predicated of John, that he ran a race, not that a race ran him. They slept a

sleep ; not a sleep slept they. This can never be the construction, though in poetry it is often the collocation of the words.

The relative case is the state of the noun when its form indicates a relation between the objects represented by itself and a following noun ; as *James'* book ; *virtue's* reward ; *men's* and *boys'* hats for sale ; *boys'* clothes cut and made.

The relative case supersedes the use of a relative ; as *Virtue's* reward, is equivalent to Reward *of* virtue. *Men's* and *boy's* hats, to Hats *for* men and boys. *Boys'* clothes, to Clothes *for* boys. It is not true that this case always or most frequently denotes *possession*. *Virtue* does not *possess* the reward. And if the men and boys possess the hats, the merchant has no right to sell them ; and how can '*boys'* *possess* clothes that are not yet cut and made.

A noun in the relative case, is always terminated with an apostrophy and the sound of *s*. If a word ends with *s*, or its equivalent in sound, an apostrophy only is added ; but if it does not, an apostrophy and the letter *s* are both added ; Boswell's life of Johnson ; John's book ; Pope's letters ; On eagles' wings ; for righteousness' sake ; " 'Tis patience' province to endure ;" ' To what is the wax' cohesion and plasticity owing ? ' Thomas' bravery ; the church's prosperity. Not as Mr. Webster says, " Thomas's bravery ; the church's prosperity, pronounced as if written *Thomas's* bravery ; the *church's* prosperity," for such a practice would not only violate the general rule, but would destroy all regularity. Such a corruption makes one think of the boy, who, finding it not easy to pronounce the word *lasts*, when speaking of his father's horse, said ' He shall have hay as long as hay *lastes*.' He that says '*Thomas's* bravery' '*Edward's* address' is qualified to say hay *lastes*. We might as

well say—*eagles* wings—*righteousness* sake as Thomas' bravery—church's prosperity. Ease of pronunciation will not justify it, for it is as easy to say Thomas' bravery, as it is righteousness' sake. Better to improve elocution than to corrupt grammar.

The Independent case is the state of the noun when it has no constructive connection in a proposition : as *James* : Harriet has received a present. *Holy Bible* : Chapter 1st.

John, you get me a book. James, will you bring some wood. I shall punish you, James. Here, John and James are not in the Independent case, but in the same case with *you*.

PRONOUNS.

Pronouns are words used instead of nouns : as John studies hard, and *he* learns fast. The tree is dead, cut *it* down. The pronoun *he* is used instead of John ; and *it* is used instead of ' the tree.'

Pronouns were originally definers ; but from the nature of the case, it not being necessary to repeat the noun after them, they have come now to be equivalent to both a noun and a definer.*

Pronouns have number, person, gender and case ;†

* " No noun properly so called, implies its own presence. It is therefore to *ascertain such presence* that the pronoun is taken in aid ; and hence it is that it becomes equivalent to *pointing or indicating by the finger*." Harris' *Hermes*.

† Mr. Webster (as do some other grammarians) discards the possessive or relative case of the pronoun ; but on scarce any subject do we consider him more unsound than he is in his reasonings upon this. We will adduce his remarks and some of the examples he has cited. He says " That *mine, thine, his, yours,*

and these terms, when applied to pronouns, mean the same as when applied to nouns. To avoid repetition

hers, and *theirs*, do not constitute a possessive case is demonstrable; for they are constantly used as the nominatives to verbs and as the objectives after verbs and prepositions, as in the following passages. 1. Whether it could perform its operations of thinking and memory out of a body organized as *ours* is. 2. You may imagine what kind of faith *theirs* was. 3. The reason is that his subject is generally things; *theirs* on the contrary is persons. 4. Having good works enough of your own besides to ensure *yours* and their immortality. 5. Your *lot* and *mine* in this respect *have been* very different. It is," he says "needless to multiply proofs. We observe these pretended *possessives* uniformly used as nominatives or objectives. To say that in these passages, *ours*, *theirs*, and *mine*, form a possessive case, is to make the possessive perform the office of a nominative case to verbs and an objective case after verbs and prepositions—a manifest solecism."

In reply, we in the first place deny that 'these possessives are used as nominatives or objectives,' and out of his own mouth will we prove it. In the second place we shall show that they are *real* not *pretended possessives*. He says, (Rule 1.) "The verb must agree with its nominative in number and person."

Now does he not condemn or contradict himself when he says *ours* in the first example is nominative to *is*; *theirs* in the second to *was*, and in the third, to *is*? *plural* pronouns nominative case to *singular* verbs! Again, pronouns are in the same case that the noun for which they stand would be in the same place. In the first example *ours* is substituted for *man's*, 'out of a body organized as *man's* is.' Here, according to his own testimony, *man's* is in both the *possessive* and the *nominative* case, which he says is 'a manifest solecism!'

In the second place these pronouns are in the *possessive* (or relative) case. He asks in a triumphant tone "Is the last example an evidence that *mine* is in the possessive case." In the same tone we reply, Yes, for if it is not in the possessive case relating to *lot* understood, then it is in the nominative case and means *a mine*. 'Your *lot* and *mine* (of ore) in this respect have been very different.' But that is not the meaning, it means *your lot* and *mine lot* have been very different. Is it said that we do not use *mine* as *mine lot*; Very well, what of that? We do not say *a eel*, *a oyster*, *an log*, *an man*; but does that prove that *a* and *an* are not essentially the same? We change *an* into *a* before a consonant for the sake of euphony or ease of utterance; for the same reason we change *her* into *hers*, *your* into *yours*, *their* into *theirs*, &c. when the noun is omitted. We

it is here remarked, that whatever is said of *nouns* applies also to *pronouns*, unless something indicates to the contrary.

do not, it is true, say—*your lot* and *mine lot*, nor, *your lot* and *my*, but *your lot* and *mine*, or *your lot* and *my lot*. Yet that *mine* and *my* are essentially the same and in the same case is evident; for they are often used in a like manner. ‘*Mine* answer to them that do examine me is this.’ ‘*My* answer would be a blow.’ ‘*My* son forget not *my* law but let *thine* heart keep *my* commandments.’ ‘Bind them about *thy* neck; write them upon the table of *thine* heart.’ Again, these pronouns are in the relative or possessive case because they indicate a relation between the objects represented by themselves and a following noun. It is in vain to say there is no noun understood, or that they are substituted for the noun understood. That there is a noun understood is manifest, not only from the fact that the verb takes its *number* from the noun understood, but because there is no sense unless a noun is supplied. True we do not use the same form of the pronoun when the noun is inserted as when not, but that does not change the nature of the case, ‘*My* and *yours* are kin’; what sense does this make? none at all. ‘*My sword* and *yours* are kin’; this makes sense, but what are the things that are kin? *my sword* and *your dog*; no, but it is ‘*my sword* and *your sword*’ The *thing* once mentioned must be understood as the thing referred to; or if not, then the noun referred to must be inserted. ‘*My house* and *your store* are alike.’ It will not do to omit *store* and say ‘*my house* and *yours* are alike,’ because the noun once mentioned is always understood in such a case. ‘*My house* and *yours*’ would be ‘*my house* and *your house*, not *store*.’

It is said that *yours*, *theirs*, &c. are substitutes for the noun understood, this we deny; “pronouns or substitutes must agree with the names they represent in *number*, *gender* and *person*.” (W’s. Gr. Rule 10) Now if in the first example ‘a body organized as ours is,’ *ours* is a substitute for *body*, then a *plural* pronoun is a substitute for a *singular* noun, which cannot be. ‘What kind of *faith theirs* was;’ *theirs* is plural while *faith* is singular.

Again, these pronouns cannot be substitutes for the following noun, because they have an office of their own to perform at the same time; and as in military, so in language, one cannot do duty for himself and be a substitute for another at the same time. Besides, the same is true in regard to nouns in the relative case, as in regard to pronouns. In the example ‘a body organized as ours is,’ if *ours* is a substitute, then *man’s* would be, in ‘a body organized as *man’s* is;’ a position which is not tena-

Person.	Case.	Singular.	Plural.
First.	Sub.	I,	We,
	Rel.	My, Mine,	Ours, Our,
	Obj.	Me.	Us.
Second.	Sub.	Thou,* You,	Ye, You,
	Rel.	Thy, Thine, Your,	Your, Yours,
	Obj.	Yours, Thee, You.	You.
Third.		Sin. M. Sin. F.	Sin. N. Plural.
	Sub.	He, She,	It, They,
	Rel.	His, Her, Hers,	Its, Their, Theirs,
	Obj.	Him. Her.	It. Them.
All persons and numbers.	Sub.	Who,	
	Rel.	Whose,	
	Obj.	Whom.	

One, other, and another, are sometimes pronouns, and are varied like nouns: as one, one's, oned; other, other's, or others', others. Another Another's.

Self is sometimes joined to the pronouns to denote emphasis; they are then varied like nouns, and have the same case that a noun would in the same situation,

ble. Neither *man's* nor *ours* can be a substitute for *man's body* or *our body*, unless it can be proved that a thing is greater than itself. To conclude; a correct explanation of the idiom is that the sense, euphony and ease of utterance require that the pronoun in such cases should have the suspensive quantity; and the termination is changed to favor this prolonged utterance. In confirmation of this, it may be observed, that when the pronoun of the relative case ends with a smooth flowing sound it is not changed; as *thine, mine, whose, &c.* The same is true of nouns; we say 'conscience' sake,' not 'conscience's sake,' "eagle's wings" not 'eagles's wings.' Further, *mine* and *thine* are the true possessives from which by abridgment *my* and *thy* have been formed for the sake of euphony, an additional evidence that *s* is added to *their, your, &c.* for the sake of sound and not sense.

* Thou, thy, thine, thee and ye are not used in familiar language, but are called the *solemn style*, because used only in discourse.

no regard being paid to the case of the pronoun combined. Myself, himself, itself, yourself, yourselves, themselves, ourselves. They are used in the subjective and objective cases, but never in the relative.

Definers that are not varied like pronouns are not called pronouns if their noun is omitted, but 'definers parsed as nouns, the noun being omitted.'

"Every object which presents itself to the senses or intellect, is either then perceived for the *first time*, or else is recognized as having been perceived *before*. In the former case it is called an object of the *first knowledge or acquaintance*; in the latter it is called an object of the *second knowledge or acquaintance*. Now as all conversation passes between *particulars*, or *individuals*, these will often happen to be reciprocally, objects of the *first knowledge or acquaintance*; that is to say, *till that instant unacquainted with each other*. What then is to be done? How shall the speaker address the other, when he knows not his name? or how explain himself by his own name of which the other is ignorant? Nouns, as they have been described, cannot answer the purpose. The first expedient upon this occasion seems to have been *pointing* or *indication by the finger or hand*, some traces of which are still to be observed, as a part of that action which naturally attends our speaking. But the authors of language were not content with this. They invented a *race of words to supply this pointing*; which words, *as they always stood for substantives or nouns*, were characterized by the name of *pronouns*.

These also they distinguished into three several sorts, calling them *pronouns* of the *first*, the *second*, and the *third person*, with a view to certain distinctions which may be explained as follows. Suppose the parties conversing to be wholly unacquainted, neither name nor countenance on either side, known, and the subject of the conversation, to be *the speaker himself*. Here to supply the place of pointing by a word of *equal power* they furnished the speaker with the *pronoun I*. *I write, I say, I desire, &c.* and as the speaker is always principal with respect to his own discourse, this they called for that reason, *the pronoun of the first person*. Again, suppose the subject of the conversation to be *the party addressed*. Here for similar reasons they invented the pronoun *THOU*. *Thou writest, Thou walkedst, &c.* and as the party addressed is next in dignity to the speaker, or at least comes next with reference to the discourse; this pronoun they therefore called *the pronoun of the second person*. Lastly, suppose the subject of the conversation neither the speaker nor the party addressed, but *some third object, different from*

30th. Here they provided another *pronoun*. *He, She or It*, which in distinction to the two former, was called *the pronoun of the third person*.

And thus it was that *pronouns* came to be distinguished by their respective *persons*.

As to *number* the pronoun of each person has it. I has the plural *we*, because there may be many speakers at once of the same sentiment; as well as one, who, including himself, speaks the sentiment of many. *Thou* has the plural *you*, because a speech may be spoken to many as well as to one. *He* has the plural *they*, because the subject of discourse is often many at once.

But though all these pronouns have *number*, it does not appear either in Greek, or Latin or any modern language, that those of the first and second person carry the distinctions of *sex*. The reason seems to be, that the speaker and hearer being generally present to each other, it would have been superfluous to have marked by art a distinction which from nature and even dress was commonly apparent on both sides. But this does not hold with respect to the third person, of whose character and distinctions (including *sex* among the rest) we often know no more than what we learn from the discourse. And hence it is that in most languages *the third person* has its *genders* and that even *English* (which allows its adjectives (definers) no genders at all) has in this pronoun the triple distinction of *He, She, and It*.

The utility of this distinction may be better found in supposing it away. Suppose, for example, we should read in history these—*He caused him to destroy him*—and that we were to be informed that the *He* which is here thrice repeated, stood each time for something different, that is to say, for a man, for a woman and for a city, whose names were Alexander, Thais and Persepolis. Taking the pronoun in this manner divested of its genders how would it appear which was destroyed; which was the destroyer; and which the cause that moved to the destruction? But there are not such doubts when we hear the genders distinguished; when instead of the ambiguous sentence *He caused him to destroy him*, we are told with the proper distinctions, that *she* caused *him* to destroy *it*. Then we know with certainty what before we could not, that the promoter was the woman; that her instrument was the hero; and that the subject of their cruelty was the unfortunate city." Harris' *Hermes*, p. 214.

REMARKS.

Grammarians in their lists of *personal* pronouns have included the pronoun '*it*' which is *never* applied

to *persons*, and omitted '*who*' which is *always* applied to persons, (whose excepted,) can they tell why?

The *Relative* pronouns, so called, are *who*, *which*, and *that*. These Relatives are also called *interrogatives* because they are used in asking questions. Is it advisable to burden the scholar with *two* technical terms for only *three words*? Besides, *this* and *that*, *these* and *those*, and many other words are used in asking questions; should not *they* also be called interrogatives?

"The *Distributive* pronouns are *each*, *every* and *either*." Another technical term for *three words* only!

Murray calls '*some*,' '*any*,' '*one*,' '*other*,' ('*all*' and '*such*') "*Indefinite* pronouns, because they express their subjects in an indefinite or general manner." Webster calls them "*Definitive* pronouns, because they limit the signification of the noun to which they refer." Now as these are directly contrary, one or the other of these learned gentlemen must be in the wrong. Can Murray name any thing more *definite* than *all* and *such*? Or can Mr. Webster find any thing more *indefinite* than *some* and *any*? Besides, is not his definition either useless or incorrect? for do not *all* pronouns limit the signification of the noun to which they refer?

"The *Demonstrative* pronouns are *this* and *that*, *these* and *those*." This class of *pronouns* comprehends *four words*, and *they* are all *adjectives*! (or definers.)

For further remarks upon the pronouns see the following, from The Scholar's Quarterly Journal, by Emerson Davis, A. M.

"Murray divides pronouns into three classes, personal, relative, and adjective. The distinguishing character of a pronoun is that it is used instead of a noun. Those which are used instead of the names of persons are called personal pronouns. *It* is never used instead of a person's name, and is not therefore

a personal pronoun ; *they* is often referred to things and is not personal. If it be said there are other reasons for calling some words personal, other difficulties arise equally objectionable. Some pronouns are called *relative*, because they relate to a word going before called the antecedent ; and so do all pronouns relate to a word or phrase going before which may be called their antecedents. What is the difference then between a personal and relative pronoun ? Writers upon English grammar have not told us. There seems to be good reason, therefore, for adopting the opinion of Cardell, and naming this class of words, *pronouns* simply. The term *Adjective pronoun* is no less objectionable. Give me *that* book. *That* is called an adjective pronoun, and must therefore have the property of an adjective and a pronoun. It has the property of a pronoun so far as it is used instead of a noun. What noun then is *that*, in the above sentence, used instead of ? Why not call this class of words *adjectives* ?”

We will mention only one thing more, and which may be called the *beauty* of the scheme. Murray, and others, not only divide the pronouns into the several classes above named, but they apply several names to each class : as ‘Indefinite adjective pronouns ;’ ‘Demonstrative adjective pronouns ;’ ‘Interrogative relative pronouns’, &c. Now as these terms are very euphonic, let us see if we cannot unite more of them, especially since the classes of words to which they are applied are so very large ! containing *two* and *three* words ! They surely should be duly represented. ‘*What* do you want ?’ ‘*What*, when used in asking questions is an interrogative relative pronoun.’ ‘*This* is called a demonstrative adjective pronoun. Now substituting *this* for *what* (to which there can be no objection,) as ‘*This*, do you want ?’

we have *This* an *interrogative relative demonstrative adjective pronoun* !

By consulting Webster we might get one more title as he calls *this* an article. Surely the little word *this* with all these titles strung to it, must feel as proud as some modern literary gentlemen with their one and twenty initials.



DEFINERS.*

Definers are words used to define other words : as, *A red coat. The black horse. Birds fly swiftly.*

Define is to limit, point out, or describe.

* It will be seen and objected, that we have classed 'articles' 'adjectives' and 'adverbs' all under the term 'definers;' thus breaking up a long established and well founded distinction of the parts of speech. To this we reply that the distinction, though long established, is not well founded. In support of this we advance the following.

'Articles' we reject because their *use* is precisely like that of other definers, and because we can find no sufficient reason for making or retaining them a distinct class of words. And in rejecting them as a 'part of speech' we think we cannot justly be charged with taking unwarranted liberty, so long as Webster and Cardell (as good authority as can be produced) both exclude them. The following are Webster's remarks. "*An* or *a* and *the* are never employed as substitutes, but are constantly attached to some name or an equivalent word; and from their peculiar use have obtained the distinctive appellation of *articles*. But *definitive* is a more significant and appropriate term, as they are *definitive attributes*† and have, grammatically considered, *jectives* we can by no means approve. To be an attribute, the adjective must be inherent in the noun, or adherent to it. But it is neither; for the adjective is frequently not joined to a noun; as, *Cast steel knives. Russia iron stoves. Five thousand men.*

† Webster's use of the term *attribute*, as a substitute for *ad-*

Definers denoting quantity or quality, signify it in different degrees, which are called degrees of compar-

the like use of *this, that, some, none, any, &c.*—WEBSTER'S Grammar. For this very same reason, and we think a sufficient one, we have called them *definers*; which is preferable to the term *definitive*, which is an adjective rather than a noun. And further, it saves making a distinct part of speech of two words.

In respect to *adjectives* and *adverbs*; we advocate their being called definers because they have the *same use*, and that to *define*; we reject the terms *adverb* and *adjective*, because they either include too little, or too much. If they are called *adjectives* because they qualify nouns, and *adverbs* because they qualify verbs, then if they qualified neither a noun nor a verb, as is often the case, they could not be called either adjectives or adverbs; but another term would be necessary. But if to avoid this difficulty, the terms are extended so as to embrace those words not strictly included by them, it gives rise to another objection equally insurmountable; for where shall we place the *dividing line*? We may as well seek for the 'philosopher's stone' which never has nor can be found. And why? Because their *use is the same*; and whether we call them adjectives or adverbs, they alike are joined to nouns, to verbs and to one another, indiscriminately. In support of this we will give a few examples, and for others refer to WEBSTER'S Grammar, Rules 18th, 19th, and 20th.

"Godly man." "He conducts badly." "The heat feels uncomfortable." "It is uncomfortable weather." "A hard apple." "He struck hard." "It is pleasant to hear the birds sing." "It is pleasant weather." "James is sick." "He is a very sick man." "I am well." "He is patient." In this last example *patient* is considered an adjective; but *well* in the one preceding is called an adverb; can there be any reason given for making such a distinction? "Much grass," here *much* is called an *adjective*. "Much more grass," here *much* is called an *adverb*; is there any justification of it? "*Very little more wood*;" are these adjectives, or adverbs? and why, or why not? *Very* is never joined either to a *verb* or *noun* (except in such elliptic expressions as, "He is the *very* man" "for He is the *very same* man,") what class then shall *very* be put into? In the same dilemma are *firstly, secondly, yes, no, amen, &c.* "Slow tolls the village clock, *deep* mourns the turtle." "He spoke *short* and *quick*." "Let us write *slow* and *exact*." Adjectives in the dualistic and superlative degrees are used to qualify verbs; as, "Her smiles amid the blushes *lovelier* show." "But mercy first and last shall *brightest* shine." What

ison ; as when we say paper is *white* but snow is whiter. They both are white, but one is so in a greater degree than the other. Quantity and quality may be expressed in many different degrees, but there are not but *four regular* degrees of comparison : as blackish, black, blacker, blackest. The other degrees, called the *variable* degrees, are indicated by the sentence ; or by joining two or more comparing words : as ‘*somewhat black,*’ ‘*exceedingly black,*’ ‘*snow is very much whiter than paper.*’

The *regular* degrees only are named. They are the subpositive, positive, dualistic and superlative. The subpositive degree denotes the quantity or quality in a partial or subordinate degree. Whitish, reddish, roughish.

The Positive degree simply denotes the quality without excess or deficiency : as large, small.

The Dualistic degree denotes an excess of the quality in one thing above it in another : as larger, smaller, whiter, blacker.

shall we call these, *adjectives*, or *adverbs*, or *adjective-adverbs*? These are some of the difficulties that attend the distinction of these words into *two classes*. But call them *definers*, and all difficulties disappear. And we would inquire *what objection there can be to calling them definers*, except that it would interfere with the obstinate prejudice of some? Some grammarians, to remove the objections, have called them *qualifiers* and *modifiers*, but they might as well have called them *adjectives* and *adjectives*, for the terms are so nearly synonymous that were they interchanged, it would make no material difference. There is no part of grammar that causes learners more difficulty than to tell adjectives from adverbs ; and this is not to be wondered at so long as *grammarians* cannot tell the difference.

The Superlative degree denotes that the quality in the one thing exceeds it in any of the other things compared: as largest, smallest, blackest, whitest.

When *two* things only are compared, the dualistic degree must always be used; and it may be used when more than two things are compared, if there are but two degrees of comparison. George is the tallest man in the company, but I have seen *many* men *taller* than he.

The superlative degree must never be used when there are not more than two things compared; yet it may be used when there are not but two degrees of comparison. They are all *tall*, but James is the *tallest*.

The degrees of comparison are all used *relatively*, that is, we say a thing is black only in relation to a thing that is not black; and a thing can be blackish or blacker only in reference to a thing that is black.

The degrees of comparison being made *relatively*, the dualistic degree may exceed *absolutely* the superlative degree. Ten is a greater number than two; and of the numbers two, four, and six, six is the greatest. Here we see that the *greater* number *ten* exceeds the *greatest* number *six*. Solomon was the *wisest* man that ever lived. Solon was the *wisest* man that ever lived in Greece. Here the same definer is used and in the same degree; yet there may be a great difference between the wisdom of the two men. The degree of the latter is varied by the clause '*in Greece*.'

Blackish, little blackish, quite blackish. Nearly perfect, quite perfect, perfect, *quite* perfect, very perfect, more perfect, most perfect. Blackish, somewhat blackish, little blackish, little black, rather black, very black, much more black, real black, extremely exceedingly perfectly black, little blacker, much blacker, very much blacker, blackest, little the blackest, much the blackest, the very blackest possible. These will serve as specimens of the variable degrees which are almost infinite in variety.

The degrees of regular comparison are formed in three ways.

1st. By adding to the positive *ish* for the subpositive ; *r* or *er* for the dualistic ; *st* or *est* for the superlative. P. Black ; S-P. blackish ; D. blacker ; S. blackest.

2nd. By placing *more* before the positive to form the dualistic, and *most* for the superlative ; the subpositive is wanting. P. handsome ; D. more handsome ; S. most handsome.

3d. By a change of words. P. good ; D. better ; S. best. P. bad ; D. worse ; S. worst. P. much ; D. more ; S. most.

Some words, as you see, do not take the subpositive degree.

Some definers from their natures are not compared ; as omnipotent, eternal, supreme, causeless, changeless, this, that, which, and numerals, as one, two, three, first, second, third, &c.

Many definers may be used together, either defining one another, or referring directly to the noun. A *little old white* man. These all refer to man. A very deep blue colored silk ribbon. *Very* defines *deep* ; *deep, blue* ; and *blue colored* ; *a, colored*, and *silk*, define ribbon.

The following is a list of a few definers that have heretofore been improperly classed among other parts of speech. The first half of them are principally clausal definers.

Wherefore, therefore, whereof, wherein, herein, whereby, thereby, thereof, therein, heretofore, hitherto, hereafter, already, otherwise, however, moreover, instead, because, likewise, also, else, yea, nay, yes, no, amen, anon, namely, surely, why, where, there, whence, thence, when, then, here, hence, while, never, so, as, rather, than, not, more, much, either, neither, or, nor ; and most, if not all of those formerly called adverbs.

REMARKS ON THE ARTICLES,

Additional to the note on definers, page 106.

The two definers *an* or *a* and *the*, have hitherto been separated from the other definers, and made a distinct class. But their use is the same of the other definers and the definitions of them as given by grammarians is as applicable to others as to them.

"An *article* is a word prefixed to nouns to point them out, and to show how far their significations extends." The use of *all* definers is, 'to show how far the signification of other words extends;' hence, there is no difference between them. It is said that articles are prefixed to *nouns*; but that is not always the case; as 'The sooner you do it *the better*.'

"An or *a* is called the *indefinite* article,' because it is used to point out one single thing of a kind, in other respects indeterminate; as 'Give me *a* book.'" This is the common definition; but what does it mean? what is it that is *indeterminate*? is it the *book* or the *kind* of book, or is it the *article* itself? Any one examining this *definition* will find it an *indefinite article* truly! How can that which is *pointed out* be *indeterminate*? But it is indeterminate '*in other respects*;' than what? To decide this we must ascertain in what respects it is *determinate*. It is said that "it is used to point out *one single thing*;" hence, its use cannot be to show that *one* or *single* thing is meant for that is predetermined. It must mean then that it *points out* a thing, in other respects indeterminate; that is, in other respects than the pointing out. Give me a book—is *book* a thing indeterminate, uncertain or unknown, except when pointed out by *a*? How does *a* point it out and make it *determinate*? Let those decide who can see through a mill stone. What is meant by *point out*? Harris in his *Hermes* says, "*A* leaves the individuals *unascertained*, whereas the article *the* ascertains the individual also." The only conclusion we can draw is that, *A* *points out* a thing, that is, *leaves it unascertained*!

Lowth, in his grammar, says "*A* determines it to be *one single* thing of the kind, leaving it still *uncertain which*." When Lowth commenced his Grammar, thus, "*A* short introduction to English Grammar," did he mean to be understood according to his rule, that he wrote *one* introduction of the kind, but it was *uncertain which*? "*A* battle between the English and Americans was fought at Lexington in 1775." Is it *uncertain* or *indeterminate* what battle is meant? If it is said other words determine that, the reply is, how then does *a* point it out? and how can it be said that *battle* is *in other respects* indeterminate?

Does *a* point out *one single* thing of a kind? '*A* horse likes grain'—does this mean *one single* horse? does it not rather mean *all* horses generally? If pointing out 'a single thing of a kind without determining which' constitutes *a* an 'article,' are not *some, one, any, &c.* entitled to the same name for the same reason?

Grammarians say that, "*a* becomes *an* before a vowel, or silent *h*," but the truth is *a* never becomes *an*, but *an* becomes *a*. For *an* or *ane* is the original Saxon word; it means *one*, and the *n* is dropped before *consonants* for the sake of euphony.

"*The* is called the *definite* article; because it points out what particular thing of the kind is meant; as Give me *the* book." Substitute *this* or *that*? as, Give me *this* book.—Hand me *that* book. Do not *this*, and *that*, point out a particular book, as much as *the* does? Are they not then deserving of the same title? 'The christian expects the coming of his Lord.' Is any *particular* christian meant? 'How long will it be ere you will exclaim, *The* summer is past, *the* harvest is ended, and my soul is not saved?' Is the *the* in this sentence a *definite* article? Says Cardell—"The least definite of all defining adjectives, is the word *the*. It is of general use where it is not necessary to be very *specific*, or a sufficient idea of the thing exists, to answer the purpose of ordinary communication; as a person at evening says, "*The* stars appear to night." *How many*, or *what* stars appear, must depend on something more definite to explain. '*The* wind blows.' '*The* camel is a beast of burden.' '*The* wolves were heard howling in *the* woods.' "New York was evacuated by *the* British army, and re-occupied by *the* Americans, Nov. 25th, 1783."—Gr. p. 40.

What has been said, will show the errors, and absurdities into which grammarians have run, for the want of due reflection.

RELATIVES.*

Relatives are words used to show the relation of one thing to another : such as *above*, *below*, *to*, *from*, *with*, &c.

“ There must be two sides to a relation ; we never use the word *above* without speaking of something as being *above*, and it must be above something else as a matter of course, whether it is barely *above* the ground, or ‘*above* these heavens to us invisible or dimly seen.’—*Cardell*. “ Thou shalt not make *unto* thee any graven image, or any likeness *of* any thing that is *in* heaven *above* (), or that is *in* the earth *beneath* (), or that is *in* the water *under* the earth.”

An action, or circumstance may constitute one side of the relation : as “ I *see* clearly *through* this day’s business.” “ My Lords, you seem *impatient for* the sacrifice.”

The noun which precedes or follows a relative, is frequently omitted : as I shot (the shot) above the mark. I threw (the ball) over his head. Peter went in (the house.) He walked to () and fro () up () and down the earth. Lift your axe up (). The ball is up a great *distance* in the air. How came it up

* That the term ‘relative’ is more appropriately applied to this class of words, than to that to which it has hitherto been, is obvious. It is necessary to a perfect definition, that it perfectly distinguishes the thing defined from every thing else. But the term ‘preposition’ is as applicable to the words called ‘articles’ and ‘adjectives,’ as to those called ‘prepositions.’ For the adjectives are *generally*, and the articles *always* placed before the noun to which they refer. And by many writers, the preposition more frequently than the adjective is placed after its noun. The term relative, as heretofore used, is equally applicable to *all* pronouns as to those to which it has been applied. (See remarks on the pronouns, p. 103.) The application of the term to the class of words to which it is here given, is not only appropriate, but ensures uniformity of principle in naming the different parts of speech.

is *up* a great *distance* in the air. How came it *up* there? I threw it *up* (). ‘Come to,’ ‘heave to,’ ‘cast up,’ ‘bear on.’ “Hence, if our thoughts have nothing to act *upon* (), they act upon ourselves.”

“I told the man who is painting my house to put *on* a good coat of white lead.” Every person of ordinary sense understands that the workman was to put the paint *on* the house.

If we speak of a man’s taking his hat *off*, or putting his boots *on*, there is no need of being very particular about objective words. Children will readily find them, if books and teachers will allow them to use their reason; and they are not likely to mistake in supposing that the man takes his hat *off* his feet, or puts his boots *on* his head. There is no need, therefore, of “adverb conjunctions,” or “postpositive prepositions,” to explain this prevailing structure in expressing the relation of things. It is the business of grammar rightly conducted, to teach two things: first, the complete and undisguised construction of words in a sentence, and second, how far it is allowable to abridge or modify this structure in practice.” *Cardell*.

The relative is frequently omitted before nouns of time and place: as He came () home. He came () here. He ran () a mile. He staid () hour.

The relative is frequently placed between a predicative and its object, its own objective case being omitted: Put *on* () your hat; take *off* your coat; that is, Put your hat *on* your head; take your coat *off* your back.

Two or more relatives are frequently placed together: as “All the region *round about* Jordan.” “And the cloud was taken *up from over* the tabernacle.” “Aaron’s sons shall sprinkle the blood *round about upon* the altar.”

The relatives are a species of definers, and often used as such:—When we say a thing is *fore* or *aft* the mast; *fore* and *aft* are relatives; but when we say the *fore* end, or *aft* end of a thing, they are definers. ‘The dog followed *after* his master:’ here *after* is a relative. ‘He was asleep in the *after* part of the ship;’ here it is a definer.

After is the dualistic degree of *aft*.

He was *at* the house; he was *near* the house; *at* and *near* are relatives. So, John went *near* the fire, James went *nearer* (), but William went the *nearest* (). Here *near* has three degrees of comparison, yet is a relative. John was in *near* connection with the fire, James was in a *nearer* connection, but William was in the *nearest* connection. Here *near* has the same degrees of comparison, but is a definer.

“ *Up, upper, uppermost*, are definers in three degrees of comparison, as much as *high, higher, highest*, and the difference in their meaning is very slight. So we have *in, inner, inmost; out, outer, outmost, or utmost*. The relatives, like definers, are compared by adding definers or other relatives; as *very far above* or *beyond, directly against, entirely through, exactly over*; the child was *close by* or *very near* its mother.”

Cardell.

The following list contains nearly all the relatives in our language, with their primary signification.

About, around, near.
Above, over, higher.
Across, over from side to side.
Aboard, on or in (a ship)
Aft, } behind, later.
After, }
Against, opposite, meeting.
Aloft, on high, up.
Along, by the length, length-wise.
Amid, } in the middle,
Amidst, } among.
Among, } united or mingled
Amongst, } with.
Around, } encircling, encom-
Round, } passing.
Astride, straddling.
At, by, near to, in.
Athwart, across, transverse.
Before, in front, preceding.

Behind, in the rear, remaining.
Below, lower, farther down.
Beneath, under, lower.
Beside, at the side.
Besides, more than.
Between, } intermediate.
Betwixt, }
Beyond, at a distance, farther off.
By, being, near, contiguous.
Down, off an elevation.
Ere, before.
For, cause, purpose.
From, beginning, offspring, origin, source.
In, surrounded.
Into, termination in.
Like, resembling.
Near, } almost, not far off.
Nigh, }

<i>Of</i> , procession from origin, object.	<i>Throughout</i> , completely, through.
<i>Off</i> , away, removed from.	<i>Under</i> , beneath, below.
<i>On</i> , contiguity with an upper surface.	<i>Underneath</i> , under, having something above.
<i>Over</i> , above, upon, across.	<i>Up</i> , top, above.
<i>Opposite</i> , in front, facing, ad-verse.	<i>Upon</i> , on top.
<i>Out</i> , not within, exterior.	<i>Unlike</i> , not resembling.
<i>Round</i> , encircling.	<i>Unto</i> , even, to.
<i>Since</i> , after, later, seeing.	<i>Until</i> , } to, even to.
<i>To</i> , end, termination.	<i>Till</i> , }
<i>Toward</i> , } looking to, facing.	<i>With</i> , being in connection.
<i>Towards</i> , }	<i>Within</i> , in, interior, internal.
<i>Thro</i> , } passage internal	<i>Without</i> , not in connection, ex-terior.
<i>Through</i> , } from side to side or end to end.	<i>Worth</i> , equal to in value.

PREDICATIVES.*

A Predicative is a word used to predicate *i. e.* to express some fact command or request, as *They go. Go. Will you go?*

Predicatives are the predicated words expressing whatever is said or predicated, in whatever form or manner.

* It is with much reluctance that we lay aside terms which have been so long established and so interwoven into our language, as those of *verbs* and *participles*. But we have done it not from a love of change for novelty's sake, but for imperious reasons. These reasons are too many and lengthy to be stated here; and we trust many of them, without enumeration, will be manifest to the candid investigator. The common use of the word 'verb,' conveys no idea of its *technical* use. The only recommendation the term has, is its *brevity*. But it is said that verbs should be so called by way of *eminence*, because they are the most *important*. But that is a mistake; *nouns* or names, must be allowed the precedence both in time and importance.

The terms 'affirmer' and 'asserter' are too specific. We could wish for a shorter term than the one we have chosen, but our language does not afford one that will signify the simple and general idea *to express*. Besides, the term we have selected,

not only conveys the desired idea, with philosophic accuracy, but also affords a happy facility in appropriately naming the two species or subdivisions, the nominal predicative and predicals. That these distinctions should be made, and should hold the rank we have assigned them, we think must be obvious to any one. For the words embraced in them are plainly *too different* from the genuine predicatives, to hold an equal rank and title with them, and *too like* them to have their claim to relationship rejected. Well then, allowing them their proper rank, what titles shall we give them? We need not spend time to prove that the term 'participle' is very objectionable and should be rejected.

The verb in the 'infinitive mode' should not be so called, because the distinctions of 'mode' are not necessary, and because its distinction from other verbs does not depend upon the '*infinitive*' manner of its use, but upon its very *nature*, and should be named accordingly. As it partakes of the nature of both 'verb' and 'noun,' and as the former predominates, it should not be called a 'verbal noun' nor the 'noun's verb,' but a 'noun verb,' or as our term exactly expresses it, a 'nominal predicative.'

DIVISIONS OF THE PREDICATIVES.

The predicatives have generally been divided into three kinds: the Active or Transitive; the Neuter or Intransitive; and the Passive or Receptive. Let us consider these distinctions. Of the defects of the *definitions*, which different grammarians have given to these terms, it is not our purpose now to speak. We intend only to consider the general distinctions according to the obvious ideas of grammarians in making them; viz., that the Transitive verb denotes action performed by its subject, and terminating upon something else as the object; as James *struck* William. Cesar *conquered* Pompey.

The Intransitive verb denotes action performed by or in its subject, and not affecting any other object: as We *are*, They *live*, We *run*, He *walks*.

The Receptive verb denotes action not performed by its subject, but by something else, and which terminates upon the subject or object: as, John *is convinced*, James *was struck*.

We will first consider what the difference is between the first two. 'James struck William;' here the verb is said to be *transitive*. 'James struck at William but did not hit him,' here it is called *intransitive*. We *run*, (intransitive.) We *run* our horses, (transitive.) The horses *run* themselves, (intransitive.) Birds *fly*, (intransitive.) Boys *fly* their kites, (transitive.) The rope-dancer *stands* upon a rope, (intransitive.) The farmer *stands* his grain up in the field, (transitive.) He

set his bundle down, (transitive,) and *sat* down upon it, (intransitive.) Having *set* things in order, (transitive,) he *set* out from home, (intransitive.) They *set* the armies in array, (transitive.) He *set* himself in opposition to the will of God, (intransitive.)

Can any scholar *perceive*, or any grammarians *tell* the difference between the verbs in each of these couplets? Can any one explain why one should be *transitive* and the other *intransitive*? Will not the one take if necessary an object after it, as readily as the other? We say yes. Is there any difference in their nature? We hesitate not to positively say *no*. The verb is precisely the same whether we say, 'We run the horses' or 'The horses run themselves.' The *action* is the same, the *object* is the same, and the *actor* is the same. And as to the *cause*, if it is the horses in the one case and the persons in the other, it does not alter the *verb* at all. The horses must in both cases be acquiescent, for no person can cause a horse to run, if the horse will not run. And besides, if persons cause a horse to run there is always something that causes the persons to cause the horse to run, so that there can be nothing in the cause, which alters the nature of the verb. For, it is immaterial to the verb or action, whether the horse is induced to perform the act of running by something which he *desires*, or by something that he *hates*, as a whipping; or in other words, whether he acts in obedience to his own will alone, or in obedience to his will controlled by the will of another. The case is the same with all the other verbs. There is no difference in the verb whether a man *sets* an army in opposition; or *sets* his own will in opposition; or *sets* himself in opposition; or whether some one *sets* him in opposition. But perhaps some will say that in the example 'He *sets* himself,' &c. the verb is *transitive*. If so, then all the above verbs are transitive and should be so denominated. From the foregoing we may see that there is no difference in the *nature* of the verbs. Perhaps it will be said that the distinction is not in the *nature*, but in the *use* of the verbs; and that when the object is omitted the verb is intransitive, and when not, it is transitive. If this is true, then all verbs are both transitive and intransitive. We say 'Cesar *conquered* Pompey;' 'he *saw* the Pyramids.' Cesar says 'I *saw*,' 'I *conquered*.' 'James *struck* William;' James *struck* at William. They *walk* their horses, their horses *walk*. Run a race, Sleep a sleep, &c. and so on. Some pretend that the distinction lies in the *form* of the verb. Say Murray, Smith, &c. "In the phrases, To dream a dream, To live a life, To run a race, To walk the horse, To dance the child,—the *verbs* certainly assume a *transitive form*, and may not improperly be denominated transitive verbs." But any verb may take after it the *name* of the *action*, and thus all verbs would be transitive. They say the verb *assumes a transitive form*. But what was

its form before? has it changed its *form* in the least? Certainly not. It is precisely the same with or without the objective case. How then can a person not destitute of reason or conscience, say that a thing has *assumed another form* when it has not changed its form one iota! But others deny that such verbs are transitive, because the noun after them is not the *object* of the action, but the *name* of it, and hence do not come under the definition of a transitive verb. Grant it, and what follows? It is allowed that such verbs as the following are transitive; *Write* a letter, *Make* a pen, *Build* a house, *Make* a cart, &c. They certainly come under the definition of a transitive verb, for they express action which terminates upon some object. But if a verb that does not take after it a noun denoting the *object* is not transitive, then these verbs are not. For a 'pen' or a 'cart,' is not the *object* of the act of *making*; because we cannot make a thing that is already made. But is it said that 'these nouns denote the *result* of the action, and that a verb which represents the action as producing an effect or result must be transitive?' Grant it. The same reasoning will prove that the verbs in 'Live a life, Run a race, Dream a dream,' &c. are transitive; for 'life,' 'race,' 'dream,' &c. are the result of the several actions denoted by the verbs.—Will not a consideration of the above convince any one that there is no difference between transitive and intransitive verbs. That they are alike in *nature*, *form*, and *use*; that we irrespectively insert or omit the object after them, not according to their being *transitive* or *intransitive*, but according as the nature of the case may require. That when we say, 'birds fly,' we omit the object, not because there is anything in the verb that prevents its insertion, but because it is not necessary. And when we say 'Boys fly,' we insert the object, not because the *verb* requires it, but because if not inserted we should not know whether it is meant that Boys fly their kites; or fly (themselves) to the assistance of their comrades; or, fly (themselves) about like a top.

We will now consider the Passive or Receptive verb. Some grammarians use one of these terms and some the other; but it is evident that neither of them is sufficient to cover the whole ground to which they are applied. For instance, in He was enraged, I am forced to go, He was compelled to submit, &c. the verb cannot properly come under the term *passive*; and if the term *receptive* is substituted, then such verbs as in He is dead, He was learned, They were encamped, She was seated, I am resolved, &c. do not come under that term any more than He is dying, He was learning, They were encamping, She was sitting, &c. So that whichever term is adopted, it proves inadequate to the purpose designed.

But wherein does the Passive or Receptive verb differ from

the Transitive or Intransitive? 1. She *sits* by her little sister, (I.) 2. She *is seated* by her little sister, (R.) 3. He *became enraged* by his treatment, (I.) 4. He *was enraged* by his treatment, (R.) 5. Two men *had engaged* in argument, (I.) 6. Two men *were engaged* in argument, (R.) 7. He *stands condemned*, (I.) 8. He *is condemned*, (R.) 10. He *is*, (I.) 11. He *is dead*, (R.) In the first and second examples the two verbs denote the very same act, performed by the very same person. Now, who can tell why the *second* should not be called *intransitive* as much as the *first*; or why the *first* is not as much *passive* as the *second*? It is an impossibility for a person to be both *passive* and *not passive* at the same time. Therefore if one of the verbs is passive they both are; and if one is not neither of them is. Again, which of them is receptive, and which not? 'She' in both cases performed the act herself and did not receive any effect from any extraneous cause. Is then either of the verbs receptive? if so, why? As the act is precisely the same in both cases, then if one verb is receptive the other is, and if one is not the other is not; because it would be false to say she received an action, and did not receive it, at the same time. In the fifth and sixth examples why is one passive or receptive and the other not, the same thing being expressed by both? And in the seventh and ninth, why is not 'stand condemned' as much passive as 'is condemned'? A thing and its opposite both cannot be true at once, therefore if the same action is expressed by two verbs having the same 'subject'; that subject cannot be the *agent* and *not* the *agent*, nor be the *object* and *not* the *object*; consequently if 'were engaged' is passive or receptive, then 'had engaged' is passive or receptive. And if 'had engaged' is passive or receptive, then any intransitive verb may be passive or receptive. But if 'had engaged' is not passive or receptive, then 'were engaged' is not. In the tenth and eleventh examples 'is dead' is no more receptive than 'is' and as to its being passive, a *dead* man is no more passive than a stone 'is'. So in *Prepare* to meet thy God; *Be prepared* to meet death; *let* him who can, tell the difference.

Let us now see how the case stands between the *transitive* and receptive. Does the difference consist in the one's taking an object after it and the other not?—They *offered* him a thousand dollar *salary*, (T.) He *was offered* a thousand dollar *salary*, (R.) (You *have asked* news of me.) 'You *have asked* me news a hundred times'—Pope, (T.) He *was asked* the news a hundred times, (R.) Several persons *offered* him money, (T.) He *was offered* money by several persons, (R.)—From these and other similar instances, we see they alike will take the objective case after them when necessary. But is it said that the difference consists in the subject of the verbs being the agent in the one case and not in the other?—The *army* had encamped,

(I.) The army were encamped, (R.) *He* had gone, (I.) *He* was gone, (R.) *He* was enlisted in the cause, (R.) *He* had enlisted himself and others in the cause, (T.) *He* engaged in the pursuit, (I.) *He* was engaged in the pursuit, (R.)—From such instances we see that the *subject* of receptive verbs, alike with others, may be the *agent*.

Perhaps it may be said that the distinction lies in the *form* of the verb. But what manifest distinction is there between the form of 'has gone' and 'was gone;' 'has convinced' and 'was convinced;' 'will be going' and 'will be gone?' There is a difference, but is it very obvious to an inexperienced person? And besides, such verbs as 'is dead,' 'be prepared,' 'was gone,' 'were engaged,' 'is seated,' &c. have the passive or receptive *form*, yet, as we have shown, are not passive nor receptive verbs. How then can the *form* be a distinguishing mark?

From the foregoing remarks, we think it must be manifest to every one that the *transitive* and *intransitive* verbs being alike in nature, alike in form, and alike in use, they are to all intents and purposes alike; and there being no real difference between them, none should be made by grammarians. And that kind of verbs called *passive*, many of them not being passive, should not therefore have the term; and if the term receptive is substituted, many of them not being receptive, the name is not appropriate. And besides, many of them agreeing with other verbs in their taking an object after them; and their subject being the agent; and some of them having the receptive form being not receptive, the reasons for distinguishing them from others by denominating them either passive or receptive, seem to be insufficient for making such a distinction. If one verb denotes 'passiveness' or 'the receiving of an action,' and another does not, the difference consists not in the verb but in the nature of the case. For, *He* was suffering, *He* has suffered, indicate 'passion,' 'suffering' or 'receiving an action,' as much as *He* was suffered.* To me it appears to be clear that there is no *essential* distinction between the verbs; and if there is not, then the distinction hitherto made should be rejected, and not retained to the embarrassment of the learner.

* 'The youth *was consuming* by a slow malady.' 'The Martyr *was burning* at the stake when he cried out.' 'He *was wasting* away with consumption.' Are not these verbs 'passive' or 'receptive' if there are any in language?

For further remarks upon the verb, see the extract from Cardell's Grammar, in the sequel.

TENSE.

The only attribute of predicatives is *tense*.*

If a predicative expressed *the fact* only, it would have but one simple form. But in addition to *the fact*, it expresses the *time* when the fact occurred, and sometimes several other ideas also.

* NUMBER, PERSON AND MODE.

There are many, who, without examining the subject, will deny the omission from predicatives, of the attributes, Number, Person and Mode. But while it has been no object with us to make unnecessary innovations, it has been equally remote from our purpose to gain the favor of the ignorant and the prejudiced by adherence to 'the accustomed track,' at the expense of truth and utility. The reasons for the omission are briefly given in the notes; and to the intelligent and unprejudiced, after a candid consideration of the subject, we are willing to submit the question, and will cheerfully abide their decision.

NUMBER AND PERSON.

If as grammarians state 'The nominative case governs the verb in *number* and *person*,' then the verb must undergo some change to correspond to different numbers and persons of its nominative case. But that that is true as a general thing we deny. We admit that it is so in some cases, but those are *exceptions* and not the rule, and as such we have pointed them out, (p. 140.) The correctness of this position may be seen from examples. *I will go. You will go. He will go. We will go. You will go. They will go. I had written. You had written. He had written. We had written. You had written. They had written. I wrote. You wrote. He wrote. We wrote. You wrote. They wrote, &c.* These and the majority of predicatives undergo no alteration whatever to correspond with the number and person of their nominative, or to denote those properties of themselves. Hence it cannot be said that they have number and person. Says Murray, in his Grammar:—"In philosophical strictness, both number and person might be entirely excluded from every verb. They are in fact the prop-

Therefore to represent a thing as past, or as present, or as yet to come, we use different *forms* of the predi-

erties of substantives, not a part of the essence of the verb." To this every lover of propriety must say, amen.

MODES.

In an elementary treatise no technical distinctions should be made which are not both *essential* and *clear*. Hence, the distinction in Grammar of *Modes* being neither essential nor clear, has in this work been omitted. That the distinction is *not clear* is manifest both from an examination of the subject, and from the acknowledged fact that "Scarcely two authors agree in the number and denomination of the modes."—WEBSTER'S Grammar.

We deem it scarcely necessary to advance arguments to show that the distinctions of *potential*, *subjunctive* and *interrogative* mode are indefinite and false. To a reflecting mind no reasoning is needed to prove that there is no essential difference of mode between I *may*, *can*, or *must* go, and I *do*, *will*, or *shall* go. Says Webster, "The forms of expression, *I can go*, *we may ride*, *he must obey*, are really declaratory, and properly belong to the Indicative (Declarative.) They declare the power liberty, or necessity of an action, instead of the action itself."

"Mode" is said to be "the *particular form* of the predicative, showing the *manner* in which the being, action, or passion is represented." But no person can with propriety, or reason, say there is any difference in the *form*, or *manner*, of those predicatives classed under the *potential*, and *indicative* modes. The *only* difference consists in the *meaning* of the *auxiliaries*, and if the distinction of modes is to be founded on the meaning, then there will be as many modes as there are auxiliaries.

Mr. Webster rejects the potential, while he retains the subjunctive mode; but the latter is even more absurd than the former. The 'subjunctive' or 'conditional' mode, is so called, because it is said to represent a thing under a condition, supposition, contingency, &c., but we are told at the same time, and by the same authors, that the supposition, or contingency is not expressed by the *verb*, but by some contingent, or conditional word which *precedes* it, and which they say is *no part* of the *verb*, but a *conjunction*! Now what consistency or reason is there in saying that a thing is so *because* it possesses a certain property, and in the same breath denying that it does possess that property!

Grammarians say, "The Conditional, or Subjunctive mode is the same as the Indicative, with some *preceding* word ex-

cative: as I *wrote*, I *write*, I *shall write*. This is the most pure, simple, and perfect form of the predica-

pressing condition, supposition, or contingency." What then is the difference in the *verb*? Mr. Webster rightly says, "The correct construction of the subjunctive mode, is *precisely the same* as the indicative." Why then does he have any subjunctive mode? Why make a distinction where there is none? Another thing which heightens the absurdity of the distinction, is that the verb said to be in the subjunctive mode, is not the one that is under the condition or contingency. For instance, Philip says to the Eunuch who requested to be baptized, "If thou believest with all thine heart thou mayest." The predicative *believest*, although it follows *if*, is not, as grammarians assert, the one that is under the condition or contingency, but it is *mayest*. Consequently if there is any truth in the subjunctive mode, then *mayest-be baptized*, and not *believest*, should be in that mode. Philip told him that he *would baptize* him upon *condition* that he believed with all his heart, but there was no contingency respecting his *belief*, for the Eunuch says positively 'I *believe* that Jesus Christ is the Son of God.' So with all other predicatives that follow conjunctions, and are put in the subjunctive mode. The condition, or contingency is never in the proposition which *follows* the conjunction, but always in the one which *precedes* it. "If he mounts now, we *are gone*." 'I *shall do it*, if I am able.' 'I *shall do it*,'—this I do not assert positively, but upon the supposition, or condition that 'I am able.'

There is more ground for an *Interrogative* mode, but as that form or manner of predicating is not confined to interrogation, the distinction is not sufficiently clear and necessary for to warrant its use.

If *any* distinction of modes is made, the only rational and defensible division of them is into the three, *declarative*, *imperative*, and *indefinite*, i. e. unlimited. But the 'indefinite mode' is not necessary because the distinction in such predica-

* "What we denominate the Subjunctive mode, is resolvable into the Indicative." WEBSTER'S Dissertations, page 187.

"The Indicative is employed to express conditional ideas more frequently than the Subjunctive, even by the best English writers." Ibid. p. 245.

"There is no Subjunctive mode; in strictness of speech all sentences are resolvable into distinct declaratory phrases." Ibid. p. 273.

Is it not a wonder that Mr. Webster after such declarations should have in his Grammar a subjunctive mode?

tive, which we have. It expresses simply *the fact* and the *time when*. If in addition we wish to show whether the action is *finished* or *unfinished*, we superadd that idea to the former by using another form of the predicative: as, *He is writing*; which not only declares the *fact* and the *time*, but also denotes that the act of writing *is not completed*. *It is written*, denotes that the act *is completed*. This latter form is used also to denote a different thing. If we say 'The cloth *is damaged*,' our purpose is not to show whether the act is finished or unfinished, but to signify what state the cloth is in. So that this form has a double use. In the one case it denotes the *state* of the *action*, in the other the *state* of the *subject*. Thus predicatives denote the *time* and the state of the *action*, or the state of the *subject* at that time. And if time was considered no more definitely than as past, present, and future, these distinctions of the predicatives would be all that would be necessary. But there is another distinction. *Now* is not present time, but only a *point in* present time. To say 'I have written' conveys the idea that the act is done *before* the *point now*. But to say 'I write,' conveys no such idea. It denotes present time without referring to any particular *point* in time.

As *now* is a point of time in the *present*, so we may assume any *point* in *past* or in *future* time. 'I had written,' bears the same relation to some point in *past* time, that 'I have written,' does to the point *now*

tives, of mode, is sufficiently designated by giving them as we ought their appropriate specific name, and this is done by calling them 'nominal predicatives.' We then have only the two modes, *declarative* and *imperative*. But predicatives of the latter mode are sufficiently distinguished from those of the common or declarative mode by calling them simply, 'imperatives.' Hence we say that the attribute of 'mode' is not necessary therefore should not be used. In respect to it we may ask—'cui bono?' what valuable purpose will be gained by its use? what detriment will arise from its disuse?

in *present* time ; and ‘ He will have written,’ corresponds in like manner to some *point* in future time. This *form* of the predicative represents the action as performed *before* the specified *point* either in past, present, or future time. Predicatives of this form add only the idea of *priority* to the distinctions mentioned above ; as He wrote, He had written the day before. ‘ He was writing’ when I saw him, denotes that he was then performing the action ; but ‘ He had been writing when I saw him,’ denotes that he was performing the act before I saw him, and also implies that it was but just before, a little previous.

From the above, you see that the predicatives convey the idea of *time*, and of the *state* of the *action*, or the *subject* with regard to time. *Tense* is the technical term for *time* ; but the forms of the predicative to denote time, and those to denote the state of the action or subject are so closely allied, that they both are included under one and the same term. Hence :

Tense is the *form* of the *predicative* which denotes *time* and the *state* of its action or subject.

The *divisions* of *time* are *three*, past present and future.

The *points* of time that may be assumed in these divisions are *three* ; one in each.

The *divisions* and *points* of time together, are therefore *six*. The particular ideas to which the mind may be directed, at or in each of these points and divisions are also *three*. Hence there are *eighteen tenses*.

Past.	{	<i>Wrote</i> , past tense perfect.
		<i>Was written</i> , past tense duple.
		<i>Was writing</i> , past tense pending.
		<i>Had written</i> , prior past tense perfect.
		<i>Had been written</i> , prior past tense duple.
		<i>Had been writing</i> , prior past tense pending.
Present	{	<i>Write</i> , present tense perfect.
		<i>Is written</i> , present tense duple.
		<i>Is writing</i> , present tense pending.
		<i>Has written</i> , prior present tense perfect.
		<i>Has been written</i> , prior present tense duple.
		<i>Has been writing</i> , prior present tense pending.
Future.	{	<i>Will write</i> , future tense perfect.
		<i>Will be written</i> , future tense duple.
		<i>Will be writing</i> , future tense pending.
		<i>Will have written</i> , prior future tense perfect.
		<i>Will have been written</i> , prior future tense duple.
		<i>Will have been writing</i> , prior future tense pending.

The signification of each tense is indicated sufficiently clear by its name.

Duple means twofold. *Pending* means continuing, not ended. *Prior* means *before*; (and in this case, before the specified point of time.)

The *perfect* tenses express *completed* action, and in the most *perfect* manner, both as it respects the *time* and the *action*.

The *duple* tenses have a twofold use.

The *prior* tenses, are so clearly connected with their specified point of time, that they cannot be separated from it by the intervention of another point of time, nor by any circumstance which causes a reversion of idea; nor can they be used to express what occurs *at* or *after* the specified point of time. Hence, arises another division of the tenses, which is preferable

to the preceding, in point of *simplicity*, but inferior to it in *philosophical precision*.

From the fact that all the *prior* tenses are *limited* by the designated point of time, and that all the others are *not limited*, by anything, the tenses have been named accordingly; those limited being called *definite*, and those unlimited *indefinite*.* And as an action may be *limited* or *unlimited* at any past time, or at the present, or at the future, we have consequently *six* tenses; *two* to denote the state of the action in past time, *two* for the present, and *two* for the future.

Wrote,	}	Past tense indefinite.
Was written,		
Was Writing,		
Had written,	}	Past tense definite.
Had been written,		
Had been writing,		

* Mr. Webster uses the terms *definite* and *indefinite*, as referring to the *time*, and as meaning *true*, *precise*, *certain*, or the contrary. But the truth is, the true meaning of the terms is, *limited* and *unlimited*; and as no predicative denotes the *precise time*, they cannot properly be applied to the *time* of an action, but to the *limitation* of an action. It is not the *time* that is limited, but the *action*. To show the correctness of this, take two examples: 'I *write* this line, better than the preceding. I *am reading* Cicero.' Mr. Webster says that *write* is in the present tense *indefinite*, and *am reading* present tense *definite*; but who does not see, that the former is more *definite* than the latter, for the former sentence indicates that I am now engaged in the act of writing, but the latter does not necessarily imply that I have a book in my hand, and am actually engaged in reading; but simply means that I have commenced (perhaps months ago) reading Cicero, and have not yet *finished* reading him. Hence, his use of the terms is incorrect. 'I *was standing* at the door when the procession passed.' 'I *stood* at the door when the procession passed.' The former of these he calls *indefinite* and the latter *definite*. But it is plain that the one is as definite or indefinite as the other. The difference between them (if any besides form) is, that one predicates the act as momentary without reference to duration, while the other implies duration in the act. *Perfect* and *imperfect* would be more appropriate terms to express the intended idea.

Write, }
 Is written, } Present tense indefinite.
 Is writing, }

Has written. }
 Has been written, } Present tense definite.
 Has been writing, }

Will write, }
 Will be written, } Future tense indefinite.
 Will be writing, }

Will have written, }
 Will have been written, } Future tense definite.
 Will have been writing, }

Have, has, or had, always helps compose a prior or definite tense, but not the others.

No predicative denotes the *precise* time. The form of the predicative shows whether time past, present, or future, is meant; but the *precise* time is always indicated by other words in the sentence, or by some attendant circumstance.*

* TENSE.

"Tense being the distinction of time, might seem to admit of only the past, present and future; but to mark it more accurately, it is made to consist of six variations." MURRAY.

"There are *six tenses*, modifications or combinations of the verbs to express time. Each of these is divided into two forms, for the purpose of distinguishing the *definite* or *precise* time from the *indefinite*." WEBSTER.

These definitions of 'tense' we deem essentially false in two particulars. First, 'tense' is not merely '*the distinction of time*' or 'modifications or combinations' of the verb to express *time only*. 'I *started* before twelve o'clock.' I *had started* before twelve. Here are *two* tenses, yet not but *one* time and one act. 'The President *will have signed* the bill before that.' 'The

TIME.

In order clearly to understand the subject of *tense*, it is necessary to consider that of *time*.

Time I define to be *limited ideal extension, relating to existence*. Eternity is *unlimited ideal extension, relating to exist-*

bill *will be signed* before that.' 'He *has published* the book.' 'The book *is published*.' 'I *wrote* from two till four.' 'I *was writing* from two till four.' In each of these couplets there are *two* distinct *tenses*, while the *time* is *one* and the *same*. But how can this be if 'tense' is only the 'distinction of time?' But further, 'the *distinctions of time* can be only *three*, hence, there cannot be *six* tenses to *express time*, or to *mark it more accurately*, nor, secondly, is the number of tenses increased *beyond six*, or even *three*, 'for the purpose of distinguishing the DEFINITE or PRECISE time from the INDEFINITE.

That no *predicative* 'expresses the *true* or *certain* time of action or being' is so obvious that it is a wonder and an astonishment that any should have made the assertion. 'He *died*;' when? this morning, yesterday, the day before, last year, or before the flood? 'I *rise*;' when? at noon, or midnight, or in the morning, or daily at four o'clock? I *am taking* lessons. He *had been writing*, 'He *will be writing*;' when? at what particular time? What '*precise*,' '*true*' or '*certain*' time do these predicatives express? do we not have to depend upon the context to know the *precise* time, the *when*? and yet they are not only predicatives, but are in the *definite* tenses, so called. Truly "the inquisitive scholar may naturally ask, as Murray says, 'what necessity there is for *adverbs of time* when verbs are provided with *tenses* to show that circumstance.' 'The answer is,' he says 'though tenses may be sufficient to denote the greater distinctions of time, yet to denote them all by the tenses would be a perplexity without end. What a variety of forms must be given to the verb, to denote *yesterday, to-day, to-morrow, formerly, lately, just now, now, immediately, presently, soon, hereafter, &c.* It was this consideration that made the adverbs of time necessary *over and above the tenses*!' " Yet we are told that tense denotes the *precise* time! To reconcile the two, must be the *depth* of philosophy. It is beyond our metaphysics—we cannot *soar so low*!

Having multiplied the number of the tenses to what some and perhaps many will call an unwarrantable extreme, it may perhaps be necessary to make a few remarks upon the subject. And if in so doing, the theories of other authors should be treated with considerable freedom, it will not be to detract from the merit of such authors, or harshly accuse them of blindness. But it may tend to show more fully the justness of our own scheme, to point out the defects in others. The subject of

ence. Time to man, is as long as the world exists. Time to the inhabitants of other planets, is as long as their world may

of 'tenses' has to grammarians been one of difficulty, and one upon which a diversity of opinions and theories have been advanced. The wavering of opinion upon a subject so important convinced us that the truth had been seen only through a glass darkly; that it arose from a want of a clear conception of what constitutes *tense*. Therefore we made it the subject of a long and thorough investigation, and the result of that investigation was the scheme we have given, and which we believe to be supported by both philosophical and philological truth. It appears to us that the two prime errors upon the subject have been these—first, that tense marks only the distinctions of time; second, that it marks the *precise* time. Both of which are important mistakes, for much is involved in tense besides time, and no tense marks the precise time. The number of the tenses has with different authors varied from three to twelve. The division of the tenses to correspond to the three divisions of time is founded upon a most obvious natural distinction. But every one who knows anything of language, knows that there are more than three tenses. The paucity of the division when compared with fact in language, like Egyptian darkness, is so palpable as to be felt. We need no argument to convince us of its deficiency because our perceptive faculties detect it at once. The next most natural distinction is into six tenses. This distinction is not only obvious, but is in accordance with fact in language. But while this has been a common division of the tenses, the distinctions have hitherto been made upon false principles, and the names which have been applied to them could not have been more exceptionable. Probably no one will attempt to defend the nomenclature of Murray, not one term in which, except the present, but whose use is too absurd to be in the least justified or tolerated. Other and better terms have been employed by some authors, yet we have seen none who made the divisions and applied terms according to what we conceive to be the *only true* principle (for *six* tenses) viz. the *limitation* or *non limitation* of the act as predicated.

Mr. Harris, and Mr. Webster, make *twelve* tenses. To do justice to those authors as well as ourselves, we shall present a synopsis of the tenses as given by each.

HARRIS'.

- { Write. Aorist of the present.
- { Wrote. Aorist of the past.
- { Shall write. Aorist of the future.

exist. Time to God, is eternity. When we inhabitants of earth, speak of time, we mean the 'ideal extension' from the

-
- { Am intending (to write.) Inceptive present.
 - { Am writing. Middle or extended present.
 - { Have written. Completive present.

 - { Was beginning (to write.) Inceptive past.
 - { Was writing. Middle or extended past.
 - { Had done writing. Completive past.

 - { Shall be beginning (to write.) Inceptive future.
 - { Shall be writing. Middle or extended future.
 - { Shall have done writing. Completive future.

Harris' distinctions of the tenses are philosophical, but not philological, for unfortunately they do not accord with fact, (in language.) In order to make his distinctions apply, he has to make a tense for the purpose, none of the kind being found in language. His distinctions are founded upon this principle, that we speak of an action without reference to duration, or with reference to it. And everything that has duration has a *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*. Therefore the divisions of time being *three*, and the divisions with respect to duration, *four*, there would be *twelve* tenses. But in his scheme a number of tenses are omitted; and there is, in language, no form of the predicative which denotes the *beginning* of an action. For such purpose we join a nominal predicative to pure predicatives: as, I am intending *to write*. But as, *to write* does not form the tense, this distinction is not philological, consequently, however beautiful it may be, it must fall.

WEBSTER'S.

- Write*, present tense indefinite.
- Am writing*, present tense definite.
- Wrote*, past tense indefinite.
- Was writing*, past tense definite.
- Has written*, perfect tense indefinite.
- Has been writing*, perfect tense definite.
- Had written*, prior past indefinite.
- Had been writing*, prior past definite.
- Will write*, future tense indefinite.
- Will be writing*, future tense definite.
- Will have written*, prior future tense indefinite.
- Will have been writing*, prior future tense definite.

To the above scheme, beautiful as it is, there are several important objections. He uses the terms definite, and indefinite,

creation to the final destruction of our world; unless we designate some specific division of time, such as years, days, hours,

not to denote the limitation, or non limitation of the act, but to specify the particular time of the act, erroneously supposing that the *predicative* marked the *precise* time. But even if the terms meant what he intends, he makes a false application of them, and thereby destroys the value of his scheme. For in fact, there is not the distinction of *precision*, or *want of precision*, between those he calls *definite*, and those he calls *indefinite*. To show this, we will adduce some examples in addition to those already given, (p. 129.)

First, the present tense. *I read, I write, I attend*, (indefinite.) *I am reading, I am attending*, (definite.) *I read* one hour each day. *I write* this line better than the other. *I attend* church at the Center. *I am reading* the Bible by course. *I am attending* lectures on Astronomy. Are the latter predicatives any more *definite* than the former? What is the difference in *precision*, between *I take* lessons in drawing, and *I am taking* lessons in drawing? does the latter any more mark the *true* or *certain* time? I do not see it.

Past tense. The man *was hung* at four o'clock yesterday. The ship *sailed* at six this morning. *I was writing* at the time. *Wherein* is the last example more definite than the preceding? The same may be said of all his tenses.

He has left it for the scholar to conjecture whether the tense of 'passive verbs' is definite or indefinite.

Why does he apply to the 'prior present' tenses the term 'perfect?' he has not told us, and probably no good reason can be given.

We will now state the reasons for our scheme.

Although all facts require time for their occurrence, yet they may be predicated either as with or without duration; as abiding or as momentary. If we say, *I was writing, I am writing, I shall be writing*, we represent the action as abiding or pending at the time mentioned, whether past, present, or future. Hence the propriety of the term *pending*. And we have only to prefix the epithet, past, present or future, to indicate *when* it was pending. But if we say, *I wrote, I write, I shall write*, no regard is had to duration, the bare fact is mentioned as of momentary occurrence in one of the divisions of time. As this form denotes *completed* action in the most simple and *complete* manner in which any fact can be predicated, we see the propriety of their being called 'perfect' tenses. To which it is necessary to prefix the appropriate epithets of time. Again, if we say, *It was written, It is written, It will be written*, we find that *both* of the above particulars are involved in the expression. For if we say, The book of Revelations *was written* by John,

‘the time of a man’s life,’ &c. The general divisions of time are into past, present, and future. *Past time* is time past or gone

we speak of the act of writing, and predicate it without reference to duration, as much as if we had said John *wrote* the book of Revelations. But in the sentence ‘The inscription upon the Cross *was written*, and Pilate would not recall it,’ we represent the writing to be remaining in or pending in that state in which the act of writing had left it.* Hence, as these tenses have a double use, they are properly called *duple* tenses. Again, a fact may be predicated as limited or as not limited. The fact *He wrote* has the unrestricted range of all past time; and *He will write* is unrestricted in all future time. And as present time is a compound of both past and future, *He writes* is unrestricted, not only in all past and future *time* but in all *eternity*. For we say with strict propriety, truth *is* eternal, for it *always was* and *always will be* immutable and everlasting. And this fact must always be predicated in the present tense, for it always did and always will be on both sides of *now*. Opposed to this unlimited manner of predicating, is that of assuming a certain point in the divisions of time, and predicating the fact in respect to that point; as He had written, He has written, He will have written. The assumed point in present time must be *now*, but in the past and future it may be at any time we please, whether distant from now one day, or a week, or a month, or a year, or a thousand years; as He had written when I saw him, whether yesterday, or the day before, or years ago. So, He will have written before I shall see him. A thing which grammarians have not noticed is, that although we may specify a certain time, yet it is not *time*, but a *point* in respect to which the fact is predicated. We cannot use this form to predicate a fact as occurring on any day, without specifying some point before which it on that day did or will occur: as He had dined yesterday at or before one o’clock. He will have dined to-morrow by one o’clock. But not He had dined yesterday, or He will have dined to-morrow, when no reference is had to a particular point of time. Yet we say He has dined to-day, because the point *now* is always understood. This form cannot be used to predicate a fact that occurs *at* or *after* the assumed point. We cannot say, They had raised the building *while* I was there, unless there is a point after that, understood. Nor they had raised the building *after* I was there. But we can say The building *was* raised *while* or *after* I was there.

* It may be seen more clearly from these examples: ‘The garment is torn;’ ‘The paper was soiled;’ ‘The book is blotted.’

by; *future time* is time not yet come; but what is *present time*? *Present* means 'being before one,' being now in view; and *present time* is generally defined to be, "time *now* existing; not past, nor future." But what is '*time now existing*?' Both *time*, and *existence*, imply duration and extension; but *now* does not. *Now* is not *time*, but a *point* in time. How then can anything have existence, i. e. extension, in that which has no extension? *Now* is only an imaginary *point*, or *bound*, between two portions of time, and consequently cannot be *any part of time*.

"A *point* is the *bound* of every finite *line*; and a *now* or *instant*, of every finite *time*. But although they are *bounds*, they are neither of them *parts*, neither the *point* of any *line*, nor the *now* or *instant* of any *time*." *Harris' Hermes*.

"It is evident that a *now* or *instant*, is no more a part of time, than *points* are of a *line*. The parts indeed of one line are two other lines." *Natur. Ausc. L. IV. c. 17*.

"A *now* is no part of time; for a part is able to measure the whole, and the whole is necessarily made up of its parts; but *time* doth not appear to be made up of *nows*." *ibid. c. 14*. "As every *now*, or *instant* always exists in time, and without being time is *time's bound*; the bound of *completion* to the *past* and the bound of *commencement* to the *future*;" for all time *previous* to the point *now*, is necessarily *past time*, and all time *subsequent* to it, is necessarily *future*; therefore we see that *all time* is either *past*, or *future*. "For if all time is *transient* as well as *continuous*, it cannot like a *line* be present all together, but part will necessarily be gone, and a part be coming." For, even the *smallest division* of time has *extension*, which a *point* has not; therefore a *moment* even is *too large* to stand at once upon the point *now*. And as that part of a moment which has not yet come to the point *now* must be *future*, it consequently cannot be *present*; and that part which has already crossed the point is *past*, it therefore cannot be *present*. We therefore come to the conclusion that philosophically and strictly there is no such thing as *time present*. But, it will be said that 'this is nonsense, for we do have present time and every one knows it and knows what is meant by it.' I grant that we have present time, or, what we call present time; but that 'every one' or that *many* 'know what is meant by it,' I very much doubt. If I did not, I should not spend so much *time*

And as we cannot use this form to predicate the fact as occurring at, or after, the assumed point, but always as having occurred *previous*, they are called *prior* tenses.

To each of the prior tenses also the terms 'perfect,' 'duple,' and 'pending,' together with those indicating time, are necessarily and justly applied.

upon the subject. Let us therefore see what we *mean* by *present time*. We say, 'The present century,' 'the present year,' 'the present month,' 'the present week,' 'the present hour,' 'the present minute,' 'the present moment,' &c. Now it is plain that the *whole century* cannot be *present*, be 'time *now* existing;' nor can the month, nor the week, nor the day, nor the hour; and we have proved that even a whole *moment* cannot be present all at once.

What then *do* we mean by the present year, the present day, &c.? *Time* we have seen is extension *limited*. A *year* is the time or extension from the *point* of *commencement* of a revolution of the earth around the sun, to another point which is the *point* of *completion*. A *day* is either the extension from the point midnight to another midnight, or between the two bounds sun-rising and sun-setting.

On the last day of a year, when it is nearly drawn to close; when its sun has already set, and the wheels of time have borne us on to the midnight hour; when the last hour and the last moment of that hour has come, then it is that one moment we are in one year, and the *next moment* in another; and the *point* which separates those two moments, is the *end* of the one year, and the *beginning* of the other. And that year which a moment before was *present* to us, is now *past*, and that which in the previous moment was to us *future* is now *present*. And why? Simply because, carrying with us, as we always do, the point *now*, the moment we step from within the precincts of one year, to within the confines of another, we make that *past* which before was *present*, and that *present* which before was *future*. Hence you see that time is not *present* as most suppose, because it is *at the point now*, but because it *lies on both sides of it*. We therefore define *present time* to be *time which contains within it the point now*. And 'the present year' 'the present day,' 'hour,' &c. is such a specific portion of time denoted by 'year,' 'day,' &c. as contains *within it* the point *now*. And whatever time lies *wholly* on the side prior to *now* is *past time*, and that which lies all on the side subsequent to *now* is *future time*. Or, in other words, whatever takes its rise with the point *now* and extends *subsequently* is future; and whatever may have been *antecedent* if it *ends* with *now*, is past. As all time must be on one side or the other of the point *now*, therefore *present time* is only a compound of *past* and *future time*.*

The above view of *time* will, it is thought, throw much light upon the subject of 'tenses,' and remove many of the difficul-

* 'I have heretofore risen at five o'clock,' this fact lies on the side prior to now. 'And I shall hereafter rise at five,' this fact is subsequent to now. We compound these two facts by using the present tense, I *rise* at five every morning.

ties under which grammarians have labored, especially in regard to the 'imperatives,' and what Murray calls the 'perfect tense.'

USE OF THE TENSES.

The Present tense is frequently used to express a general truth, or, in other words, to denote not that the fact *occurs* at the present, but that it is *true*; as, *Man is mortal. Truth is eternal. I am taking lessons in music.* "The secret which the murderer *possesses*, soon *comes* to possess him; and like the evil spirits of which we read, it *overcomes* him, and *leads* him whithersoever it will. He *feels* it beating at his heart, rising to his throat, and demanding disclosure. He *thinks* the whole world sees it in his face, *reads* it in his eyes, and almost *hears* its workings in the very silence of his thoughts. It *has become* his master."

It is also used in speaking of an author, in reference to his works that are extant, though he may be dead; as, "Homer *hurries* us with a commanding impetuosity: Virgil *leads* us with an attractive majesty. Homer *scatters* with a generous profusion: Virgil *bestows* with a careful magnificence. Homer, like the Nile, *pours* out his riches with a sudden overflow: Virgil, like a river in its banks, with a constant stream."

When a writer wishes to transport the mind either back or forward, and represent as present that which is past or future, he uses the present tense.

"The face of the innocent sleeper was turned from the murderer, and the beams of the moon resting on the gray locks of his aged temple, showed him where to strike. The fatal blow *is given!* and the victim *passes*, without a struggle or a motion, from the repose of sleep to the repose of death! It *is* the assassin's purpose to make sure work; and he yet *plies*

the dagger, though it was obvious life had been destroyed by the blow of the bludgeon."

So in the future: 'I shall be ready when he *comes*.' "Then when my country *takes* her seat among the nations of the earth, let my epitaph be written."

The following are actually future, because they have not the termination of the present. "Though he *slay* me yet will I trust in him," (though he *should* *slay*.) "If a man *smite* his servant, and he *die*, &c.," (shall or should smite or die.)

If we express a condition or wish, or make a supposition *contrary to a known or obvious fact*, we use in the *present* an auxiliary or single predicative of the *past* tense; and in the *past* one of a *prior past* tense; as 1. I should go if I *thought* it best. I wish I *had* a hammer. If I *had* the book I would let you have it. If the taxes laid by government *were* the only ones we have to pay, we would not complain. 2. If he *had* not *had* a strong constitution, he would have died. If it *had* not *stormed*, I should have gone. If it *had* *thundered* the air would have been cooler. This idiomatic mode of expression is adopted to distinguish between suppositive propositions where *uncertainty* is involved, and those where a *position is assumed contrary to fact*. 'If he *has* not a coat I will give him one,'—here the supposition is made in the common form and implies *uncertainty*. 'If he *had* not a coat I would give him one,'—here the supposition is made in the idiomatic form and implies that he *has* a coat, therefore I do not give him one. Mr. Webster complains that "this form of our tenses has never been the subject of much notice nor ever received its due explanation and arrangement." Yet he himself has done but a very little better, for he has only noticed the fact without giving any explanation *why* it is so. 'I wish I had a horse,'—this implies *the contrary fact* that I have no horse; and *why*?

Because it would be absurd to wish for that which I already have. As the apostle says about hope, 'For what a man seeth why doth he yet hope for?' so what a man has why does he wish for? And as 'Hope that is seen is not hope,' so a wish for that which we have is not a wish. Again, if a man says, 'I would go to church if it *did not rain*,' and yet does *not* go, the only conclusion we can draw is, *it rains*. His *declaration* and his *actions* can be reconciled in no other way. So in other cases of the kind.



PREDICALS.

Predicals are words derived from predica-
tives, and possess the properties of a predica-
tive together with those of a noun or a defi-
ner: as walking, walked, writing, written,
fighting, fought.

Predicals are of two kinds, *perfect* and
imperfect. The *perfect* predical denotes
completed action; and the *imperfect*, action
not completed.

The predicals do not of themselves usually convey
the idea of *time* any further than action completed or
pending necessarily implies time past or present.

The perfect predicals are regularly formed by ad-
ding *d* or *ed* to predicatives. Those that are not reg-
ularly formed usually end in *t*, *n*, or *g*; as, wrought,
bitten, rung, dug, &c.

The imperfect predical is formed from the predica-
tive by adding *ing*. The final *e* is usually dropped:
as race, *racing*; face, *facing*; love, *loving*.

When the two predicals are united, it is called a

compound predical: as having loved; having been written.

NOMINAL PREDICATIVES.

Nominal predicatives are a species of predicatives which partake of the nature of nouns and predicatives :* as ‘to go,’ ‘to be,’ ‘to improve,’ ‘to have.’

They are formed by prefixing *to*, to a pure predicative.

This *to* differs from the relative *to* as it has the force and probably the same origin as *do*, signifying *act, performance*. It seems to have been prefixed to predicatives upon dropping the Saxon termination of the infinitive ‘an,’ for the purpose of denoting action, and thereby to distinguish them from nouns : ‘Walk,’ ‘a walk,’ ‘to walk.’

Nominal predicatives are nearly equivalent to a predical with the definer *the* prefixed, and usually are used in nearly the same manner : as, ‘*To see* the sun is pleasant ;’ *The seeing* the sun is pleasant. ‘I did it for *to secure* your friendship ;’ I did it for *the securing* your friendship. ‘*To have done* that would have been folly ;’ *The having done* that would have been folly.

‘When one faints the hardest part is *to come to* ;’
When one faints the hardest part is *the coming to*.

Hence you may see why they have the nature of nouns, and are subjective or objective. Hence too

* “It is from the *infinitive* thus participating the nature of a noun or substantive that the best grammarians have called it sometimes ‘a verbal noun,’ sometimes ‘the verb’s noun.’ The reason of this appellation is in Greek more evident, from its taking the prepositive article before it in all cases.” *Harris*.

you may see why like nouns they so easily take a relative before them; as 'He has money enough *for to pay* his debts;' (for the paying.) 'I made a pen *for to write* a letter;' (for the writing.)

Hence we have the rule that the nominal predicative is in the case that a noun would be, in like situation; for example, '*To change* one's garments is conducive to health,' (subjective.) 'He began *to write* a letter,' (objective after a predicative.) 'What went ye out *for to see*?' (objective after a relative.)

The nominal predicatives have no 'subject,' but they take after them the 'objective case,' the same as pure predicatives: as

'Is not this the fast that I have chosen? *to loose* the *bands* of wickedness, *to undo* the heavy *burdens*, and *to let* the *oppressed* go free, and that ye break every yoke?' Is. 58. 6.

If the nominal predicative has a noun in the objective case before it, the relative must, in construction, be inserted;* as 'I made a pen (for) to write a letter,' i. e. I made a pen *for* the writing a letter, not I made a pen the writing a letter. 'He began to write a letter,' i. e. He began the writing a letter, and not He began *for* the writing a letter.†

The nominal predicatives can scarcely be said to involve the idea of 'time;' but having some of the forms of 'tense' they are arranged accordingly.

* "He did it to be rich; here we must supply by an ellipsis the relative *for*, 'He did it *for* to be rich,' the same as if we had said 'He did it for gain. Even when we speak such sentences as the following, 'I choose to philosophize rather than to be rich;' the nominal predicatives are in nature as much objectives, as if we were to say I choose philosophy rather than riches." *Harris' Hermes*.

† Thus it is sense as well as syntax, to say, 'I desire to live;' but not to say, 'I eat to live,' unless by an ellipsis instead of 'I eat *for* to live.'

To, the sign of nominal predicatives is commonly omitted before predicatives following *bid*, *dare*, *let*, *see*, *hear*, *feel*, *need*, *make*: as, *Bid him () tell the tale. I saw him () do it.*

AUXILIARIES.

On account of the variations of tense, it is necessary to unite several words to form one predicative. It is then called a *compound* predicative, and the last one of the words composing it, is called the *principal*, and the others *auxiliaries*, (i. e. helping,) because they help to compose and vary the predicative.

There are only a few auxiliary words used, or needed to effect the infinite number of changes required to express the ever varying shades of thought.

The auxiliaries are *am*, *was*, *be*, *do*, *did*, *have*, *had*, *shall*, *should*, *will*, *would*, *can*, *could*, *may*, *might*, *must*, and perhaps *let*, *need*, *dare*, and *durst*.

Some of these are at times used also as principals.

Can, and *could*, signify *ability* or *permission*.

May, and *might*, signify *liberty*, or *contingency*.

Must, denotes *necessity*.

Will, signifies *intention*, or *promise*, when expressed by a person of himself; and *prediction*, or *compulsion*, when expressed of another.

Would, denotes *willingness*, *wish*, or *determined purpose*, or simply declares a fact.

Shall, when the speaker uses it of himself *predicts*; when of others, *predicts*, or signifies *compulsion*.

Should, when spoken of a third person, denotes *duty*, or *compulsion*; when of a first person indicates *purpose* under contingency expressed by *if*: as, *I should do it if I could.*

The auxiliaries are frequently used to give *emphasis* to an expression, or to signify *opposition* to some fact or assertion: as, "Difficult as was the task, he *did*

accomplish it ;” here *did* is emphatic. ‘James *did* attend school,’ implies that he does not now attend, or that it had been asserted by some one that he did not.

The *principal* predicative, together with the remainder of the clause, or sentence, is commonly omitted, when readily supplied to the mind by what has gone before : as, ‘John and Thomas have never attended school, but Henry has,’ (*attended school*, being omitted, as the mind supplies it.) ‘William will not do as I desire, but James will’ ().

For the *principal*, and remainder of the clause, *do*, in some of its forms is frequently substituted : as

“One of the greatest pleasures we receive from poetry, is to find ourselves always in the midst of our fellows ; and to see every thing, thinking, feeling, and acting, as we ourselves *do*.” That is, as we ourselves *think, feel, and act*.

It is probable that originally there were no compound predicatives, but that the auxiliary now, was then a simple predicative, and the principal now, was a nominal predicative : as, I *can go*, i. e. I *can*, or am able *to go*, I *will go*, I *will to go*, I *may go*, I *may to go*, I *dare go*, I *dare to go*, *Let go* your hold, *Let your hold to go*.

VARIATIONS OF THE PREDICATIVE.

Predicatives do *not* have *number* and *person* ; that is, they do not generally vary to accord with the number and person of their subject. But—

Simple predicatives in the present tense, depending on a noun of the third person, singular number, add *s* or *es* to their usual form ; as, I improve, You improve, He *improves*, We improve, You improve, They im-

prove. I go, You go, He *goes*, We go, You go, They go.

In the solemn style, instead of *s* or *es*, *th* or *eth* is added; He improveth, He goeth.

A predicative depending on a noun of the second person singular, solemn style adds *st* or *est* to the usual form; Thou improvest, Thou goest, Thou wentest, Thou didst. *Shall* and *will* have *t* only added, and one *l* is dropped; Thou shalt, Thou wilt.

In compound predicatives, the auxiliaries only are varied; I have improved, You have improved, He *has* improved, We have improved, You have improved, They have improved. Solemn style, Thou *hast* improved, He *hath* improved.

None of the auxiliaries are varied, except *am*, *was*, *do*, and *have*.

Am and *was* are irregular, being thus, I *am*, You *are*, Thou *art*, He *is*, We *are*, You *are*, They *are*. I *was*, You *was*, Thou *wast*, He *was*, We *were*, You *were*, They *were*.

Do follows the general rule. *Have* changes *ve* to *s*, otherwise it is regular.

Was is the only auxiliary varied out of the present tenses, except in solemn style.

Predicatives are never simple, except in the *perfect present* and *perfect past* tenses.

By the following synopsis may be seen how false is the general rule that "a verb *must agree* with its nominative in number and person." The varied predicatives are in italic, that it may be seen how few they are comparatively, and that the most of them are to accord with the solemn style, and not *number* and *person*.

SYNOPSIS OF THE VARIATIONS.

SIMPLE PREDICATIVES.

	Move	Fight	Will
<i>Singular.</i>	{ 1. I move 2. You move 3. He <i>moves</i>	{ I Fight You fight He <i>fight</i> s	{ I will You will He <i>will</i> s
<i>Plural.</i>	{ 1. We move 2. You move 3. They move	{ We fight You fight They fight	{ We will You will They will

Solemn Style.

<i>Singular.</i>	{ 1. I move 2. Thou <i>movest</i> 3. He <i>moveth</i>	{ I fight Thou <i>fightest</i> He <i>fighteth</i>	{ I will Thou <i>willest</i> He <i>willeth</i>
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Other predicatives accord with these.

AUXILIARIES.

	Singular.	Plural.		Singular.	Plural.
	Are			Was	
<i>Present.</i>	{ I <i>am</i> You are He <i>is</i> S. S. Thou <i>art</i>	{ We are You are They are	<i>Past.</i>	{ I was You was He was S. S. Thou <i>wast</i>	{ We were You were They were
	Have			Had	
<i>Present.</i>	{ I have You have He <i>has</i> S. S. { Thou <i>hast</i> He <i>hath</i>	{ We have You have They have	<i>Past.</i>	{ I had You had He had	{ We had You had They had

	Singular.	Plural.		Singular.	Plural.
	Do			Did	
Present.	I do	We do	Past.	I did	We did
	You do	You do		You did	You did
	He <i>does</i>	They do		He did	They did
	S. S. { Thou <i>dost</i> He <i>doth</i>			S. S. Thou <i>didst</i>	

	May			Might	
Present.	I may	We may	Past.	I might	We might
	You may	You may		You might	You might
	He may	They may		He might	They might
	S. S. Thou <i>mayest</i>			S. S. Thou <i>mightest</i>	

	Must	
Present.	I must	We must
	You must	You must
	He must	They must

	Can			Could	
Present.	I can	We can		I could	We could
	You can	You can		You could	You could
	He can	They can		He could	They could
	S. S. Thou <i>canst</i>			S. S. Thou <i>couldst</i>	

	Will			Would	
Future.	I will	We will		I would	We would
	You will	You will		You would	You would
	He will	They will		He would	They would
	S. S. Thou <i>wilt</i>			S. S. Thou <i>wouldst</i>	

	Shall			Should	
Future.	I shall	We shall		I should	We should
	You shall	You shall		You should	You should
	He shall	They shall		He should	They should
	S. S. Thou <i>shalt</i>			S. S. Thou <i>shouldst</i>	

Might, could, would, and should, are conditional auxiliaries and are not fixed to any tense, being used in the present as often as in the past, and sometimes used as future.

COMPOUND PREDICATIVES.

<i>Present.</i> { <i>Perfect.</i> { I, We, Ye, You, They do He, She, It does Thou dost He, She, It doth }	{ may, can, must, might, could, would, or should }	{ mayest, canst, or must }	{ love. }
<i>Duple.</i> { I am We, Ye, You, They are He, She, It is Thou art, mayest be, canst be, or must be }	{ may be, must be, can be, might be, could be, would be, or should be }	{ loved. }	
<i>Pending.</i> { I am We, Ye, You, They are He, She, It is Thou art, mayest be, canst be, or must be }	{ may be, can be, must be, might be, could be, would be, or should be }	{ loving. }	

<i>Prior Present.</i>		
<i>Perfect.</i>		
{ I, We, Ye, You, They have He, She, It Thou hast He, She, It hath	{ has mayest have, canst have, or must have	{ may have, can have, must have, might have, could have, would have, or should have loved.
<i>Duple.</i>		
{ I, We, Ye, You, They have He, She, It Thou hast He, She, It hath	{ has mayest have, canst have, or must have	{ may have, can have, must have, might have, could have, would have, or should have been loved.
<i>Pending.</i>		
{ I, We, Ye, You, They have He, She, It Thou hast He, She, It hath	{ has mayest have, canst have, or must have	{ may have, can have, must have, might have, could have, would have, or should have been loving.

Perfect. { I, He, We, Ye, You, They did } love.
 { Thou didst }

Duple. { I, You, He, She, It was } loved.
 { We, Ye, You, They were }
 { Thou wast }

Pending. { I, You, He, She, It was } loving.
 { We, Ye, You, They were }
 { Thou wast }

Past.

Perfect. { I, You, He, She, It, We, Ye, You, They had } loved.
 { Thou hadst }

Duple. { I, You, He, She, It, We, Ye, You, They had been } loved.
 { Thou hadst been }

Pending. { I, We, Ye, You, They, He, She, It had been } loving.
 { Thou hadst been }

Prior Past.

Future.	Perfect.	{ I, He, She, It, We, Ye, You, They will or shall } love.
		{ Thou wilt or shalt }
Future.	Duple.	{ I, He, She, It, We, Ye, You, They will or shall } be loved.
		{ Thou wilt or shalt }
Future.	Pending.	{ I, He, She, It, We, Ye, You, They will or shall } be loving.
		{ Thou wilt or shalt }
Prior Future.	Perfect.	{ I, He, She, It, We, Ye, You, They shall or will have } loved.
		{ Thou shalt or wilt have }
Prior Future.	Duple.	{ I, He, She, It, We, Ye, You, They shall or will have been } loved.
		{ Thou shalt or wilt have been }
Prior Future.	Pending.	{ I, He, She, It, We, Ye, You, They shall or will have been } loving.
		{ Thou shalt or wilt have been }

The foregoing synopsis is a comprehensive view of all the varieties and combinations of the predicative. Any other principal may be substituted in the place of *love*, and undergo the same changes. It is not to be understood that all those subjects and all the auxiliaries are at once to be combined with the principal; but either of the subjects and any one of the auxiliaries; as *I may love*, or *he may love*; *we would love*, or *they would love*. *We may have been improved*, or *it may have been improved*, &c.

N. B. The synopsis of the predicatives is not to be committed to memory and repeated, but to be understood and referred to as occasion may require.

A list of the predicatives which are irregular in their formation.

<i>P. Present.</i>	<i>P. Past.</i>	<i>I. Predical.</i>	<i>P. Predical.</i>
Abide	abode	abiding	abode
Am	was	being	been
Arise	arose	arising	arisen
Awake	awoke	awaking	awakened
Bear { to bring forth	bore, bare	bearing	borne, born
Bear, to carry	bore	bearing	borne
Beat	beat	beating	beaten, beat
Begin	began	beginning	begun
Bend	bent	bending	bent
Bereave	bereft	bereaving	bereft
Beseech	besought	beseeking	besought
Bid	bid, bade	bidding	bidden, bid
Bind	bound	binding	bound
Bite	bit	biting	bitten, bit
Bleed	bled	bleeding	bled
Blow	blew	blowing	blown
Break	broke	breaking	broken
Breed	bred	breeding	bred
Bring	brought	bringing	brought
Build	built	building	built
Burst	burst	bursting	burst
Buy	bought	buying	bought

<i>P. Present.</i>	<i>P. Past.</i>	<i>I. Predical.</i>	<i>P. Predical.</i>
Become	became	becoming	become
Behold	beheld	beholding	beheld
Cast	cast	casting	cast
Catch	caught	catching	caught
Choose	chose	choosing	chosen
Cleave <i>to adhere</i>	clave	cleaving	cleaved
Cleave <i>to split</i>	cleft or clove	cleaving	cleft, cloven
Cling	clung	clinging	clung
Clothe	clothed	clothing	clad
Come	came	coming	come
Cost	cost	costing	cost
Crow	crew	crowing	crowed
Chide	chid	chiding	chid
Creep	crept	creeping	crept
Cut	cut	cutting	cut
Dare <i>to venture</i>	durst or dared	daring	dared
Dare <i>to challenge</i> —Regular.			
Deal	dealt	dealing	dealt
Dig	dug	digging	dug
Do	did	doing	done
Draw	drew	drawing	drawn
Drive	drove	driving	driven
Drink	drank	drinking	drank, drunk
Dwelt	dwelt	dwelling	dwelt
Dream	dreamt	dreaming	dreamt
Drop	dropt	dropping	dropt
Eat	ate	eating	eaten
Engrave	engraved	engraving	{ engraven engraved
Fall	fell	falling	fallen
Feed	fed	feeding	fed
Feel	felt	feeling	felt
Fight	fought	fighting	fought
Find	found	finding	found
Flee	fled	fleeing	fled
Fling	flung	flinging	flung
Fly	flew	flying	flown
Forget	forgot	forgetting	forgotten

<i>P. Present.</i>	<i>P. Past.</i>	<i>I. Predical.</i>	<i>P. Predical.</i>
Forsake	forsook	forsaking	forsaken
Freeze	froze	freezing	frozen
Forbear	forbore	forbearing	forborne
Gild	gilt	gilding	gilt
Get	got	getting	got
Gird	girt	girding	girt
Give	gave	giving	given
Go	went	going	gone
Grave	graved	graving	graven
Grind	ground	grinding	ground
Grow	grew	growing	grown
Have	had	having	had
Hang	hung	hanging	hung
Hear	heard	hearing	heard
Hew	hewed	hewing	hewn
Hide	hid	hiding	hidden, hid
Hit	hit	hitting	hit
Hold	held	holding	held
Hurt	hurt	hurting	hurt
Keep	kept	keeping	kept
Knit	knit	knitting	kuit
Know	knew	knowing	known
Kneel	knelt	kneeling	knelt
Lay	laid	laying	laid
Lead	led	leading	led
Leave	left	leaving	left
Lend	lent	lending	lent
Let	let	letting	let
Lie to lie down	lay	lying	lain
Load	loaded	loading	laden
Lose	lost	losing	lost
Light	lighted, lit	lighting	lighted, or lit
Make	made	making	made
Meet	met	meeting	met
Mow	mowed	mowing	mown
Mean	meant	meaning	meant
Pay	paid	paying	paid

<i>P. Present.</i>	<i>P. Past.</i>	<i>I. Predical.</i>	<i>P. Predical.</i>
Put	put	putting	put
Read	read	reading	read
Rend	rent	rending	rent
Rid	rid	ridding	rid
Ride	rode	riding	rode
Ring	rang, or rung	ringing	rung
Rise	rose	rising	risen
Rive	rived	riving	riven
Run	run	running	run
Saw	sawed	sawing	sawn
Say	said	saying	said
See	saw	seeing	seen
Seek	sought	seeking	sought
Sell	sold	selling	sold
Send	sent	sending	sent
Set	set	setting	set
Shake	shook	shaking	shaken
Shape	shaped	shaping	shaped, shapen
Shave	shaved	shaving	shaven
Shear	sheared	shearing	shorn
Shed	shed	shedding	shed
Shine	shone	shining	shone
Show	showed	showing	shown
Shoe	shod	shoeing	shod
Shoot	shot	shooting	shot
Shrink	shrunk, shrank	shrinking	shrunk
Shred	shred	shredding	shred
Shut	shut	shutting	shut
Sing	sung, sang	singing	sung
Sink	sunk, sank	sinking	sunk
Sit	sat	sitting	sat
Slay	slew	slaying	slain
Sleep	slept	sleeping	slept
Slide	slid	sliding	slid
Sling	slung	slinging	slung
Slink	slunk	slinking	slunk
Slit	slit	slitting	slit

<i>P. Present.</i>	<i>P. Past.</i>	<i>I. Predical.</i>	<i>P. Predical.</i>
Smite	smote	smiting	smitten
Sow	sowed	sowing	sown
Speak	spoke, spake	speaking	spoken
Speed	sped	speeding	sped
Spend	spent	spending	spent
Spill	spilt	spilling	spilt
Spin	spun	spinning	spun
Spit	spit	spitting	spit
Split	split	splitting	split
Spread	spread	spreading	spread
Spring	sprung sprang	springing	sprung
Stand	stood	standing	stood
Steal	stole	stealing	stolen
Stick	stuck	sticking	stuck
Sting	stung	stinging	stung
Stink	stunk	stinking	stunk
Stride	strode	striding	strode
Strike	struck	striking	struck
String	strung	stringing	strung
Strive	strove	striving	strove
{ Strow or	strowed or	strowing or	strown or {
{ Strew	strewed	strewing	strewed }
Sweat	swet	swetting	swet
Swear	swore	swearing	sworn
Swell	swelled	swelling	swollen
Swim	swam, swum	swimming	swum
Swing	swung	swinging	swung
Take	took	taking	taken
Teach	taught	teaching	taught
'Tear	tore	tearing	torn
Tell	told	telling	told
Think	thought	thinking	thought
Thrive	throve	thriving	throve
Throw	threw	throwing	thrown
Thrust	thrust	thrusting	thrust
'Tread	trod	treading	trod, trodden
Wax	waxed	waxing	waxed

Wear	wore	wearing	worn
Weave	wove	weaving	woven
Wet	wet	wetting	wet
Weep	wept	weeping	wept
Win	won	winning	won
Wind	wound	winding	wound
Work	{ worked { wrought	working	{ worked { wrought
Wring	wrung	wringing	wrung
Write	wrote	writing	written

Explanations of some words hitherto improperly classed.

As.

As is always a definer ; it means *so, such, like, while, when*, and with *to, respecting, concerning* : as “ I state it *as* it was told to me ;” “ He is much esteemed *as* a man ;” “ Take *such as* you please ;” “ He trembled *as* he spoke ;” “ —he journeyed on

Till *as* a rock’s huge point he turned,
A watchfire close before him burned ;”

“ *As to* the truth of that, I could not say.”

As, when used correlatively has the same meaning as the correlative word, and also defines a like word understood : as “ Send him *such books as* (i. e. such books) will please him.” ‘ Send him books,’—what books ? ‘ such books that will please him.’

“ *As* safe to me the mountain way,
At midnight *as* in blaze of day.”

That is, *so* safe the mountain way is to me in blaze of day, *so* safe it is to me at midnight.

As, so, such, &c. are transmissive words, and derive whatever force they possess at any time from their connection with a known, or specified circumstance. In the above case, we know the force of the first *as*, from its connection with the specified circumstance, *as*

in blaze of day; and of the latter from a knowledge of the safety of a person in the light of day. A person is usually considered quite safe from robbers in the day time; well, says young Malcolm, "I am *as* safe at midnight, *as* (safe) in the blaze of day."

'How much may I get?' 'As much *as* you wish.' Ascertain the quantity you wish to get and *so* much you may get. 'Do it *as* soon *as* you can,' do it so soon,—how soon? so soon you can. "Take such *as* you please,"—take such *such* you please.

This repeating the definer is an idiom of the language. Such expressions contain two propositions; and if there are only two definers, the first belongs to the first proposition, and the other to the second: as "The malecontents made such demands as none but a tyrant could refuse." The malecontents made *such* demands—none but a tyrant could refuse *such* (). If there are three definers, the first defines the second, and the third defines the same word *understood*; as 'Come *as* soon *as* you can,'—the first *as* defines the *soon* expressed, and the other defines *soon* understood.

As has usually been called an *adverb*, or a *conjunction*.

"But fear to call a more important cause,
As if 'twere treason 'gainst English laws."

Here *as* is called a conjunction, but an analysis of the sentence will show the error. 'We *fear* to call a more important cause, *as* we should *fear* if it was treason against English laws, to call a more important cause.' *As*, is a *definer* showing *how* we *fear*, by pointing to the fear well known, in a case respecting treason.

'I do not wish *as much as* that,'—here *as much as*, is called an adverbial phrase; but let us analyze it. 'I do not wish *as* or *so much* money, *as much* that much or amount you named is;' or, 'That much or quantity, you named, is *as* or *so much*; I do not wish so much.' But who would think of calling, *so many*

more as, in the following sentence, an adverbial phrase; yet it may be done with equal propriety. "The Lord God of your fathers make you a thousand times *so many more as* you are, and bless you *as* he hath promised you."—That is, 'You are *so many*, may God make you more than you are now, until you are a thousand times *so many*, your present number.'

As is said to be a '*relative pronoun*,' so called, when it follows *many*, *such*, or *same*; but the absurdity is too gross to deserve notice.

THAN.

Than is a definer, and is used in the same manner as *as*. It defines a word in the positive degree, corresponding to the definer which precedes it, in the dualistic degree; as, 'Solomon was *wiser than* Absalom,'—that is, Solomon was *wiser than* or *so wise* Absalom was. James is *taller than* (tall) William (is); William is so tall, James is taller, or more tall. When it follows *other*, a noun is repeated; I have no other fruit *than* (fruit) apples. *Than* is a transmissive word, used to point out the object with which the comparison is made. It has been called a conjunction, but for no other reason, than because it was not known what else to do with it.

EACH, EVERY, EITHER, AND NEITHER.

These words are always definers.

Each relates to the individuals of a number: as, '*Each* man of the army is allowed a fixed ration.'

Every denotes the whole taken separately: as, '*Every* man is accountable for his own conduct.'

Either implies *one* or *any one* of a collection without including the rest; 'If *either* of them disobeys he is punished.' 'There are several ways of doing it, *either* of which is correct.'

Neither means *not either*, that is, not any one of the whole.

These words have frequently been called pronouns, but it is an error, for they are never used instead of nouns; though the noun after them is often omitted.

EITHER, OR—NEITHER, NOR.

These words are always definers; they have been falsely called conjunctions, and erroneously said to be correlative. *Neither* is formed from *either*, and *nor* from *or*, by prefixing the Saxon negative *ne* to *either* and *or*; as, *ne-either*, *ne-or*.

Or is a contraction of *other*, and means the same; as, 'Let us conquer him *or* die.'—That is, 'Let us conquer him, *other*, or other than that, let us die.' 'He must work *or* starve.'—He must work *or*, *other*, *otherwise* starve. It denotes that if the preceding proposition is not true, the following one is.

'You may take either book,'—here *either* is admitted to be a definer, but in other cases it has been called a conjunction; yet it has the same force and import when followed by *or*, as when not. 'You may take either this book, or that,'—that is, 'You may take either book, this book *or*, *otherwise* that book.' 'You may have either the apple, or the orange,'—You may have either fruit, the apple, or the orange; or more fully, 'You may have either fruit, you may have the apple, *or* i. e. if you do not take the apple, you may have the orange.' Thus it may be seen that *either*, is not a conjunction. By these examples it may be seen too, that *or* is not a correlative of *either*; for the proposition containing *either*, is independent of what follows; as, 'You may have either fruit.' And the *or*, is a clausal definer between the two propositions; 'You may have the apple, (or) You may have the orange.' It is precisely like the following: 'He leaped from the boat, *otherwise*, (or) he would have been killed.'

"Either John or Thomas did it." Query—how can *either* be a conjunction? The *either* is superflu-

ous, but as it stands it may be thus explained ; Either proposition (i. e. *one* of the two) is true. John did it, *or* (if not) Thomas did it. The only peculiarity is, that *either*, means *one* instead of *any one*.

The remarks respecting *either* and *or*, will with the proper change apply also to *neither* and *nor*.

Oftentimes the *either* is suppressed ; as, ‘ Let us () conquer him or die ;’ ‘ It will () sink, or swim.’

In poetry, *or* and *nor* are frequently used for *either* and *neither*. “ *Or* nature’s laws to fix or to repeal.” “ Father of all that is *or* heard or hears.” “—*or* dense or rare.” “ *Nor* in sheet nor in shroud we wound him.” It sometimes has a like use in prose ; as, “ Another New England, *nor* we, nor our children shall ever see if this be destroyed.”—*Beecher*.

AND, BUT, IF, THOUGH, EXCEPT, SAVE, UNLESS, LESS.

All these words, however they may have been classed heretofore, are regular, and proper imperatives. They usually apply to the proposition which follows, and may, or may not have *that* after them referring to it. When they apply to a *word* that follows, *that* cannot be used.

And always means *add*. 4 *add* 2 are 6 ; 4 *and* 2 are 6. 4 shillings *add* 6 pence, are 75 cents ; 4s. *and* 6d. are 75 cts. The capitals of Connecticut are Hartford *and* New Haven.

It is used between subjects when the fact predicated is applicable alike to each ; as John and James and Harriet, are fine scholars.

When several particulars are connected, the *and*, as it can readily be supplied by the mind, is usually omitted, except between the last two. “ Is he proud of his skill in music, in dancing, in fencing, in fox-hunting, *and* in gambling ? of his knowledge in languages, in literature, in arts *and* sciences ? Or is he proud that he is subjected to the asthma, the gravel,

the dropsy *and* the gout ; that his funeral will be attended by a train of mourners, and that a monument of marble will be erected to his memory when his carcass is putrefying with the reptiles of the dust ?”

But when it is desired to add weight to the sentence, and give prominence to the several particulars, the *and* is inserted. “I know thy works, *and* thy labor, *and* thy patience, *and* how thou canst not bear them which are evil ; *and* thou hast tried them which say they are apostles *and* are not, *and* hast found them liars ; *and* hast borne, *and* hast patience, *and* for my name’s sake hast labored *and* hast not fainted.”

But, being derived from two different words, has two different meanings. *But*, from the Saxon *be-utan*, be out, leave out, save, or except ; “All *but* one are here”—all *save* or *except* one.

But for *bot*, as it was formerly written, from *botan* to boot, add, preteradd. “Twenty are here, *but* five more are coming,”—*add* the proposition, “five more are coming.” There is a corruption in respect to the use of *but*, but it is now so common as to authorize its use. “There were *but* five present.” Here *but* is said to have the sense of *only* ; and since the sentence is readily understood and has the recommendation of brevity, it may be justified. Yet the sentence construed literally, is defective ; as, There were present except five. It should be, There were *not* but five present—that is, There were none present if we except five.

If, suppose, grant, allow. It was formerly written *gif*, the word from which *give* comes. “You shall have them *if* (grant the fact or proposition) I can get them.” “*If* () a man dies, will he live again ?” Suppose the fact, ‘a man dies,’ ‘will he live again ?’

Though, *Although*, grant, allow, admit. “For *though* (that) I made you sorry with a letter, I do not repent, *though* () I did repent.” “*Although* all shall be offended *yet* will not I.” Admit even that, all

the rest shall be offended, *yet* (get or retain) this, I will not. *Yet* is originally the same word as *get*; *y* and *g* being interchanged irrespectively.

Except, to take out or away. "They have all arrived *except* three musicians."—"Except () these abide in the ship ye cannot be saved."—The proposition, 'Ye cannot be saved' is true, if you take away the fact expressed in the other. "I tell you nay, but *except* ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish." Ye shall all likewise perish—this is true *if* (give or grant that) you do not repent. Except is not a preposition or relative as named by some grammarians, for it does not denote *relation*, which is the essential characteristic of that class of words.

Save, leave out, except. "Of the Jews five times received I forty stripes *save* one." "And there was not left a man of them, *save* Caleb the son of Jephunneh, and Joshua the son of Nun."

Unless, take away, dismiss, except. It is used in the same manner as *except*, and often interchanged with it. 'He is not in town *unless* he arrived yesterday.'

Less, take away, remove. "14 and 7 and 23, less 4 are how many?"

Else is similar to *less* or *unless* in its meaning and use.

PREDICALS.

LEST, PROVIDED, NOTWITHSTANDING, SEEING, DURING.

Lest is a predical, from *less*, and means dismissed, taken away, &c. "Reprove not a scorner *lest* he hate thee."—Reprove not a scorner, that being dismissed, or, in other words, act to the contrary, and reprove a scorner and he will hate you.

Provided, granted, allowed, &c. "I shall go, *provided* he sends for me."

Notwithstanding means opposing, not standing with. "He went notwithstanding he was told not to."—He was told not to go ; notwithstanding or opposing that prohibition, he went. Mr. Webster says notwithstanding means *not* opposing, but in no case can we find that it has that meaning, but the contrary. Take, for instance, an example which he himself cites. "Moses said let no man leave of it till the morning, *notwithstanding* they harkened not to Moses." This in full he says, would be 'Moses said let no man leave of it until the morning ; *notwithstanding this command* of Moses, they harkened not to him.' Now, how he can make notwithstanding to mean *not* opposing, is to us a mystery.

Seeing, when used as in the following sentence, "Wherefore come ye to me *seeing* ye hate me," means, *being seen*, or *being in existence* so as to be seen ; 'Ye hate me,' *seeing that*, or that fact *being seen* or *existing*, 'wherefore come ye to me?' *Since* is used before propositions, in the same manner and with a like meaning.

During is in its formation a regular predical, from *dure*, but in its use is a relative, and is classed accordingly.

Some of the foregoing words are used as definers, or relatives ; as, *since* when used before nouns, is a relative ; *yet* and *else* are often used as definers, &c.

DEFINERS.

WHAT, WHICH.

What and *which* are always definers ; though commonly that which is defined is understood. *What* is often used as equivalent to *that which*, and must be parsed as such. 'This is *what* I wanted.'—This is *that which* I wanted. These words have usually been called *pronouns*, but it is an error, as they are never used instead of a noun.

THAT.

That is always a definer, the thing defined being often omitted. *That* has been called an adjective pronoun; in respect to that, see p. 104. It is also called a *conjunction*; but upon that point see in the sequel, the extract from Webster's Manual.

ALL.

All is a definer when it precedes a noun without any intervening word; as, '*All* men are mortal.' When *the* precedes or follows it, either expressed or implied, it is a noun; as, '*All* the troops were disbanded.' 'He has sold *all* of his hay,'—(the whole.)

NEVER.

Never when used as, 'It rained *never* so hard,' means something beyond any thing of the kind before. *Ever* is sometimes improperly substituted for it, and the substitution is authorized by some grammarians, yet it is an error. Substitute *ever* in the above sentence and the superlative meaning vanishes at once; instead of representing it as something more than common, it represents it as only what commonly happens. 'It rains *ever* so hard; that is, it *always* rains so hard. The substitution might as properly be made in the following sentence as in such as the above. "*Never* saw I the like before." *Ever* saw I the like before. The intended meaning is entirely perverted by the substitution; therefore it should be studiously avoided.

BECAUSE.

Because is a word compounded of *by* and *cause*; it is a clausal definer, involving both the noun and relative. It has usually been called a '*conjunction*,' but the impropriety of that may be seen from the remarks by Webster in the extract on a subsequent page.

THEN.

Then when it denotes a consequence has been improperly called a conjunction ; but it is always a definer. "He sent for you," "*Then* I must go." *Then* defines *must go*, showing the reason why. That it is not a conjunction is evident, because if we substitute *consequently*, which may be done with propriety, the same authors that call *then* a conjunction, would call *consequently* an adverb, that is, a definer of a verb, or some other part of speech except a noun, usually.

HERE, THERE, WHERE.

These words were originally nouns, meaning *this place*, *that place*, and *what place*. They are now sometimes used as nouns and sometimes as definers. "About ten o'clock in the morning we came to *where* this line of rugged hills swept down into a valley."—*W. Irving*. "They came to *where* the smoke of the distant camp was seen rising from the woody margin of the stream."—*Irving*.

"Go search it *there, where* to be born and die,
Of rich and poor makes all the history."—*Pope*.

Whence, from which position.

Hence, from a present position.

Thence, from that place.

Hitherto, to the time present.

Hither, to this place.

Thither, to that place.

Whither, to what place.

While, a wheel, a period, or revolution.

Perhaps, by haps or chance.

Wherefore, for which ().

Therefore, for that ().

These words are usually definers, though some of them are sometimes nouns ; as "From *hence* it appears probable enough."—*Addison*.

RULES.

Grammar rules are of two kinds; *rules of construction* and *rules of collocation*.

RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

RULE I.

A noun is in the Subjective case, when any thing is predicated of it. See p. 95.

RULE II.

A noun is in the Objective case, when it follows a predicative, or a relative. See p. 95.

RULE III.

A noun is in the Relative case, when it indicates a relation between the objects represented by itself and a following noun. See p. 97.

RULE IV.

A noun is in the Independent case, when it has no constructive connection in a proposition. See p. 98.

RULE V.

A noun explaining another noun and denoting the same thing, is in the same case. See p. 96.

“Must I leave thee, *Paradise*.”—*Paradise* is in the same case with *thee*.

RULE VI.

Pronouns have the same number and person and take the same relations to other words as the nouns they supersede would do in the same place.

RULE VII.

Two or more nouns united by *and* or *add* are usually taken as a collective plural in their relation to other words.

RULE VIII.

A collective noun, when the mind is directed to the individual parts by it embraced, takes the same relation to other words as a plural noun.

“The *clergy* began to withdraw *themselves* from the temporal courts.”

RULE IX.

Words in their constructive relations to other words, are singular, or plural, just as

the idea of unity or plurality may predominate.

"The greater *part* of philosophers *have* acknowledged the excellence of this government."

"There *was* more than a hundred and fifty thousand *pounds* sterling." "A *part* of the exports *consist* of raw silk." "I have not been to London *this* five *years*." "How long will *that* *people* provoke me, and how long will it be ere *they* will believe me for all the signs that I have showed among *them*." "Liberty should reach every individual of a *people*; as *they* all share one common nature." "But it is not this real essence that distinguishes them into species; *it* is *men* who range them into sorts." "Their safety and welfare *is* most concerned." "Either sex and every age *was* engaged in the pursuits of industry." These sentences cited, though in opposition to the teachings of the old grammars, respecting number and person, are nevertheless of the best authority, both as to their authors and their propriety; and show that nature will triumph over, or break through the trammels of grammar rules imposed arbitrarily. The following improper and inelegant sentences show the absurdity of adhering to the rules in all cases. "The proportion of infants which *dies*;" Is it the *proportion* which *dies*, or is it the *infants*? "While such a cloud of mischiefs *hangs* about us." "—because a greater part of the born *lives* to marry." Query, does the *part* marry?

It is correct to say, nine times nine *are* eighty one, or nine times nine *is* eighty one; for the individuals of the number are considered in the one case, and the aggregate in the other.

RULE X.

Nominal predicatives are in the same case that a noun would be in the same situation.

"For to me, *to live* is Christ and *to die* is gain." "What went ye out for *to see*?" "*To confess* the truth, I was much in fault." In the first sentence, it is in the Subjective case, in the second, Objective, in the third, Independent.

RULE XI.

Imperatives are often used without any proper subject.

"Israel burned none, *save* Hazor only." "*Let* us make man," &c. "*Go* to now *let* us," &c.

RULE XII.

Imperfect predicals take the objective case after them, the same as predicatives.

"Men *speaking* perverse *things*, will arise."

RULE XIII.

Imperfect and compound predicals may have case like nouns.

"His *being* intemperate *deprived* him of good society." "I had heard *of* his *being* intemperate." *Being* of an ungovernable temper they could do nothing with him.

RULE XIV.

Any predicative may take after it one or more objective case.

"They *offered* him a salary; therefore, he *was offered* a salary." "They *slept* their last *sleep*."

RULE XV.

Definers are used to define single words of any class, or an assemblage of words.

RULE XVI.

Words of any class may occasionally be used in any other class; and when so, they are parsed according to the class in which they are used.

REMARK.

And is used between subjects when the fact predicated is applicable alike to them all.

REMARK.

The subject and predicate may be either *logical*, or *grammatical*.

A *grammatical* subject is simply the subject of the predicative, without any modifying words; as "The principal ministerial *officer* in a county is the sheriff."

A *logical* subject is the subject of the predicative together with all its modifying words; as "*The principal ministerial officer in a county* is the sheriff."

A *grammatical predicate* is simply the predicative without any modifying words; as "The air *is* an elastic substance."

A *logical predicate* is the predicative together with all the modifying words; as "The air *is an elastic substance*."

The above distinctions are sometimes referred to by calling the grammatical subject 'the subject of the predicative;' and the logical subject 'the subject of the proposition.'



RULES OF COLLOCATION.

Rules respecting the collocation of words are so numerous and variable, that they are better learned from observation, than from a book. The following general rules may be given, but they are by no means certain at all times, and less so in poetry than in prose.

1. The natural order is, first, the *subject*, next, the *predicative*, and last, the *object*; 'David slew Goliath.'

2. Single modifying words are placed before the subject and object. ‘*These abominable principles demand the most decisive indignation.*’

3. Modifying clauses are usually placed after the subject and object. ‘The improvements *of the press* have reduced the price *of books.*’

4. The subject may be separated from its predicative, by an intervening proposition. ‘The press, *that lever of Archimedes, which now moves the world,* was unknown.’

5. In interrogative propositions the subject is placed after a simple predicative, and after the first auxiliary of a compound predicative. ‘Have *you* a horse?’ ‘Is *he* well?’ ‘Do *you* call this submission?’ *Who, which,* and *what* form exceptions to the rule; ‘Who can abide it?’ ‘Which is the one?’ ‘What book is that?’

6. In conditional or hypothetical propositions, where the word expressing the hypothesis is omitted, the subject is placed the same as in interrogative propositions. ‘Had *the day* been fair, I should have gone.’ ‘Did *he* but know my fears, he would be more careful.’ ‘Was *it* only a mile, I would go.’

Imperative propositions sometimes accord with the above, and sometimes with the natural order.

7. When a proposition introduced by a definer, has no objective case, the subject is often placed after the predicative. ‘Gradual sinks the *breeze* ;’ ‘Wonderful was the *effect* of their labor ;’ ‘So panteth my *soul* after thee, O Lord ;’ ‘Thus saith the *Lord.*’

8. In narration, the order of the proposition introducing another’s language, is frequently inverted. ‘Father, *said I*, what are these huge volumes? These, *said he*, are the Interpreters of the Scriptures. There is a prodigious number of them, *replied I*. Are there, *answered he*?’

Respecting the position of definers, no certain rules can be given, for it is a matter to be determined by the particular idea the writer wishes to convey ; for

instance, 'Enter this door *only*'—that is, enter this door and not the others. 'Enter this *only* door'—that is, there is but this one door which you may or can enter. 'Enter *only* this door'—that is, merely *enter* and no more; this form is sometimes used to mean the same as the first, but incorrectly. '*Only* enter this door'—here *only* defines the proposition; as much as to say, *Enter this door*, and such and such will be the consequences. We see from the example given, that the position of the definer is determined by the idea required to be conveyed, consequently no fixed rules can be given. We would ask the Adverbial grammarians if they can make scholars see the propriety of calling *only*, as in the above cases, sometimes an *adverb*, and sometimes an *adjective*? Query—what is *only* in the last example, where it belongs not to a *verb*, *adjective*, or *noun* alone, but to *all* together?

Respecting the *omission* of words, it may be given as a general rule, that words *may be* omitted whenever the ellipse will not obscure the meaning; the following are some cases where they *are* usually omitted.

1. The *to* of nominal predicatives following *bid*, *let*, *see*, *hear*, *feel*, *make*, and some others is omitted; as, 'He bid me () come unto him,' 'They made him () do it,' &c.

2. The relative before nouns of time, distance, direction, &c., is usually omitted. 'He lived here () seven years;' 'The horses ran () a mile,' &c. The propriety of inserting a relative in such cases whether in writing or parsing is by many doubted, because it is an idiom of the language to use the expressions without a relative.

3. After the definers *which*, *what*, *this*, *that*, *these*, *those*, *few*, *many*, &c. the noun defined is often omitted. 'Many () are called, but few () are chosen.' 'This () is an evidence of the truth of that ().' 'Which () will you have?' 'What () is this?'

4. After *than*, there is usually an ellipsis of one or more words besides the definer corresponding to the one the in dualistic degree. ‘There is none in this house greater than () I,’ ()—that is, than great, I am. ‘It is better for me to die, than () () to live’—*for me*.

But it is needless as well as impossible to give rules for all cases of ellipse. When a word or words, once mentioned, occur again in close connection, there is usually an ellipse; as, ‘*I will pull down my barns and () build greater*’ (). ‘*I shall not go to town to day, but Henry will*’ ().

PUNCTUATION.

Before giving rules for punctuation, it will be profitable to consider what punctuation is, and what is its use. Punctuation is commonly defined to be, “The marking of the several pauses to be observed in reading and speaking.” And in strict consistency with this definition the comparative *length* of the pauses, is given. But, whatever punctuation may have been formerly, it is manifest to an investigator, that it is not now what it is said in the above definition, to be. For if the object is to mark the pauses to be observed in reading, then a point should be placed wherever a pause is to be made, and a pause should be made wherever a point is placed; which is not the case, as every good reader knows. Good reading often requires a pause to be made after the subject of a verb or predicative; but it would be a violation of the rules of punctuation, to put a point there. Thus, “All finery—is a sign of littleness.” “An idle, trifling society—is near akin to such as is corrupting.” “True gentleness—is native feeling heightened and improved by principle.” As to the length of the pauses, it is well known that we make the same pauses

of much greater length in reading serious, dignified pieces, than in those of a lively, spirited nature. And as to the *comparative* length of them, we know that good readers often stop as long at a comma as is required for a semicolon, or colon, and frequently for these last, not longer than for a comma; and at a period we may stop one, two, three, or four *moments*, or as many *hours*. Hence we infer it is not the business of points to mark the *pauses* to be observed in reading. We do not mean by this, to say that punctuation has nothing to do with reading. Good reading is mainly dependent on the apprehension of the sense of the piece, and punctuation, so far as it aids in a ready and clear perception of that, is highly conducive to it. And this we conceive to be the main object of punctuation; not to mark the *pauses*, but the *sense*. For illustration; "On the use made of the Psalms, in the New Testament"—This sentence requires no *pause*, yet it requires points to mark the sense; for who ever heard of there being psalms in the New Testament? Yet without punctuation the sentence reads thus. But separate the clause of *the Psalms* by points, and then it will read as it should, "On the use made in the New Testament." Again; "That I may be delivered from them that do not believe in Judea."—Here also points are needed to mark the sense rather than a pause. There should be a comma after *believe*, to show that the clause *in Judea*, does not come in connection with it; and another after *them*, to show that it belongs in there. For the apostle was speaking of disbelief in *christianity*, not *Judea*; but the *men* were in Judea.

The following on punctuation, it is hoped, will be found to be not merely new, but better than the rules heretofore given, inasmuch as the *reasons* are given.

Punctuation is the division of a composi-

tion, by significant points, to aid in apprehending the meaning.

The Period (.) is a point placed at the close of a sentence to denote that the thought is complete. Man is mortal. Truth is immutable. It is used also to denote an abbreviation ; as N. Y. New York. Heb. Hebrews.

Colon (:)*

The Semicolon (;) } is used between members of a sentence to denote that the previous member is complete, yet, what follows is to be considered in connection with it ; as " Economy is no disgrace ; for it is better to live on a little, than to outlive a great deal." " Be in peace with many ; nevertheless have but one counselor of a thousand."

The Comma (,) is used to remove obscurities that may arise from collocation. When the order of construction is so interrupted by transposition, interposition, or el-

* "This point is of little use ; the difference between the colon and semicolon is so small, that the two pauses are frequently confounded, as may be seen in our present version of the Proverbs. It is said that a colon should be placed before a quotation ; but I consider the use of the semicolon as preferable. I conceive the colon might be rejected, without injury to the perspicuity of sentences ; and punctuation very much simplified by substituting the semicolon and the full point. That slight dependence of a subsequent sentence upon a preceding one, which is marked by a colon, is also marked by the full point ; for we are not to suppose a full point precludes a connection between sentences."—*Webster's Grammar*, p. 154.

lipse that it may occasion doubt, or obscurity, a comma is required to indicate it.

ILLUSTRATIONS.

“The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.”—This sentence needs no comma, because the order of construction is as perfect as it can be; for no part can be omitted or have its place changed without destroying the sentence.

“His work is, *in many respects*, very imperfect.”—Here the order is interrupted by the *transposition* of the clause ‘*in many respects*,’ which belongs after *imperfect*; hence a comma is required at the *beginning* and *end* of it. “I remember *with gratitude*, his goodness to me.”—Here the order is interrupted by the *interposition* of the clause, *with gratitude*, which may be omitted, or be changed in location without injury to the sentence; but as *with* shows the relation between *remember* and *gratitude*, no point should be placed at the *beginning* of the clause; yet one is required at the *close* of it to show that the following words are broken off from their proper connection. Grammarians have hitherto taught that the clause *with gratitude* and the like, should have a comma at the beginning as well as the end; but it is incorrect. The following is a case where an *interposed* clause requires a comma at the beginning; “Vices, *like shadows*, towards the evening of life, grow great and monstrous.”—A comma is required before *like* to denote that it does not show relation between *vices* and *shadows*. The *vices* are not like shadows, but they *grow* great and monstrous like shadows. If there was no comma after *vices*, it would mean that those vices only which are like shadows, grow great and monstrous. A comma is required after *shadows* to show that it does not mean *shadows toward the evening of life*. “Among the ancient critics, Longinus pos-

sessed most delicacy ; Aristotle, most correctness.”— A comma is required after Aristotle, on account of the *ellipse*. The ellipsis of *and* should be indicated by a comma ; as “ David was a brave, wise, and pious man.” “ In a letter, we may advise, exhort, comfort, request and discuss.”

A few remarks may be necessary respecting certain words which sometimes require points. Clausal definers require points in the same manner and upon the same principle as *clauses*. “ Peter, *therefore*, was kept in prison.” “ It is, *therefore*, not much approved.” *Therefore* is a clausal definer defining the whole proposition, hence its proper place is not in the proposition. “ *Finally*, I shall only repeat what has often been justly said.” “ *Indeed*, some of those heavy particles, &c.”

The imperatives, such as *if, though, and, but, suppose, &c.* require a comma after them, when the collocation of what follows does not accord with the construction ; as, “ *If*, on the contrary, he asserts that mind is material,” &c.—A comma is required after *if* to show that the clause *on the contrary* does not pertain to *if* or the act of granting. It is not to be *granted on the contrary*, but it is to be granted that he *asserts on the contrary*. Place the words in the order of construction, and no comma is required after *if*. “ *If* he asserts on the contrary, that mind is material.” “ *Yet*, in the dialect which obtained in the beginning of the last century, these modes of expression were common.” “ *Yet* these modes of expression were common in the dialect,” &c. “ *But*, however this may succeed, our duty is the same.” “ *But* our duty is the same, however this may succeed.”

Or requires a point before it, when the words before and after it do not represent the same thing ; as “ Error in act, *or* judgment, is the source of endless sighs.” If they represent the same thing, no point

should be used; as, "A sphere *or* globe is a round body like this earth."

And requires a comma before it when the addition is not to be made to one thing alone of several; as, "A woman, gentle, sensible, well educated, *and* religious,"—here *and* requires a comma before it to denote that *religious* is not to be added to *well educated* alone.

The *Interrogation point* (?) is used to denote that the previous proposition or sentence is a question; as, "Who can fathom the plans of the Almighty?" It may be put in the place of a period, or a semicolon.

The *Exclamation point* (!) is used to show that the words were uttered under the influence of deep emotion; as, "Admirable! This is more than I could have hoped." It may be put in the place of a period, semicolon, or comma.

The *Parenthesis* () encloses some thought which is explanatory, or additional, yet not essential.

Brackets [] enclose some important explanation, or remark.

The *Dash* (—) denotes a sudden turn of thought; as, "Perdition catch my soul—but I do love thee;" an omission; as,

"———On they move,
Indissolubly firm ——."

also a reference of what follows to what precedes; as "You don't care sixpence whether he was wet or dry."—*Johnson*. "The word is used in its primitive manner, without government, like many other names of portions of time,—*a month, a week*." "They *cannot choose but*—that is, they have no choice *except* to be very fallible."

The *Hyphen* (-) shows a union of the words or parts of words between which it is placed. A word divided at the end of a line should be divided between syllables, and the hyphen be but once used.

Quotation marks (" ") indicate that the writer gives the sentiment of another in the person's own words.

The *Apostrophe* (') shows an abbreviation; as, e'er for ever; 'tis for it is.

The *Caret* (^) shows the place where omitted words should be inserted.

Various other marks are used, some for the purpose of reference, and some for other purposes; but they need not be explained here.



CAPITAL LETTERS.

1. All distinctive appellations should begin with a capital letter.

2. The first word of every sentence, verse, or paragraph; and the first word of every line of poetry.

3. The first word of an example.

4. The first word of a quotation introduced in a direct manner.

5. The pronoun *I*, and the exclamation *O*.

REMARK.

What is meant by a *distinctive appellation*, is, a word which separates out from others, the thing represented, and makes it an object of distinct consideration; as, "The proper study of mankind is *Man*." "He lectures on *Temperance* and *Slavery*." Of course all particular nouns are distinctive appellations; likewise, definers derived from particular nouns; as English, Spanish, &c. The names applied to the Supreme Being, are distinctive of the true God,

in opposition to false and idol gods ; hence they commence with a capital letter. " God said Let there be light."

" It is not Cesar, but the *gods*, my fathers ;
The *gods* declare against us, and repel
Our vain attempts."

But when any particular, fabled, or idol god is spoken of, a capital letter is used ; as,

" The River Gods no longer rise like old father Thames."

" Rollin's Ancient History."—Rollin's begins with a capital letter, because it is a particular noun ; Ancient begins thus to distinguish the *history of ancient things*, from an *old history* ; and History, because it designates a particular book appropriated to history. ' Thompson's Seasons,' and other titles of books and subjects follow the same rule, for similar reasons.

Much has been said respecting the proper address when two or more persons of the same name are included. Some grammarians contend that the distinctive *title* only should be plural, as, The two *Misses* Brown ; others that the *name* only should be plural, as, The two Miss *Browns* ; and others, that *title* and *name* both should be plural, as, The two Misses Browns. A little reflection will be sufficient to show that the last is the only correct form. For the *name*, as is obvious, is not a definer defining the *title*, but is a noun in apposition. Hence by substituting, or annexing other appositive nouns we shall see that it should be plural ; as, The two Misses Browns, Mantuamakers, The Gentlemen Russells, Silversmiths, and not, The two Brown Misses Mantuamaker, nor The two Misses Brown Mantuamaker, nor The two Misses Brown Mantuamakers ; not The Russell Gentlemen Silversmiths, nor, The Gentlemen Russell Silversmiths. The twelve Cesars, Romans, or, The

twelve Romans, Cesars; and not The twelve Cesars Roman, nor The twelve Romans Cesar, which would be the case, if 'The Misses Brown was correct.

COMPOSITION.

This subject, in its details belongs more properly to rhetoric than to grammar; hence we shall not enlarge upon it, and what we do say, will be more in the way of pointing out errors to be avoided, than in prescribing rules to be followed.

In writing, the following inquiry should be constantly applied as a test of propriety—does my language express my whole meaning and nothing but my meaning; does it express it concisely; does it express it elegantly?

The following are violations of the rule.

1. “—and their cattle were brought into the area, every night, under *penalty* of their being driven off before morning.”—*Martineau*. It is evident that this sentence does not express the writer's meaning and had she applied the test, she would not have left it as it is. The sentence as it now stands, means that the cattle were liable to be driven off as a forfeiture for their being brought into the area; but the writer's meaning evidently was, that cattle left out of the enclosure, were liable to be driven off by prowling plunderers. Hence they were not *brought in* under the penalty, but would have been *left out* under penalty of their being driven off before morning, by prowlers.

2. “I shall give from the work last quoted, a specimen (I cannot say of great delicacy) in stigmatizing, *but at least* of such an indirect manner as is sufficient to screen the author from the imputation of down-

right rudeness.”—*Campbell's Ph. Rhet.* This sentence is very faulty in its arrangement, or in its design. The clause *but at least*, evidently was intended to qualify the clause in the parenthesis, but if that was omitted, which according to rules it might be, what would *but at least* apply to? Besides, as it now stands it most properly qualifies *in stigmatizing*, but that would make little or no sense. The arrangement would be better, thus, “I shall give from the work last quoted, a specimen in stigmatizing, (I cannot say of great delicacy, but at least,) of an such an indirect manner as is sufficient to screen the author from the imputation of downright rudeness.”

3. “From one element, ‘solid and liquid fire,’ the poet has framed a world of horror and suffering, such as imagination had never traversed. But fiercer flames than those which encompass Satan, burn in *his own* soul.”—*Channing*. Who would suspect from the language here used, that *his own* does not refer to the poet? yet reflection and the context both show that it does not. If *own* was omitted, the ambiguity would be removed—“But fiercer flames than those which encompass Satan, burn in his soul,”—that is, fiercer flames rage within, than without.

4. “The conduct of the Jews towards the disciples after their Lord’s death, proves that *they* knew nothing of the Trinitarian doctrine.”—*Ware*. There is nothing in this sentence that would go to show that *they* does not refer to the Jews, and it obviously does refer to them; yet the context shows that *they* stands for the *disciples* and not the Jews.

5. “It is folly to pretend to arm ourselves against the accidents of life, by heaping up treasures, *which* nothing can protect us against, but the good providence of our heavenly Father.”—*Sherlock*. *Which*, in this sentence would obviously refer to *treasures*, but who wishes to be *protected against treasures*? The sentence should stand thus—“It is folly to at-

tempt, by heaping up treasures, to arm ourselves against the accidents of life, *from* which nothing can protect us, but the good providence of our heavenly Father." *Pretend* and *against* are incorrectly used in the first form of the sentence.

6. "—and looks like Scarron's character of the great queen Semiramis *who says that author* was the founder of Babylon, conqueror of the east and an excellent housewife."—*Addison*. Now did the writer mean to say that Queen Semiramis says the author Scarron was the founder of Babylon, conqueror of the east, and an excellent *housewife*; or that, the author Scarron says Semiramis was so? There is nothing except punctuation (which is purposely omitted) that would determine it to be the latter. But if practicable the arrangement should determine the sense without the aid of punctuation; which might have been done in this case, by placing *says* after *author*—'who that author says.'

7. "But see young Juba! the good youth appears,
Full of the guilt of his perfidious subjects."—*Addison*.

The clause, *full of the guilt*, is ambiguous, as it may mean that Juba though ostensibly good, was yet full of the same perfidiousness as his subjects, or that he was full of sorrow and regret on account of the guilt of his perfidious subjects; and this, probably, was the writer's meaning.

8. "If rich freights are in danger *afar off* from storms, and harvests at home, from blights."—*Martineau*. The phrase *afar off* is very improperly located. Whether it be '*in danger afar off*' or '*afar off from storms*,' either is an impossibility, or an absurdity. As *afar off* applies to 'freights,' it should be thus—'If rich freights *afar off*, are in danger from storms, and harvests at home, () from blights.—'

9. "Such were the centaurs of Ixion's race,
Who a bright cloud, for Juno, did embrace."—*Denham*.

What does *who* represent, the *centaurs*, or *Ixion*, or *Ixion's race*? The pronouns are very liable to cause ambiguity; and often it is impossible to prevent it without excluding them and substituting that which they represent. "*They* were persons of such moderate intellects, even before *they* were impaired by *their* passions." Here the pronoun first stands for persons, and next for intellects, and then for persons, again. "If *it* were spoken with never so great skill in the actor, the manner of uttering that sentence could have nothing in *it* which could strike any but people of the greatest humanity, nay, people elegant and skillful in observations upon *it*." The definer *which*, is often liable to the same fault unless the noun defined is inserted. "One may have an air *which* proceeds from a just sufficiency and knowledge of the matter before him, *which* may naturally produce some motions of his head and body, *which* might become the bench better than the bar." Here *which* defines three different things, and the mind does not readily apprehend what they are; hence, in such cases the expression should be varied, or the thing defined should be inserted a sufficient number of times to prevent all doubt or hesitancy in regard to the meaning. There are some words that have a double meaning, and unless they are used with great caution ambiguity will arise from their use. "The young man did not *want* natural talents." There may at first be a doubt whether *want* means *to desire* or *to lack*; yet upon reflection we know that there are none that do not *desire* natural talents, consequently we conclude that the young man did not *lack* natural talents. But sentences that require us to stop and reflect for to apprehend the meaning, are faulty.

Inattention to the position of definers is a common fault among writers. "Not *only* Jesuits can equivocate." Here *only* defines *equivocate* according to grammatical construction, or if not, it defines *Jesuits*,

making them 'only Jesuits;' but the writer's meaning, evidently was 'Jesuits only,' hence he should have said, 'Not Jesuits only can equivocate.' "Theism can *only* be opposed to atheism,"—that is, it can be *nothing more* than opposed; it should be, 'Theism can be opposed to atheism only.' "The Romans understood liberty, *at least*, as well as we." The collocation here would indicate that *at least* was to be taken with *liberty*, meaning that among all the subjects which the Romans understood, liberty at least they understood as well as we; that is, if they did not understand the other things, as well as we, they did liberty. But the writer's meaning was probably that the Romans understood liberty, if not better, at least *as well* as we; hence it should be, The Romans understood liberty, as well at least, as we.

Ellipsis often occasions obscurity. "I can lift the weights as easily as you,"—does this mean that the weights, or you can be raised with equal ease; or does it mean I can lift the weights as easily as you can lift the weights? If the latter was the writer's meaning, *can* should not have been omitted. "I have furnished the house exactly according to your fancy, or, if you please, my own; for I have long since learnt to like nothing but what you *do*,"—does *do* mean here *like*, or *perform*?

There are errors of another kind, a few examples of which may be given to put the student upon the alert. "Of this art, it is not easy to decide, which deserves to be most admired, the *difficulty*, the ingenuity, or the usefulness of the invention."—*Webster's Gr.* p. 6. Do we *admire* a *difficulty*? "There are three things in that establishment which I *admire*—the folly of the builder—the waste of property—and the taste displayed in wasting it."—*Dr. Tenney*. Whatever meaning may be attached to *admire*, it cannot be appropriate to all the objects which follow, because they are incompatible. The 'taste' is an ob-

ject to be admired, but the others are not, unless admire should be used with a different meaning, which is not admissible in the same sentence. Present custom inclining to make *admire* a factotum; hence, we hear often such expressions as these. "I should admire to have you see that building." "You would admire to hear him." This incorrect use of *admire* is an affectation that ought to be discarded.

In the use of the auxiliaries *shall*, *will*, &c., English writers violate good English, and some American writers, through affectation, expose themselves to the same censure. "He speaks an infinite deal of nothing. His reasons are as two grains of wheat hid in two bushels of chaff; you *shall* seek all day ere you find them, and when you have them they are not worth the search."—*Shakspeare*. It seems rather hard to *compel* one to search all day when he may perhaps find them in a very short time.

"China vessels are playthings for women of all ages. An old lady of fourscore *shall* be as busy in cleaning an Indian mandarin, as her great-granddaughter is in dressing her baby."—*Addison*. "There is as little hazard that a piece *shall* be faulty in this respect, as that a mirror *shall* be too faithful in reflecting the images of objects, or that the glasses of a telescope *shall* be too transparent."—*Campbell*. *Shall* should be *will*. "For they were now sure we *would* fall in with robbers."—*Henderson*. *Should* and not *would*. If native writers do not use good English, we cannot find fault with the Frenchman who complaining of tardy assistance while he was drowning, said, 'I *will* drown, I *will* drown, nobody *shall* help me.'

With is often improperly used. "So much *with* regard to the use of copulatives."—*Blair*. "They are disheartened from doing their best *with* (*by*) the miserable reward which in some places they receive." "I do likewise dissent *with* the Examiner, upon the

phrases *of* 'passion's being poised,' and *of* the 'retrieving merit from dependence,' which are very beautiful and poetical."—*Addison*. The language here means, that he *with* the Examiner, dissented *from* some one else; but the last clause shows that he dissented *from* the Examiner. *Of* is improperly used, and should be omitted.

In the use of *of* great looseness as well as great latitude prevails. "What is life in the slave States in respect *of* work."—*Martineau*. "So that the size of the object may be inconsiderable in respect *of* it."—*Gregory*. *To* should be used instead of *of*. "No one is admitted *of* the museum proprietary body, who has not doubled the capes Horn and Good Hope."—*Martineau*. This is a very obscure sentence, and it is difficult if not impossible, to determine the exact meaning. "Plan *of* the gradual abolition of the poor laws proposed;" *for*. "A little after the reformation *of* Luther." This more properly implies a change *in* Luther, than one wrought *by* him, which the writer meant. "—able to separate us from the love *of* God."—*Paul*. *Of* is used before the subject and *to* before the object; therefore as Paul meant our love to God, and not the love of God to us, he should have used *to* instead of *of*.

There is one use of *of*, which it may be rash in us to pronounce an error, yet it looks so much like it that we cannot help pointing it out. We find in our best authors, this use made of *of*; '*Of* Pronouns,' '*Of* Versification,' '*Of* reading verse,' &c. It would have been a favor, if Mr. Webster had told us in his Grammar what *of* means in the case; his Dictionary throws no light upon the subject, unless we are to consider the heading, Pronouns, Versification, &c. as the *source*, *from* or *out of* which, proceed the remarks that follow them. Remarks are generally spoken or written *on* a subject rather than *of* it.

We can conceive no advantage accruing from the exchange of *on* for *of*. "He wrote at this time his work *of* Human Nature."

In the use of *or* there is an almost unavoidable ambiguity. "They were *both* much more ancient among the Persians than Zoroaster *or* Zerdusht." There is no way by the sentence, to determine whether Zoroaster and Zerdusht are the same, or two. If the rule which we have given for punctuation in such cases, was uniformly followed, that would decide that Zoroaster and Zerdusht, both are one, because there is no comma used before *or*. Likewise, if in such cases *a* or *the*, or a *relative* is used before the first noun and not the second, it determines that both refer to the same object. *Both* is wrongly placed in the above, as it now defines *were*, saying that they were both *more ancient* and something else. But that is not the meaning; it should be, 'They both were more ancient, &c.,—that is, there were two things each of which were, &c. Emphasis often corrects erroneous collocation, but it never excuses it.

Elegance depends upon both the words and their collocation. It may be violated by the use of low words and phrases, by harsh words, and by an unharmonious disposition of the words. A sentence should not end with such small words as *of*, *with*, *to*, &c. The unharmonious repetition of a word should be avoided by an interchange of synonymous words, unless precision should forbid it. A chaste use of figures tends much to an increase of elegance in composition. On these several points ample instruction may be derived from Rhetorics. But as they are less full upon the subject of *versification*, we shall give more particular directions in respect to that.

PROSODY.—LAWS OF VERSIFICATION.*

The following rules for the composition of English verse, are drawn from the writings of Dryden, Pope, and other great masters of poetry, chiefly by the late Judge Trumbull, of Connecticut, who was, probably, the most accurate critic, in this department of literature, which the present age has produced. A careful attention to these rules, may check the prevalence of mistakes in measure, which often disfigure the compositions of modern writers.

Prosody is that part of grammar which treats of the pronunciation of words, and the laws of versification.

Pronunciation is regulated principally by *accent* and *quantity*.

Accent is a particular stress of voice with which a certain syllable of a word is uttered, and by which it is distinguished from the others. Thus, in pronouncing *probability*, we lay a greater stress of the voice upon the third syllable, than upon the others—the voice naturally resting upon that, and passing over the others with rapidity and a slight enunciation. This stress of voice on a particular part of a word, is equally necessary to the ease of utterance and the melody of speaking.

In addition to the accent, which may be called primary, there is, in pronouncing words of many syllables, a secondary accent, less distinct than the principal accent, but evidently distinguishing some one syllable from those which are unaccented. Thus, in the word *indiscriminate*, the principal accent is on the third syllable; but the first syllable is evidently uttered with more force of voice, than the second and last two syllables. The final cause of both accents is the *ease of pronunciation*, and by this should both be regulated; for that manner of pronouncing words which

* Taken from Webster's 'Manual of Useful Studies,' and inserted without alteration or remark.

is most easy for the speaker, enables him to utter the several syllables with the most distinctness, which is consistent with a rapid communication of thoughts; and this is necessary to render his enunciation agreeable to his hearers. Hence no rules of pronunciation, drawn from the termination of words, from their etymologies, or from the practice of popular speakers, should be suffered to interfere with this fundamental principle, *the ease of utterance*—for a forced, unnatural accent is not only painful to the speaker, but utterly destructive of melody.

The accent may fall on a vowel or on a consonant. When it falls on a vowel, the vowel is long—as in glōry, tāble, lāwful. When it falls on a consonant, the consonant closes the syllable, and the preceding vowel is short: as in hab'it, grat'itude, deliv'erance.*

The *quantity* of a syllable is the time in which it

* It has been the practice of many English authors, to place the marks of accent, in all cases, over the vowel of the accented syllable—a practice probably borrowed from the Greek language. Thus, in Johnson's Dictionary, and in Richardson's, the vowel *a* in *hábit* as well as *o* in *hóly*, has the mark of accent, for which reason the mark is no guide to the true sound of the letter, and the learner would be led to give to *a* its long sound, thus, hā-bit, as well as to *o* its long sound in hōly.

But this is not the worst evil. The usual rules for dividing syllables, are not only *arbitrary*, but false and absurd. They contradict the very definition of a syllable given by the authors themselves. Thus Lowth defines a syllable to be “a sound either simple or compound, *pronounced by a single impulse of the voice*, and constituting a word or part of a word.” But in dividing syllables, no regard is had to the definition—for *manifest*—Lowth divides thus, ma-ni-fest. Here, the first syllable, *man*, is pronounced with a *single impulse of the voice*—according to the definition: yet in writing, the syllable is split—the *constituent part* of a word is divided into *two parts*—that which is to be pronounced with a *single impulse of the voice*, is so separated, as to require *two impulses*. A syllable in pronunciation is an *indivisible* thing; and strange as it may appear, what is *indivisible* in utterance, is *divided* in writing; when the very purpose of dividing words into syllables in writing, is to lead the learner to a just pronunciation.

is pronounced. In English this time is *long* or *short*—long as in *frāme*, *denōte*, *compensātion*—short, as in *thāt*, *nōt*, *mēlon*.

The accent has no small influence in determining the length of a syllable, by prolonging the sound of the vowel; but, in many words, vowels have their long sound, though not under the accent, as *nosegāy*, *agitāte*.

There are some general rules for accenting syllables, which may be discovered by attending to the analogy of formation. Thus words ending in *tion* and *sion* have the accent on the last syllable save one; as *protection*, *adhesion*; words ending in *ty* usually have the accent on the last syllable except two, as *vanity*, *hostility*.

Few of these rules, however, are so general, that the exceptions to them are not almost as numerous as the words which fall within the rule; and therefore the accent of words is best learned from a dictionary and general usage. The rules laid down for this purpose in several works of distinction, are so numerous, and subject to so many exceptions, that they tend rather to embarrass, than to assist the student.

Most prosodians who have treated particularly of this subject, have been guilty of a fundamental error, in considering the movement of English verse as depending on long and short syllables, formed by long and short vowels. This hypothesis has led them into capital mistakes. The truth is, many of those syllables which are considered as *long* in verse, are formed by the shortest vowels in the language; as *strength*, *health*, *grand*. The doctrine, that long vowels are necessary to form long syllables in poetry, is at length exploded, and the principles which regulate the movement of our verse, are explained; viz. *accent* and *emphasis*. Every emphatical word, and every accented syllable, will form what is called in prose a long

syllable. The unaccented syllables, and unemphatical monosyllabic words, are considered as short syllables.

But there are two kinds of emphasis; a natural emphasis, which arises from the importance of the idea conveyed by a word; and an accidental emphasis, which arises from the importance of a word in a particular situation.

The first or natural emphasis belongs to all nouns, verbs, participles, and adjectives, and requires no elevation of the voice; as

“Not *half* so *swift* the *trembling doves* can *fly*.”

The last or accidental emphasis is laid on a word when it has some particular meaning, and when the force of a sentence depends upon it; this therefore requires an elevation of the voice; as,

“Perdition catch my soul—but I *do* love thee.”

So far the prosody of the English language seems to be settled; but the rules laid down for the construction of verse, seem to have been imperfect and disputed.

Writers have generally supposed that our heroic verse consists of five feet, all pure Iambics, except the first foot, which they allow may be a Trochee. In consequence of this opinion, they have expunged letters from words which were necessary, and curtailed feet in such a manner as to disfigure the beauty of printing, and in many instances, destroyed the harmony of our best poetry.

The truth is, so far is our heroic verse from being confined to the Iambic measure, that it admits of eight feet, and in some instances of nine. I will not perplex my readers with a number of hard names, but but proceed to explain the several feet, and show in what places of the line they are admissible.

An Iambic foot, which is the ground of English numbers, consists of two syllables, the first *short* and

the second *long*. This foot is admitted into every place of the line. Example, all Iambics.

“ Whẽre slāves ǒnce mōre thẽir nātīve lānd bẽhōld,
Nō fiẽnds tǒrmẽnt, nō chrīstiāns thirst fōr gōld.”

Pope.

The Trochee is a foot consisting of two syllables, the first *long* and the second *short*. Example.

“ *Wārms* in the sun, refreshes in the breeze,
Glōws in the stars, and blossoms in the trees ”

Pope.

The Trochee is not admissible into the second place of the line ; but in the third and fourth it may have beauty, when it creates a correspondence between the sound and sense.

“ Eve, rightly call’d *mōthẽr* of all mankind.”

“ And staggered by the stroke, *drōps thẽ* large ox.”

The Spondee is a foot consisting of two long syllables. This may be used in any place of the line.

1. “ *Gōod life* be now my task, my doubts are done.”

Dryden.

2. “ As some *lōne moũtain*’s monstrous growth he stood.”

Pope.

But it has a greater beauty when preceded by a Trochee.

“ Lōad the *tāll bārk* and lanch into the main.”

3. “ The mountain goats *cāme bōunding* o’er the lawn.”

4. “ He spoke, and speaking in *prōud trīumph* spread,

The long contended honors of her head.”

Pope.

5. "Singed are his brows, the scorching lids *grōw blāck*."
Pope.

The Pyrrhic is a foot of two short syllables; it is graceful in the first and fourth places, and is admissible into the second and third.

1. "*Nōr* in the helpless orphan dread a foe."
Pope.

2. ————"On they move,
Indissōlūbly firm."———*Milton.*

3. "The two extremes appear like man and wife,
Coupled together *fōr* the sake of strife."
Churchill.

But this foot is most graceful in the fourth place.

"The dying gales that pant *ūpōn* the trees."

"To farthest shores the ambrosial spirit flies,
Sweet to the world and gratefūl *tō* the skies."

The Amphibrach is a foot of three syllables, the first and third short, and the second long. It is used in heroic verse only when we take the liberty to add a short syllable to a line.

"The piece you say is incorrect, *why tāke* it,
I'm all submission, what you'd have it, *māke* it."

This foot is hardly admissible in the solemn or sublime style. Pope has indeed admitted it into his *Essay on Man*.

"What can ennoble sots or slaves ōr cōwārd's,
Alas! not all the blood of all thē Hōwārd's."

Again :

"To sigh for ribbands, if thou art sō silly,
Mark how they grace Lord Umbra or Sīr Billy."

But these lines are of the high burlesque kind, and in this style the Amphibrach closes lines with great beauty.

The Tribrach is a foot of three syllables, all short; and it may be used in the third and fourth places.

“And rolls impetũoũs tõ the plain.”

Or thus :

“And thunder down impetũoũs tõ the plain.”

The Dactyl, a foot of three syllables, the first long and the two last short, is used principally in the first place in the line.

“*Fũ*rioũs he spoke, the angry chief replied,”

“*Mũ*rmũrĩng, and with him fled the shades of night.”

The Anapest, a foot consisting of three syllables, the two first short and the last long, is admissible into every place of the line.

“Căn ă bõsõm sõ gẽntlẽ rẽmãin

Unmoved when her Corydon sighs?

Will a nymph that is fond of the plains,

These plains and these valleys despise!

Dear regions of silence and shade,

Soft scenes of contentment and ease,

Where I could have pleasantly stay'd,

If aught in her absence could please.”

The trissyllabic feet have suffered most by the general ignorance of critics; most of them have been mutilated by apostrophes, in order to reduce them to the Iambic measure.

Thus in the line before repeated,

“*Mũ*rmũrĩng, and with him fled the shades of night,”

we find the word in the copy reduced to two syllables, *mũrm'ring*, and the beauty of the Dactyl is destroyed.

Thus in the following :

“On every side with shadowy squadrons deep,”

by apostrophizing *every* and *shadowy*, the line loses

its harmony. The same remark applies to the following.

“ And hosts infuriate shake the shudd’ring plain.”
 “ But fashion so directs, and moderns raise
 On fashion’s *mold’ring* base, their transient praise.”
Churchill.

Poetic lines which abound with these trissyllabic feet, are the most flowing and melodious of any in the language ; and yet the poets themselves, or their printers, murder them with numberless unnecessary contractions.

It requires but little judgment, and an ear indifferently accurate, to distinguish the contractions which are necessary, from those which are needless and injurious to the versification. In the following passage we find examples of both.

“ She went from op’ra, park, assembly, play,
 To morning walks and pray’rs, three times a day ;
 To pass her time ’twixt reading and bohea
 To muse and spill her solitary tea ;
 Or o’er cold coffee trifle with the spoon,
 Count the slow clock, and dine exact at noon ;
 Divert her eyes with pictures in the fire,
 Hum half a tune, tell stories to the ’squire ;
 Up to her godly garret after sev’n,
 There starve and pray, for that’s the way to heav’n.”
Pope’s Epistles.

Here *e* in *opera* ought not to be apostrophized, for such a contraction reduces an Amphibrachic foot to an Iambic. The words *prayers*, *seven*, and *heaven*, need not the apostrophe of *e* ; for it makes no difference in the pronunciation. But the contraction of *over* and *betwixt* is necessary ; for without it the measure would be imperfect.

PAUSES.

Having explained the several kinds of feet, and shown in what places of a verse they may be used, I proceed to another important article, the pauses. Of these there are two kinds—the *cesural* pause, which divides the line into two equal or unequal parts; and the *final* pause, which closes the verse. These pauses are called *musical*, because their sole end is melody of verse.

The pauses which mark the sense, and for this reason are denominated *sentential*, are the same in verse as in prose. They are marked by the usual stops, a comma, a semicolon, a colon, or a period, as the sense requires, and need no particular explanation.

The cesural pause is not essential to verse, for the shorter kinds of measure are without it; but it improves both the melody and the harmony.

Melody in music is derived from a succession of sounds: harmony from different sounds in concord. A single voice can produce melody; a union of voices is necessary to form harmony. In this sense harmony can not be applied to verse, because poetry is recited by a single voice. But harmony may be used in a figurative sense, to express the effect produced by observing the proportion which the members of verse bear to each other.

The cesural pause may be placed in any part of the verse: but has the finest effect upon the melody, when placed after the second or third foot, or in the middle of the third.

After the second:

“In what retreat, inglorious and unknown,
Did genius sleep, when dullness seiz’d the throne.”

After the third:

“O say what stranger cause, yet unexplored,
Could make a gentle belle reject a lord?”

In the middle of the third :

“Great are his perils, in this stormy time,
Who rashly ventures on a sea of rhyme.”

In these examples we find a great degree of melody, but not in all the same degree. In comparing the divisions of verse, we experience the most pleasure in viewing those which are equal ; hence those verses which have the pause in the middle of the third foot, which is the middle of the verse, are the most melodious. Such is the third example above.

In lines where the pause is placed after the second foot, we perceive a smaller degree of melody, for the divisions are not equal ; one containing four syllables, the other six, as in the first example.

But the melody in this example, is much superior to that of the verses which have the cesural pause after the third foot ; for this obvious reason : When the pause bounds the second foot, the latter part of the verse is the greatest, and leaves the most forcible impression upon the mind ; but when the pause is at the end of the third foot, the order is reversed. We are fond of proceeding from small to great, and a climax in sound pleases the ear, in the same manner as a climax in sense delights the mind. Such is the first example.

It must be observed further, that when the cesural pause falls after the second and third feet, both the final and cesural pauses are on accented syllables ; whereas, when the cesural pause falls in the middle of the third foot, this is on a weak syllable, and the final pause on an accented syllable. This variety in the latter, is another cause of the superior pleasure we derive from verses divided into equal portions.

The pause may fall in the middle of the fourth foot : as,

“Let favor speak for others, worth for me ;”
but the melody, in this case, is almost lost. At the

close of the first foot, the pause has a more agreeable effect.

“ That’s vile, should we a parent’s fault adore,
And err, because our fathers err’d before ?”

In the middle of the second foot, the pause may be used, but it produces little melody.

“ And who but wishes to invert the laws
Of order, sins against the eternal cause.”

Harmony is produced by a proportion between the members of the same verse, or between the members of different verses. Example :

“ Thy forests, Windsor, and thy green retreats,
At once the monarch’s and the muse’s seats,
Invite my lays. Be present, sylvan maids,
Unlock your springs, and open all your shades.”

Here we observe, the pause in the first couplet is in the middle of the third foot ; both verses are in this respect similar. In the last couplet, the pause falls after the second foot. In each couplet, separately considered, there is a uniformity ; but when one is compared with the other, there is a diversity. This variety produces a pleasing effect. The variety is further increased, when the first lines of several succeeding couplets are uniform as to themselves, and different from the last lines, which are also uniform as to themselves. Churchill, speaking of reason, lord chief justice in the court of man, has the following lines :

“ Equally form’d to rule, in age or youth,
The friend of virtue, and the guide to truth ;
To *her* I bow, whose sacred power I feel,
To *her* decision make my last appeal ;
Condemn’d by *her*, applauding words in vain
Should tempt me to take up my pen again ;

By *her* absolv'd, the course I'll still pursue ;
 ' If *Reason*'s for me, *God* is for me too.' "

The first line of three of these couplets, has the pause after the second foot ; in this consists their similarity. The last line in three of them, has the pause in the middle of the third foot ; they are uniform as to themselves, but different from the foregoing lines. This passage, which on the whole is very beautiful, suffers much by the sixth line, which is not verse, but rather hobbling prose.*

The foregoing remarks are sufficient to illustrate the use and advantages of the cesural pause.

The final pause marks the close of a line or verse, whether there is a pause in the sense or not. Sentential pauses should be marked by a variation of tone ; but the final pause, when the close of one line is intimately connected with the beginning of the next, should be merely a suspension of the voice, without elevation or depression. Thus :

" Of man's first disobedience, and the fruit
 Of that forbidden tree, whose mortal taste
 Brought death into the world, and all our woe," &c.

When these lines are read without a pause after the words *fruit* and *taste*, they degenerate into prose. Indeed, in many instances, particularly in blank verse, the final pause is the only circumstance which distinguishes verse from prose.

* Churchill has improved English versification, but is sometimes too incorrect. It is the remark of some writer, "That the greatest geniuses are seldom correct," and the remark is not without foundation. Homer, Shakspeare, and Milton, were among the greatest geniuses that ever lived, and they were certainly guilty of the greatest faults. Virgil and Pope were much inferior in point of genius, but excelled in accuracy. Churchill had genius, but his contempt of rules made him sometimes indulge a too great latitude of expression.

EXPRESSION.

One article more in the construction of verse deserves our observation, which is *Expression*. Expression consists in such a choice and distribution of poetic feet as are best adapted to the subject, and best calculated to impress sentiments on the mind. Those poetic feet, which end in an accented syllable, are the most forcible. Hence the Iambic measure is best adapted to solemn and sublime subjects. This is the measure of the Epic, of poems on grave moral subjects, of elegies, &c. The Spondee, a foot of two long syllables, when admitted into the Iambic measure, adds much to the solemnity of the movement.

“ While the clear sun, rejoicing still to rise,
In pomp *rolls round* immeasurable skies.”

Dwight.

The Dactyl, *rolls round*, expresses beautifully the majesty of the sun in his course.

It is a general rule, that the more important syllables there are in a passage, whether of prose or verse, the more heavy is the style. For example :

“ A past, vamp’d, future, old, reviv’d new piece.”
“ Men bearded, bald, cowl’d, uncowl’d, shod, unshod.”

Such lines are destitute of melody, and are admissible only when they suit the sound to the sense. In the high burlesque style, of which kind is Pope’s *Dunciad*, they give the sentiment an ironical air of importance, and from this circumstance derive a beauty. On the other hand, a large proportion of unaccented syllables or particles, deprives language of energy ; and it is this circumstance principally which in prose constitutes the difference between the grave historical, and the familiar style. The greatest number of long syllables ever admitted into a heroic

verse is seven, as in the foregoing ; the smallest number is three.

“ Or to a sād variety of wōe.”

The Trochaic measure, in which every foot closes with a weak syllable, is well calculated for lively subjects.

“ Softly sweet in Lydian measures,
Soon he sooth'd his soul to pleasures ;
War, he sung, is toil and trouble,
Honor but an empty bubble,” &c.

The Anapestic measure, in which there are two short syllables to one long, is best adapted to express the impetuosity of passion or action. Shenstone has used it to great advantage in his inimitable pastoral ballad. It describes beautifully the strong and lively emotions which agitate the lover, and his anxiety to please, which continually hurries him from one object and one exertion to another.

“ I have found out a gift for my fair,
I have found where the wood pigeons breed !
Yet let me that plunder forbear,
She will say 'twas a barbarous deed.
For he ne'er could prove true, she averr'd,
Who could rob a poor bird of her young :
And I lov'd her the more when I heard
Such tenderness fall from her tongue.”

The Amphibrachic measure, in which there is a long syllable between two short ones, is best adapted to lively comic subjects ; as in Addison's Rosamond.

“ Since conjugal passion
Has come into fashion,
And marriage so blest on the throne is,
Like Venus I'll shine,
Be fond and be fine,
And Sir 'Trusty shall be my Adonis.”

Such a measure gives to sentiment a ludicrous air, and consequently is ill adapted to serious subjects.

Great art may be used by a poet in choosing words and feet adapted to his subject. Take the following specimens :

“ Now here, now there, the warriors fall ; amain
Groans murmur, armor sounds, and shouts convulse
the plain.”

The feet in the last line are happily chosen. The slow Spondee, in the beginning of the verse, fixes the mind upon the dismal scene of woe ; the solemnity is heightened by the pauses in the middle of the second and at the end of the third foot : but when the poet comes to shake the plains, he closes the line with three forcible Iambics.

Of a similar beauty take the following example.

“ She all night long, her amorous descant sung.”

The poet here designs to describe the length of the night, and the music of the nightingale's song. The first he does by two slow spondees, and the last by four very rapid syllables.

The following lines from Gray's Elegy, written in a country church yard, are distinguished by a happy choice of words.

“ For who, to dumb forgetfulness a prey,
This pleasing anxious being e'er resigned ?
Left the warm precincts of the cheerful day,
Nor cast one *longing, lingering* look behind ?”

The words *longing* and *lingering* express most forcibly the reluctance with which mankind quit this state of existence.

Pope has many beauties of this kin

And grace and reason, sense and virtue split,
With all the rash dexterity of wit.”

The mute articulations with which these lines end, express the idea of *rending asunder*, with great energy and effect. The words *rash* and *dexterity* are also judiciously chosen.

In describing the delicate sensations of the most refined love, he is remarkable for his choice of smooth flowing words. There are some passages in his *Eloisa* and *Abelard*, which are extended to a considerable length, without a single mute consonant or harsh word.

PARSING.

TO PARSE is to construe and analyze language.

First—construe or explain the piece, showing the order in which the words should be arranged to make the sense; supply the words omitted by ellipsis, and explain the punctuation. Secondly—take the sentences in their order, and resolve each into its separate propositions, naming and classing the connectives; then taking each proposition by itself, beginning with the first, separate it into its subject and predicate; then name and describe the predicative, its subject, and object, with their modifying words.

ILLUSTRATIONS.

1. "Then Judah came near unto him, and said, Oh, my lord, let thy servant, I pray thee, speak a word, in my lord's ears, and let not thine anger burn against thy servant; for thou art even as Pharaoh."

Parsed thus—

Then Judah came near unto him, and said, I pray thee, Oh, my lord, let thy servant speak a word, &c.—of the remainder, the construction is the same as the collocation.

There is a comma after *him*, to show that *him* is

not that, to which, *said* is to be added—a comma is required after *said*, because it is not followed immediately by the thing said—one is placed after *Oh*, because it is an interposed word—one is placed after *my lord*, because it is a transposed clause, its proper place being after *thee*—a semicolon is used after *servant*, because what precedes is complete, and, in itself, independent, yet what follows is to be considered with it, &c.

The propositions are—*Then Judah came near unto him—Said*, an elliptic proposition, consisting of the predicative only, and having understood, the same subject as the previous proposition—*I pray thee, Oh, my lord, let thy servant speak a word in my lord's ears, and let not thine anger burn against thy servant—Thou art even as—Pharaoh is*.

The connectives are—*then*, a definer, which connects the first proposition with something previous, and defines the whole proposition, showing the time of Judah's coming unto Joseph ;—*and*, an imperative, connects the first two propositions, and shows that the fact, *Judah spoke*, is to be added to the other fact, *Judah came near* ;—the imperative *and* is the connective between the members of the third proposition ;—*for*, a definer, is the connective between the third and fourth propositions defining the reasons of his petitioning and of his petition ;—*as*, a definer, is the connective between the last two propositions.

Judah is the subject of the first proposition, and *came near unto him* is the predicate ;—*Judah* is the subject of the second, and *said*, the predicate ;—*I* is the subject of the third, and *pray thee my lord, let thy servant speak a word in my lord's ears, and, let not thine anger burn against thy servant*, is the predicate ;—*Thou* is the subject of the fourth, and *art even as Pharaoh is*, is the predicate ;—*Pharaoh* is the subject of the last proposition, and *is* is the predicate.

Of the first proposition *Judah* is the grammatical

subject. It is a *particular noun*, because it is a name given to a particular individual—*singular number*, because it shows that it is a single object—*third person*, because it represents that which is spoken of—*masculine*, because it denotes a male—*subjective case*, because it is the subject of the predicative *came*. *Came* is a predicative from *come*; *come, came, coming, come, to come; come, have or has come, came, had come, shall or will come, shall or will have come; came, was come, was coming*, it is made in the ‘past tense perfect;’ has *Judah* for its *subject*. *Near* and *unto* are *relatives* showing the relation between *came* and *him*. *Him* is a *pronoun*, because it supersedes the use of the noun—*singular number*—*third person*—*masculine*—*objective case* after the relatives *near* and *unto*. In the second proposition, the *subject* is the same of the preceding, the *predicative* is *said* from *say*; *say, said, saying, said, to say; say, have or has said, said, had said, shall or will say, shall or will have said; said, was said, was saying*, made in the ‘past tense perfect;’ its *subject* is *Judah* (understood.) Of the next proposition *I* is the grammatical subject. It is a *pronoun*—*first person*, because it is representative of the person speaking, *singular number*—*neuter*, because it does not indicate the sex of the object represented—*subjective case* to the predicative *pray*. *Pray* is a predicative, from the same; *pray, prayed, praying, prayed, to pray; pray, have or has prayed, prayed, had prayed, shall or will pray, shall or will have prayed; pray, is praying*, the double tenses of this predicative are seldom used; *pray* is made in the ‘present tense perfect;’ *I* is its subject. *Thee* is a *pronoun*—*second person*—*singular*—*neuter*—*objective case* after the predicative *pray*. *Oh* is an *exclamative*; independent. *My* is a *pronoun*—*singular*—*first person*—*neuter*—*relative case* to *lord*, because it shows the relation between the persons represented by *my* and *lord*. *Lord* is a *general noun*, be-

cause it is a name applied to individuals of a *genus* or class—*second person*, because it represents the person addressed—*singular*—*masculine*—*objective case* after the predicative *pray*, the same as *thee*, because it represents the same object. *Let* is a predicative from the same; *let, let, letting, let, to let; let, have or has let, let, had let, shall or will let, shall or will have let; to let*, it is a *nominal predicative* in the *objective case* after *pray*, I pray thee *to let*, &c., the *to* being omitted after some predicatives.

The above will serve imperfectly to show the mode of parsing. It will be observed, that in the above, where the reasons of any step have been once explained, the explanation is afterwards omitted for the sake of brevity; yet scholars should be taught to give the reasons until they are perfectly familiar with them. The scholar should be taught in parsing predicatives, *to name the principal parts*, which are the present and past, the two predicals, and the nominal predicatives—*to collect the tenses*, that is, to name all the perfect tenses—and *to inflect the tense where found*. If any predicative is not used in all the forms, it should be mentioned. Scholars should be frequently exercised in giving a complete synopsis of predicatives. The colloquial form may be used in parsing, if preferred. Thus—“Read the paragraph or section—How many sentences are there?—What is a sentence? Why is () a sentence?—Why is not () a sentence?—Construe—Why is there a comma after ()? Should not there be a point after ()? How many propositions are there in the first sentence? Name them—Name the subject and predicate of each—What is a proposition? Why is () a proposition? Why is not () a proposition?” &c. Such will be the part of the teacher, and the reply to the several particulars will be the part of the scholar.

The following is given to show how full the exercise of construing may be.

“ Hail, holy Light, offspring of Heaven, first born,
Or, of the Eternal, coeternal beam.
May I express thee, unblam'd? Since God is light,
And never, but in unapproached light,
Dwelt from eternity, dwelt then in thee
Bright effluence of bright essence increate.”—*Milton*.

[*Construed.*].—*Hail, holy Light, first-born offspring of Heaven*, or other than call thee first-born offspring, may I unblamed express or call thee coeternal beam of the *Eternal* or God? Since God is light and dwelt not from eternity except in unapproached light, then consequently he dwelt in thee, bright effluence of bright essence increate or self-existent.

[*Explained.*].—This is the commencement of Milton's address to Light, written after he had become blind. Milton did not believe that ‘all things were created out of nothing,’ but believed them to be an *efflux of the Deity*, a part of God himself proceeding forth and assuming an infinite variety of forms, and this sentiment he has embodied in this paragraph, especially in the last line. He in high admiration of light, which in consequence of his blindness was fully appreciated, at first, calls it the *first-born offspring* of Heaven, but as that did not quite equal his views of it, yet fearing lest he should be called to account, by some, if he boldly said that light was a part of God or coeternal with him, he says *May I unblamed* or be unblamed if I *express thee, coeternal beam of the Eternal*; and then to further turn off reproof, gives the reason for his belief. As God must from eternity have dwelt in light, for *he is light*, consequently light must be *coeternal* with God, and must be a *bright effluence* from the bright essence of an uncreated God.

Such explanations should always be given; by the scholar when able, and when not, by the teacher.

MISCELLANEOUS REMARKS AND CRITICISMS.

"The chief were those who, from the pit of Hell,
Roaming to seek their prey on Earth, durst fix
Their seats *long after* next the seat of God."—Milton.

"—— the wisest heart
Of Solomon he led by fraud to build
His temple *right against* the temple of God."—Milton.

By these examples we see that definers define relatives, for *long* and *right* are definers defining the relatives, *after* and *against*. It is hardly possible to conceive how this case could be disposed of by the old grammars, for *after* and *against* are according to them, prepositions, and they have no rules for adjectives or adverbs belonging to prepositions.

"Henry was driving a dark grey horse."

Was driving is a predicative from *drive*; *drive*, *drove*, *driving*, *driven*, *to drive*; *drive*, *have* or *has driven*, *drove*, *had driven*, *shall* or *will drive*, *shall* or *will have driven*; *drove*, *was driven*, *was driving*, made in the 'past tense pending,' and has *Henry* for its subject. *A* is a definer defining *horse*. *Dark* is a definer defining *grey*. *Grey* is a definer defining *horse*. *Horse* is a general name, objective after *was driving*.*

*Some grammarians in parsing, separate the imperfect predical from the predicative, but parse the perfect predical as forming part of the predicative. Is there any reason for so doing? Is not the former a part of the predicative, as much as the latter? Take an example; *I am destroying* my book; *I have destroyed* my book. The timber *was lying* in the water; The timber *was laid* in the water. Can any one see why *am destroying*, or *was lying* should not be parsed together as forming one predicative, as much as *have destroyed*, or *was laid*. It appears to us, that the error of separating the one and not the other, arose from the error of 'passive verbs.' One error, like one lie, needs another to help it out. Having erroneously adopted the theory of passive verbs, it brought them into a difficulty, from which they could not extricate themselves without violating common sense, as above. Other grammari-

"Belial came last *than whom*, a spirit more lewd
Fell not from Heaven."—*Milton*.

"Which, when Beelzebub perceived *than whom*
Satan except, none higher sat."—*Milton*.

It is amusing to witness the various shifts of grammarians, in trying to dispose of *whom* in the above instances. Sometimes, *than* is said to have the force of a preposition, and to govern *whom*; sometimes *whom* is considered as a privileged case, where the objective is used without any governing word; and sometimes it is put in the objective case after *than* according to the Latin rule, 'The comparative degree governs the ablative,' forgetting that the *objective* case in English corresponds to the *accusative* in Latin, and not the *ablative*. But what would be the course of a sensible, independent mind, one not accustomed to bow to authority without reason? Such a person would at once declare *whom* to be a corruption for *who*, and having corrected the error would parse it according to the rules for all such cases, instead of endeavoring to pervert the principles of grammar to conform to the use of a word, because it is found in Milton, or any other distinguished author. An author may be permitted to depart from principles of grammar already established, when utility or necessity require it, but no such defence can be made in behalf of this use of *whom*; it is a corruption of

ans go to the other extreme, and parse all predicals separate from the predicative, calling the predical a definer. But let us see whether there is any more reason for this than for the above. I *have written* a letter; to say I have a *written letter*, will do very well; but I *have spilt* my milk—to say I have my *spilt milk*, is false. I *have destroyed* the paper; I have the *destroyed paper*, is not correct, for we cannot have what is not, and destroyed paper is no paper at all. Again; John *is burning* brush. If *burning* is a definer, what does it define? 'John is—burning brush;' John is, may stand for a proposition, although a useless one, but what of 'burning brush'? nothing. If *burning* refers to John, it then would be Burning John is brush—Burning brush is John. The absurdity of the theory is too manifest to need further remark.

good English. This will be perceived by changing the position. 'Except Satan none higher sat, than *whom*.' 'Except Satan none sat higher than *Beelzebub* sat.' *Whom* is a pronoun used instead of *Beelzebub*; but who will say that this is good English, 'Except Satan none sat higher than *whom* sat?' If we are to subscribe to all we find in distinguished authors, we should have to justify the following.

"If thou *beest* he; but O, how fallen."—*Milton*.

"Save *he* who reigns above."—*Milton*.

"If a man *have* built a house," &c. &c.

"I knew of his *being* a gambler."

Being is a predical used as a noun; in the objective case after the relative *of*. *Gambler* is a noun in the same case with *being*, because it is explanatory of it.—Rule 5. I knew of his *being*, or I knew his *being*—what was it?—it was the *being* of a gambler. "His *being* a gambler deprived him of good society." What was it that deprived him of good society?—His *being* or life; what was his life?—He *was* or lived a gambler.

"The child was called *Alfred*."

Alfred is in the objective case after *was called*. The Passive verb grammars parse *Alfred* as in the nominative case after *was called*; but it is an error; for, 'The child *Alfred* was called,' is a very different proposition from 'The child was called *Alfred*.' The child was not *Alfred*, before they named him; the act of naming made him *Alfred*. They named him *Alfred*, therefore he was named *Alfred*. *Alfred* must be in the objective case as the result of the action, the same as 'They ran a race,' 'They built a building,' &c. They named a name for the child, and that name was *Alfred*.

"Must I leave thee, *Paradise*? thus leave
Thee, native *soil*, these happy walks and shades,
Fit haunt of gods?"

Paradise and *soil* are in the same case with *thee*. The old grammars would make them in two cases; in the objective case with *thee*, according to the rule, 'A noun explaining another is put by apposition in the same case;' and in the nominative case, by the rule, 'When a direct address is made, the noun or pronoun is in the nominative case independent.'

To say nothing of the falsity and absurdity of making Para-

dise in two cases, we think that the two rules named, show clearly the want of reflection which characterized the authors of the old grammars. What does *put by apposition* mean? *Apposition* means *putting to*, hence we cannot see but the rule reads thus—A noun explaining another noun is *put by putting to* in the same case! Do we in *parsing*, *put* a word in any case, or does the *writer* put it in the case in which it is? See Rule 5.

The above example shows the absurdity of the ‘*nominative case independent*.’ To say that a noun is in the nominative case independent, merely because a direct address is made, is a nominative absurdity. If *Paradise* and *soil* are at all *independent*, they are in the *objective independent*, and not *nominative independent*.

“I would not be a *leaf*, *to die*
Without recording sorrow’s sigh.”

Would is a predicative in the present tense, and equivalent to *wish* or *desire*. *Be* is a nominal predicative, in the objective case after *would*; the *to* is omitted. *Leaf* is a noun in the same case with *to be*, being explanatory of it. I would or desire not *he* being—what being? The being of a leaf, a leaf’s being, *a leaf*. I would not *to be* a leaf and *to die*.

“*The more* a people know, *the less* exposed they are to every description of extravagance.” “*The less* they know, *the better* they obey.”

Query—How will the old grammars parse *the*? Is *the* an ‘article’ limiting the signification of a noun?

“Some heavy business hath my lord on hand,
And I must know it, *else* he loves me not.”

Else is an *imperative*.—‘I must know it,’ *dismiss* that, that is, if he does not let me know his business, ‘he loves me not.’

“The stars *resemble* one another.”

Query—Is *resemble* a verb according to the old grammars? does it express either *action*, *being*, or *passion*?

“Her face *is* pale, and it *would* frighten me,
But that I know she loves me.”

This sentence shows in a clear light, two of the errors in previous grammars. *Might*, *could*, *would* and *should* are said

to be in the *imperfect*, that is, a *past* tense ; but what is more evidently false ? Her face *is* pale—it *would* frighten me. “If she *would* waken, she *would* soon be warm. Why is she wrapt in this thin sheet ? If I, this winter morning, were not covered better, I *should* be cold like her. If I *could* wake her, she *would* smile on me as she always *does*, and *hiss* me. Mother ! you have slept too long.”—*Shakspeare*. Who can read this and not be astonished that the falsehood that *could*, *would* and *should* are in a past tense, should have been taught to scholars for centuries, unrebated ! It is only a specimen of the blindness of those blind guides who have attempted to *enlighten* the public on grammar. *But* is called a *conjunction*, but how can *that* be disposed of, if *but* is a conjunction ? “I know she loves me,” *be out that*, and her face would frighten me. *But* is an imperative, and *that* is in the objective case after it.

“I have eight *pair* of tame pigeons.”—*Cowper*.

“So he departed thence and found Elisha the son of Shaphat who was plowing with twelve *yoke* of oxen before him, and he with the twelfth.”—*Bible*.

“There were five *span* of horses in market.”

Some incline to make *pair*, *yoke*, &c. in such cases, plural, according to grammatical principles, as *pairs*, *yokes*, *spans*, &c. but general practice authorizes the use of the singular form.

Ten foot pole ; Two foot rule.

Some would-be critics contend that it should be, Ten feet pole, Two feet rule, but it is evidently an error, the first form being more correct ; for *foot* marks the primary divisions of the measures, which divisions give the name to it. It is a *foot* pole, a *foot* rule, &c., that is, it is a pole or rule divided off into divisions of a foot each. The *length* of the measure is determined by the numeral, *ten*, *two*, &c. Who would think of saying, a three *rods* chain, yet it would be required by consistency, if ‘A ten *feet* pole’ is admitted to be correct. We say A four *horse* team, and not A four *horses* team.

There is a peculiar awkwardness manifested by some writers in their attempt to adhere to the old grammar principles of the *Subjunctive mode*. “If a man *have* built a house, the house is his.”—*Wayland*. “The triumph remained—if triumph there *were*—

with South Carolina.”—*Martineau*. “If when a dearth occurs the court *do* not make some attempt to relieve the people.”—*Malthus*.

What can be more awkward than to say, If a man *have* built a house? We do not hear the common class of people use such an expression, for nature teaches them better; it is only those who are trammelled by the arbitrary rules of false grammar that thus corrupt the language. “Banish gentleness from your hearth, and what sort of society will remain?—the solitude of the desert *were* preferable to it.” *Were* as in this case is not admissible, its use is not good English. The following is another specimen of corruption arising from the same source. “If in the last line, the poet had used the verb ‘raised’ which though not equivalent would have conveyed much the same meaning, the expression *had* been fainter.” Here the writer, simply because he had used *if* at the beginning of the sentence, thought he must use *had* instead of *would have*. The theory and rules of the Subjunctive Mode have ever been destructive of the elegance and propriety of language, and the sooner they are discarded, the better. See Webster’s Grammar under Rule 43,—pages 138, 9; also pages 148, 9.

“The bishops and abbots *were allowed their seats* in the house of Lords.” “Theresa *was forbid the presence* of the emperor.” “He *was shown that very story*.”

Mr. Webster says, ‘this idiom is outrageously anomalous, but perhaps incorrigible.’ It would be strictly more correct to say ‘Seats were allowed to the bishops,’ than that ‘The bishops were allowed their seats,’ but the latter is authorized by general practice, and is as he says incorrigible. But it is no more ‘outrageously anomalous’ than the following; “The provisions were not fit *to eat* ;” “The oxen are fat enough *to kill* ;” “The grain is ripe enough *to cut*.” Use authorizes these expressions, though *to be eaten*, *to be killed*, *to be cut* would be more in accordance with strict arbitrary principles.

“———while we

Sit here deliberating in cold debates

If we should sacrifice our lives to honor

Or wear them out in servitude and chains.”—*Addison*.

“Quick, let us hence; who knows *if* Cato’s life stands sure.”—*Addison*.

The use of *if* for *whether*, is somewhat common, but it is scarcely admissible.

“Why *did* they make this law? Because they *are* obliged to do so.”—*Dwight*.

Here is an incorrect use of the tenses; *are* should be *were*.

“It may appear, perhaps, that a doctrine—”

It should be, ‘It may perhaps appear,’ &c. The doubt and contingency should be together, that the mind may pass at once from them to the declaration.

“Nadab and Abihu took *either* of them his censer.”—*Bible*.

Here *either* should be *each*, because it means that *both* took them; but *either* means *one* of two or more, but not *both*, or *all*.

“Let us resume the worship of God by singing *in* the one hundredth psalm.”

This mode of expression is not incorrect only, but extremely inelegant. We sing psalms, not sing *in* psalms.

“He was fined *in the sum of* two dollars.”

This is an error common with those who affect the law style; but it is ridiculous nonsense. What would be thought if a person should say, he was struck *in the amount* of two blows? Why is it more correct to say, He was struck two blows, than He was fined two dollars? We say such a thing weighed five pounds, not, weighed *in the sum of* five pounds; and so of a multitude of cases; it is the idiom of the language, and is on the same or nearly the same principle as, Ran a *race*, Dreamed a *dream*, &c.

“The tambors beat, the cymbals rung
As they would rend the sky.”—*Bowles*.

Here *if* is omitted after *as*; they rung *as* they would ring *if* they would rend the sky.

“Would I had met my dearest foe in heaven
Or ever I had seen that day, Horatio!”—*Shakspeare*.

The *or* here appears to be a corruption of *ere* before,

"Ham. I *would* I had been there.

Hor. It would have much amazed you.

Ham. Very *like*, very *like*. Staid it long?"

Shakspeare.

Would is often used in the sense of *wish*. *Like* is here used for *likely*, and defines 'would have amazed.'

"Who cheapens life abates the fear of death."—*Young*.

Who for *he who*.

"Or life or death is equal; neither weighs;

All weight in this—O let me live to thee."—*Young*.

This sentence is incorrect. Two things *are* equal, not *is* equal. The meaning probably is, life and death are equal for neither of them weighs anything. But the use of *or* is unparalleled; the first one is superfluous, and the second equivalent to *and*.

"Know, all the good that individuals find

Or God and nature meant to mere mankind."—*Pope*.

That is omitted after *or* in this case.

"O love *of* gold, thou meanest of amours!"—*Young*.

Of instead of *for*; this is a common, though, strictly speaking, an incorrect use of *of*.

"Plan *of* a gradual abolition of the poor laws proposed."

Of should be *for*.

"——whilst they (distilled

Almost to jelly *with* the act of fear)

Stand dumb, and speak not to him."—*Shakspeare*.

With should be *by*; *with* sometimes denotes the instrument, but never the cause.

"And as the mind must faint under trouble *that* sees no prospect of its termination, and no conviction of its use, it was necessary that they should keep in view the kingdom of God."—*A. Clarke*.

This sentence is defective in consequence of the use of *that*,

which refers more naturally to *trouble* than to *mind*. It would be better thus, 'And as the mind must faint under trouble, of which it sees no prospect of a termination,' &c.

"The sentence might have closed with *fully* as much advantage, at the word view,"—*full*.

"Most of these kinds of pyramids *have* originally *been raised* by the first settlers from Norway, and have been held in repair from generation to generation."—*Henderson*.

Here *have been raised* is incorrectly used for the past tense, *were raised*.

"They have *all* names which they answer to readily."

Here *all*, instead of being placed after *they* and in apposition with it, as it should be, is placed so as to be the definer of *names*, implying that there were no names but which they (the sheep) had. It should be, They all have names to which they answer readily.

"The spring will winter's gloom o'ershade,
Ere *yet* the fields are white with snow;
Ere *yet* the latest flowrets fade,
Thou in thy grave will sleep below."

Yet should be *that*; it is in the objective case after the relative *ere*.

As some of the departures which we have made, from the systems of the old Grammars, will be deemed ultraisms, we give the following extracts in their defence. And if *authority* or *reason* weigh anything, they will fully justify the changes we have made.

The following, from Webster's Manual of Useful Studies, will sustain the position we have taken in respect to the

ARTICLE.

An, or *a*, is an adjective of number, signifying *one*, and used indifferently before any *noun*, definite or indefinite.

In the grammars of the English language, there has been, and still is, a continued series of errors on the subject of this word, *an*. These grammars tell us that *a* is an indefinite article, *prefixed* to nouns, and used to point out a single thing of the kind, in a vague sense, indeterminate, or not pointing to a thing certain: as, "give me *a* book; that is, any book." So ignorant were the first compilers of English grammar, of the origin of this word, that they considered *a* the original word, and that *n* was added before a vowel,—a thing that has never been done in any instance in the language. All this is a mistake.

In the first place, *an*, or *a*, is never *prefixed* to a noun. A *prefix* is united with a word, forming a part of it, which is never the case with *an*, or its abbreviation *a*; or a *prefix* is a part of a title: as in St. John.

In the second place, *an* is the original word, and *a* is used in the place of it, before a consonant. Its only use is to express *one*, and that without the least reference to the definiteness or indefiniteness of the noun to which it relates. It is used before *definite*, or *indefinite* words, just as *two*, *three*, *four*, and every adjective of number, is used.

The example given above is correct. "Give me *a* book," that is, *one*, or *any book*. Just so is *two* used. "Give me *two* books," that is, *any two*. "Give me *three* books," that is, *any three*. From a basket of oranges, "bring me *an* orange," that is, *any orange*. "Bring me *two* oranges," that is, *any two*. "Bring me *ten* oranges," that is, *any ten*; and so onward to a thousand, or to any other number. The word *an*, or *a*, in this respect, stands on precisely the same footing as every adjective of numbers in the language.

But let other cases be cited. Congress consists of two houses, *a* senate, and *a* house of representatives; that is, according to the foregoing definition, *any senate*, indeterminate, or in a vague sense; and *any house* of representatives, uncertain which, but one of a number.

New York stands on an island: that is, on *any island*, indeterminate.

"I will be to them *a* God, and they shall be to me *a* people." Heb. viii. 10. That is, I will be to them *any God*, in a vague sense, indeterminate; one God of a number, but uncertain which. They shall be to me *a* people, that is, *any people*, indeterminate.

Who is not surprised, that such a false definition and classification of this word, should keep its place in a grammar, and be taught to children, age after age; and at this day, boldly defended by nearly every compiler who treats of the subject?

This, however, is the fact, not only in English grammar, but in French, Italian, German, and other languages.

The following rules and examples, taken from Webster's and Cardell's Grammars, seem sufficient to show that the use of *adverbs* and *adjectives* is the same, and that they constitute but one *class*.

[From Webster's Grammar.]

RULE XV.—Adjectives are usually placed before the nouns to which they belong ; as, a *wise* prince ; an *obedient* subject ; a *pious* clergyman ; a *brave* soldier.

RULE XVI.—Adjectives belong to verbs in the infinitive mode ; as “to see is *pleasant*,”—“to ride is more *agreeable* than to walk ;” “to calumniate is *detestable*.”

RULE XVII.—Adjectives belong to sentences, or whole propositions : Examples :

“*Agreeable* to this, we read of names being blotted out of God's book.”—Burder's *Oriental Customs*, 375.

“Greece, which had submitted to the arms, in her turn, subdued the understandings of the Romans, and *contrary* to that which in these cases commonly happens, the conquerors adopted the opinions and manners of the conquered.”—Enfield, *Hist. Phil.* b. 3, 1.

NOTE.—Writers and critics, misapprehending the true construction of these and similar sentences, have supposed the attribute to belong to the verb, denoting the *manner of action*. But a little attention to the sense of such passages will be sufficient to detect the mistake. For instance, in the example from Enfield, the attribute *contrary* cannot qualify the verb *adopted* ; for the conquerors did not adopt the opinions of the conquered in a *manner contrary* to what usually happens—the *manner of the act* is not the thing affirmed, nor does it come into consideration. The sense is this, the fact, that the conquerors adopted the opinions and manners of the conquered, was *contrary* to what commonly happens in like cases. The attribute belongs to the whole sentence or proposition. The same explanation is applicable to every similar sentence.

In consequence of not attending to this construction, our hypercritics, who are very apt to distrust popular practice, and substitute their own rules for customary idioms, founded on common sense, have condemned this use of the attribute, and authors, suffering themselves to be led astray by these rules, often use an adverb in the place of an adjective.

RULE XIX.—Some adjectives are used to modify the sense of others and of participles ; as a *very clear* day, *red hot* iron, a

more or *most* excellent character. "Without coming *any* nearer."—*Locke* ; *more* pressing necessity, *most* grating sound, "a *closer* grained wood."—*Lavoisier Trans.*

RULE XX.—Adjectives are used to qualify the sense of adverbs ; as a city was *very* bravely defended ; the soldiers were *most* amply rewarded ; a donation *more* beneficially bestowed ; a house *less* elegantly furnished ; a man the *least* peaceably disposed.

RULE XVIII.—Adjectives are used to modify the action of verbs, and to express the qualities of things in connection with the action by which they are produced. Examples :

"Open thine hand *wide*."—*Deut.* 15. 17.

"Bray, to pound or grind *small*."—*Johnson's Dict.*

"Magnesia feels *smooth* ; calcarious earths feel *dry* ; lithomarga feels very *greasy* or at least *smooth* ; yet some feel *dry* and *dusty*."—*Kirwan. vol.* 1. 12. 189.

"Drink *deep* or taste not the Pierian spring."—*Pope.*

"Heaven opened *wide* her ever during gates."

Milton, P. L. 7.

"And *just* as short of reason he must fall."—*Pope.*

"Thick and more *thick* the steely circle grows."

Hoole's Tasso. b. 8.

"The cakes, eat *short* and *crisp*."—*Vicar of Wakefield.*

"Here grass is cut *close* and gravel rolled *smooth*. Is not that trim?"—*Boswell. Johnson.* 3.

"To hands that *longer* shall the weapon wield."

Hoole. Tas. 7.

"So while we taste the fragrance of the rose,
Grows not her blush the *fairer*?"

Ibm. 2. 77.

"How much *nearer* he approaches to his end."

"I have dwelt the *longer* on the discussion of this point."

Junius Let. 17.

Authors, misguided by Latin rules, and conceiving that every word which is used to qualify a verb, must be an *adverb*, have pronounced many of the passages here recited and similar ones to be incorrect—and in such as are too well established to bear censure, they call the adjective an *adverb*. Were it not for this influence in early education, which impresses a notion that all languages must be formed with the like idioms, we should never have received an idea that the same word may not modify a noun, an adjective and a verb.

Thus, clay burns *white*—objects may be seen *double*—may rise *high*—fall *low*—grow *strait*, or *thick*, or *thin*, or *fat*, or *lean*—one may speak *loud*—the sun shines *clear*—the *finer* a substance is pulverized—to grow *wiser*, to plunge *deeper*, spread *wider*—and similar expressions without number, constitute a well established idiom, as common as it is elegant.

It is a just remark of Mr. Tooke, that all words which critics have not understood, they have thrown into the *common sink of adverbs*.

[From Cardell.]

The list given in the neuter grammar books for *adverbs* is subdivided into various arbitrary classes, from *eleven* to *seventy*, according to the fancy of the different compilers, and are set forth as so many *kinds of adverbs*.

The prevailing use of the words called adverbs, is said to be to express the manner of action. This supposition is a total mistake of the principle.

A large proportion of the words *called adverbs* are formed by adding *ly* to an other word. The syllable *ly* is from the same root, and means the same as the adjective *like*. The word so compounded is an *adjective* of the *second class*, almost invariably describing the object of the verb, in reference to some resemblance which it acquires or holds, as the effect of the action.

The resemblance denoted by *ly* or *like*, may be close, or very remote. There is no rule for using or omitting this syllable. It is entirely a question of fact, determined by fashion and good taste. The difference exists not only between verbs of similar meaning used in the same way; but in cases where the same verb stands in the same construction. It is worthy of remark likewise, that the verbs called *neuter*, all take the words which are said to express the *manner of action*, in the same way as the acknowledged *active* verbs, so that if the neuter verb theory was true, there would be *manner of action* where there was *no action*.

The man sleeps *soundly*.
 She sits *genteelly* or *perfectly well*.
 She sits *idle* and *contented*.
 She remains *quiet* and *entirely undisturbed*.
 She lives *contented* and *happy*.
 She lives *virtuously* and *happily*.

The new house is finished *elegantly*,
 It is made *elegant*.
 It is rendered *elegant*,

It appears *elegant* or *splendid*.
 It looks *well* or *elegantly*.
 It looks *neat* and *substantial*.
 It shows *well* or *superbly*.

The medicine *cures* the patient *completely*.
 It *makes* him *completely well*.
 It *makes* his cure *complete*.
 It *effects* his cure *completely*.
 It renders his cure *effectual*.

It sometimes happens that a number of the words called adverbs come together ; as,

Have you learned your lesson ?

Ans. Not yet quite well enough, perhaps.

CONJUNCTIONS.

[From Webster's Manual, p. 185.]

The words *if*, *though*, *that*, *notwithstanding*, *because*, *during*, *except*, *save*, *provided*, are generally classed with conjunctions or prepositions. But nothing can be farther from the truth.

If and *though* are verbs, and always verbs. *If* is only an abbreviation of *give*, or the Saxon spelling of the word, *gif*, which has been obsolete scarcely a century. *Though* is also a verb, defective in all its inflections ; but both these words have the signification of verbs, and sentences in which they occur cannot be correctly analyzed, without considering them as verbs. They have no property of conjunctions.

In this sentence, "He will go, *if* you desire it," the original and true form was, he will go, *give that*, you desire it ; that is, grant the fact that you desire it, then he will go. The word *that*, referring to the following clause, is generally omitted.

"But I pursue, *if that* I may apprehend." Phil. iii. 12. Here is the original form of expressing condition. *If* is a verb, for *give*, and *that* is the objective case after it, referring to the following sentence or clause.

"But *though that* we, or an angel from heaven, preach to you otherwise."—*Bishop's Bible*. This is the old form of writing, and is good English. *Though* is here a verb, governing *that*, which is a pronoun, or substitute for the sentence following. *That*, after *though*, is now omitted, as it is after *if*.

The phrase above is, *though that*, grant or admit that we, or an angel, &c. "Though Moses and Samuel stood before me, yet my mind could not be toward this people." Jer. xv. 1.

Because, too, is numbered among the conjunctions. How

then, can we parse such expressions as these? *Because* of these things; *because* of me; *because* of the present rain. They cannot be analyzed on the supposition that *because* is a conjunction. *Because* is now one word, but formerly the parts of the word were written separately, *by cause*; and to parse the foregoing phrase, we must still consider *be* and *cause* as two words; *by cause of these things*.

Notwithstanding is a compound of *not* and *withstanding*. This is properly followed by *that*, though this word is often omitted. It rains, but notwithstanding that, (it rains,) I must return. *Withstanding* is always a participle, whether with or without *that*; and *notwithstanding* in union with *that*, or a sentence, always forms the clause independent, or case absolute.

During has the same character and use. It is always a participle of the obsolete verb, *dure*, (to endure,) and with the following words, constitutes the clause independent: as, *during the time, during the day, during the conversation*.

Provided is a participle of the perfect tense; and with the clause or words following, always constitutes the independent clause. He will ride, *provided* you will furnish him with a horse. Here *provided*, with the following words, constitutes the clause independent. He will ride, you furnishing him with a horse *being provided*; that is, on that condition.

Except, in the sentence "except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish," is a verb. Except, take away, remove the following fact, or condition, *ye repent*, and ye shall all perish.

Save, in the phrases, "fight neither with the small nor great, *save* only with the King of Israel." "Israel burned none of them, *save* Hazor only," is a verb; in the latter passage, it governs Hazor in the objective; in the former, its object, or objective, is the following part of the sentence, *save, except*, take out of the order given, the King of Israel.

Hence the mistake in the following passages. "There was no stranger with us in the house, *save* we two in the house." *We*, should be *us*, in the objective.

"All men can not receive this saying, *save* they to whom it is given." *They* should be *them*.

But no mistake of the true character of words has been the cause of so much injury, as that of supposing *that* to be a conjunction, in cases where it refers to a sentence. A like mistake was made, by early writers, in regard to the Greek *oti*, and the Latin *quod*. Jerome adopted it, and it runs through his version of the scriptures. The consequence is, that his version abounds with errors like the following: "Ye have heard, *because* it was said to them of old time." In our common version, this mistake occurs in two or three passages; one only will be here mentioned. This is in Romans, viii. 20, 21., where the word *because* should be *that*, and no point should stand between *hope* and *that*. In consequence of this mistake, the passage is hard-

ly intelligible ; whereas, by the use of *that*, without the point after *hope*, the meaning is obvious.

These brief remarks show how imperfectly our language has been analyzed. Errors of long standing are retained, in opposition to the clearest evidence, and greatly to the prejudice of the language.

[From Webster's Grammar, p. 139.]

It has been before remarked that *if*, *though* and *unless*, are old Saxon verbs in the Imperative Mode, and that the ingenious invention of our ancestors to express a condition or supposition was, to employ a verb, with the sense of *give*, *grant*, *put*, *be*, *if*, that is, *give* the fact. We retain the idiom, and the words employed ; but as these have lost their inflections, critics have ignorantly classed them with conjunctions—a part of speech to which they have no more alliance than they have to nouns or adjectives.* We have also certain words of Latin original, employed for precisely the same purpose—*suppose*, *allow* and *admit*, which indeed are not yet misnamed and classed with conjunctions.

The Saxon method therefore of expressing condition, doubt or hypothesis, was to declare the fact which was to be supposed, by a verb in the Indicative Mode, and prefix to this fact or statement, a verb in the Imperative Mode, denoting *give*, *grant* or *suppose*. Thus, "Give his son shall ask bread, will he give him a stone." *Give*, in the Imperative, and *his son shall ask bread*, a sentence, following *give* as its object. This is precisely the construction of such sentences of a conditional kind. Now to omit the personal termination of the verb in the hypothetical sentence, "Give, he ask bread," is to convert the sentence into false English, unless we suppose the tense future, and the auxiliary *will* or *shall* suppressed. In the present tense, it is just as bad English, as to omit the termination after the Latin equivalent words *suppose* or *admit*. "Suppose, his son ask bread"—"Suppose he be the son of God."

Unless, is a verb, *onlysan*, to unloose, release, dismiss, put away, remove. Unless he wash his flesh, he will be unclean. That is, dismiss (or suppose not to exist) this fact—he wash his flesh, and he will be unclean. This shows that the sentence is not English, except we consider *wash* as in the future,

* "If his son ask bread, will he give him a stone." In the name of reason, what single property of a conjunction has *if*? "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him." What connecting powers has *though*? Not the least ; and this is equally true of *si* and *nisi* in Latin.

and the auxiliary *shall* suppressed. That the tense is future, is not only obvious, from the sense of the verb itself, but from the following clause—If his son (shall) ask bread, *will* he give him a stone?—Unless he (shall) wash his flesh, he *will be* unclean—the last clauses are in the future, corresponding in time with the contingent events expressed in the first clause.

The evils resulting from the Subjunctive Mode we have partially noticed; the following illustrates it more fully.

[From Webster's Grammar, p. 147.]

The mischiefs resulting from the vague manner of instituting Grammar rules, will be fully seen in the perpetual confusion of tenses which occur in almost every author. We are told that conjunctions connect like tenses and modes—and *whether* is a conjunction. Let us see the consequence, "If I *should* ask any one, *whether* ice and water *were* two distinct species of things."—*Locke*, 3. 6. 18.

To resolve this sentence by common grammars, we are to say, that *should ask* is a verb in the imperfect tense of the subjunctive mode, *whether* is a conjunction, and *were*, a verb connected with *ask* by that conjunction. And what sort of language is this—"If I should ask"—a contingent event or hypothesis—of course the time future—"Whether ice and water *were*, two distinct things," that is, *were*, in time past, and perfectly past; for *were* by itself never denotes time imperfectly past?

In this way, the author is led to write what he never intended—sheer nonsense. The verb was intended to express a fact of general existence—one which is always true or false—that is, the identity or diversity of *ice* and *water*—a fact existing in nature, and therefore to be mentioned in the present tense indefinite—"Whether ice and water *are* two distinct substances."

"They considered the body as a hydraulic machine, and the fluids as passing through a series of chymical changes; for getting *that* animation *was* [is] its essential characteristic."—*Darwin*, *Zoon*. *pref*.

"A stranger to the poem would not easily discover *that* this *was* [is] verse."—*Murray's Grammar*.

Examples of this mistake may be cited without end—but those which I have collected are amply sufficient to show the miserable state of grammatical knowledge. How easy would it have been to detect these blunders, had the parts of speech been understood, and properly classed! Take for example, the

passage from Murray—and resolve it according to the explanation of that which is given in the preceding pages—“This *was* verse—a stranger to the poem would not easily discover *that*.’ What nonsense! But correct the verb. “This *is* verse—a stranger would not easily discover *that*.” The whole error has arisen probably from considering *that* as a conjunction—when in fact it is a representative of the following member of the period—and the sentence is found to consist of two clauses—one hypothetical, and the other declaratory—“A stranger to the poem, (if he should attempt) would not easily discover *that—this is verse*.”

A few authors, led by their own sense of right and wrong, [for surely they have had no Grammar to guide them] have occasionally avoided these errors, and written the language with correctness.

“They *said* that man *is* an animal.”—*Anarch. vol. 4, note.*

“He *told* us these birds *are* natives of Samos.”—*ibm. ch. 74.*

THE DUPLÉ TENSE.

[From Cardell, p. 65.]

The glass *is broken*.

It is in that *condition*, in which the *finished action* of breaking has left it.

The book *is printed*.

The act of printing is finished, and the book is as the *effect* of that *action* has made it.

“My son *was lost*, and now *is found*.”

ACTIVE, PASSIVE, AND NEUTER VERBS.

[From Cardell's Grammar, p. 48.]

The verb is the part of speech without which no sentence can be framed, and on which other terms, in construction, mainly depend. They assume great variety in relation to the endless forms of action; but there is no established principle for making division lines between them. From the general practice of language in dropping redundant words, the object of a verb is omitted, when by familiar use it is understood.

All verbs appear to have been originally used to denote visi-

ble activity ; and generally in its highest forms of manifestation. It was not the *post* or *tree*, *sustaining itself* in an erect posture, which gave rise to the verb *stand* ; nor were other verbs first applied to apparently motionless things. They all had their origin in obvious actions ; and in the progress of language, extended their meaning, through lessening degrees of analogous appearance. In this unconscious manner, the nations of unlettered men, so adapted their language to philosophic truth, that all physical and intellectual research can find no essential rule to reject or change. What the simple fathers of mankind did, from first impulse, was exactly accordant with those laws of nature which industrious genius may admire, but can never fully explore.

At every patriarchal home, it was, of course, seen that adult persons could support themselves in an erect posture, and the infants could not ; that the revered parent, at one time, *stood* firm, surrounded by the family circle, and at another, lay prostrate on a bed of sickness, while they were anxiously bending over him ; for these things are common to human life : one man was seen to *stand* faithfully by his friend, or steadfastly at his post, in the hour of danger, while another fainted with fear, or basely deserted, to extricate himself from the peril : another stood in a slippery place, where his companion was seen to fall ; all these, and a thousand others, were instances of manifest action ; and a word to express it became of important use.

When the verb *stand* was established to denote what the man did, from united volition, energy, and skill, it was easily extended to the post and tree, *sustaining themselves* in the same position, without stopping to inquire by what unknown cause their action was performed. In this extension, the continuity remains unbroken, and the application just ; for where obvious movement ceases, action on scientific principles always exists ; and so inevitable is this rule, in its adaptation to things, that not only no neuter verb ever was employed, but it is beyond all human power to form one, to give it either meaning or use.

If the "*Wonderful Activity*" of the rope dancer, who *stands* on his head, upon a swinging cord, at an elevation of fifteen feet in the air, is no action, then what is action ? and who shall dare to name the feats of the mountebank, in comparison with what the *oak*, by Divine Wisdom, *performs* in *standing*, and *renewing its verdure*, for ages, against all the tempests which howl around it ?

Concerning the *objects* of verbs, the errors in grammatical inculcation appear to be of a remarkable cast.

The few specimens which follow, will give some idea of the reciprocity of verbal *actors*, *actions*, and *objects*. These examples are clumsy indeed, but not therefore the less instructive. It belongs to the art of an able writer to conceal this structure, and obviate its monotony, or alliteration. The enlightened linguist, on the contrary, instead of being deceived by this disguise, should make it a most efficient instrument in the elucidation of his principles; for it should not be forgotten, that, in the construction of language, the first process is the formation of single words, with definite meaning, and not the practice of elegant brevity in their combinations.

A very large class of verbal *objects* are the *productions* or *effects*, *resulting* from *actions*. Many others denote the *performance* itself taken as a *circumstance*, *fact*, or *thing*.

<i>Agent.</i>	<i>Verb.</i>	<i>Object.</i>
Builders	build	buildings.
Pinmakers	make	pins.
Dreamers	dream	dreams.
Laughers	laugh	laughter or laugh.
Singers	sing	singing or songs.
Breathers	breathe	breathing or breath.
Speakers	speak or make	speeches.
Actors	act or perform	actions or parts.
Sleepers	sleep	sleep, or naps.
Drinkers	drink	drink.
Walkers	walk or take	walks.
Producers	produce	products or results.
Workers	work or execute	work.
Sitters	sit, or hold	sittings or sessions.
Profligate livers	live	profligate lives.
The dying	die or encounter	dying or death.
Pleaders	plead or make	pleadings or pleas.
A coiner	coins	coin.
Sufferers	suffer	sufferings.
A player	plays	plays.
Thinkers	think or employ	thoughts.
A person	personates	a personage.
Casters	cast	casts or castings.
Fishers	fish or catch	fish.
Twisters	twist	twists.
An equal	equals	an equal.
Light	lights or sheds	light.
The glow	glows or diffuses	a glowing or glow.

The taste	tastes	the taste.
The feeling	feels	the feeling.
Rain	rains	rain.
Frost	frosts or freezes	frost.
The sight	sees	the sight.

All languages are full of this construction. The veil which covers it is more thin than would be at first supposed. This tabular explanation will serve to explain it, instead of explaining any other explanation which can be explained respecting it. The student has only to study the study of nature, around him and within him, to know the knowledge of those principles which chiefly govern all human speech.

The next mystery in verbal *objects*, appears to be the extensive class of self actions, commonly included under the name of reflected verbs. These imply actions which recur upon the agents, or in which the actor does something to himself.

Another set of verbs called reciprocal, denote actions in which two or more agents act on each other.

None of these distinctions amount to any real difference in the character of verbs, which are all substantially alike. No rational division line can be drawn between them.

Dr. Sangrado often bled his *patients*, and occasionally *bled himself*; he sometimes *opened their veins*, and sometimes *his own*.

The doctor, in both cases, performed the operation of bleeding, with the same lancet, in the same way. Whether he opened his own or his patients' veins, appears not to vary the nature of the action, or the character of the verb, any more than the difference between bleeding the same person in the arm, or the foot.

After attempting to show that all verbs are active; that they all denoted, in their origin, manifest action; in what manner they act; and what that action produces; it remains to *think* some farther brief *thoughts*, concerning the nature of verbal objects.

"To Sleep."

The action signified by this verb always affects two objects at the same time; and both are inevitably understood as the objects of the verb, whether either is expressed or not.

The noun *sleeping* is the name of the act which the verb de-

notes, as, "His *sleeping* was quiet : " "They were kept from *sleeping*."

The noun *sleep* is the resulting effect of the action of *sleeping*, or the thing which *sleeping* produces, as *breath* is only what is *breathed*. The way to *have*, *get*, or *take sleep*, is to *sleep it*.

"The stout hearted *have slept their sleep* : " "They shall *sleep* a perpetual *sleep* and shall not wake," means that they "shall *sleep* the *sleep* of death," or, "*Sleep* the long *sleep*," and not merely *sleep* a short *nap*, or *sleep* the ordinary *sleep* of the night.

That the noun *sleep* is always the *object* of the verb *sleep*, is, on the clearest principles of philosophic demonstration, as certain as that very simply proving must afford very simple proof, or bleeding produce blood.

Sleeping also, as a self action, infallibly produces its effect on the sleeper as its object.

This action, like most others performed by man, depends partly on necessity, and partly on reason and choice.

"For this cause many sleep : " 1 Cor. xi. 30.

"I will not give sleep to my eyes, nor slumber to my eyelids, until I have found out a place for the Lord."—Ps. "Awake thou that sleepest, and arise."

Every human being, at short intervals, resorts to "tired Nature's sweet restorer, balmy sleep ;" to *sleep himself* into new vigor, after the exhaustion of his waking hours.

A mother, because her child was peevish, rocked it to sleep, and "it *slept itself* quiet."

"A young lady, in great distress of mind, took a strong opiate, and *slept herself* to death." "Many idle persons *sleep themselves* into a kind of unnatural stupidity," as toppers *drink themselves drunk*.

The acetous fermentation of wine is one of the moderate kind of actions. A moment's attention will show something of its nature.

1. The wine *converts itself* to vinegar.
2. It *imbibes oxygen*, or the acidifying principle, from the air.
3. It *changes* the surrounding *atmosphere* by changing the proportions of its constituents.

This liquid then, apparently motionless in the cask, *performs* its direct *actions* on three *objects* at the same time.

To shine.

The original and strict meaning of the verb to shine is to *brighten objects* ; to make them *sheen, sheeny, shining, glossy or bright*.

“ The Sun shines.”

This verb, during the last four hundred years, very seldom has an object directly expressed ; not because it has no object, or because the sun, in shining, *produces no effect* ; but for more consistent reasons, which may be clearly explained.

On philosophic principles, and likewise according to popular conception, the sun, in shining, either produces some effect on its own body ; or it throws out something from itself ; or it influences bodies on which its shining falls. It does all the three. It *exhibits itself* in brightness, “ in peerless majesty :” “ It *sheds* its dazzling *radiance* through the world :” and it *brightens* all objects on which this radiance falls.

The *brilliancy* which the sun *displays* on its own disk, is *sun shine*. It *diffuses* or *sheds* this *brilliancy* by *shining it* : the light with which it *shines, enlightens, or irradiates the world, is sun shine*.

The reason, then, why this verb has no object expressed, is, in the first place, because it has so many objects, that it is impossible to enumerate them ; and, secondly, because its action is so uniform and familiar, that it is unnecessary to particularize for the sake of perspicuity.

To smile.

To smile is necessarily to *smile smiles*.

The sycophant “ *bowed and smiled himself* into favor at court.”

“ To *smile* our cares away.”

“ And *smile* the *wrinkles* from the brow of age.”

No action in the order of nature can affect less than two objects at the same time, nor can any verb ever have less than two objective words inevitably depending on it in construction, whether either is expressed or not. This statement may be exemplified by the following anecdote, in which duplicate objects, to each verb, are alternated with each other,

A foreigner, hired to an American farmer, *wrote writing* on a sheet of paper, or *wrote a sheet* of paper with *writing*, to *inform the information* to his mother or *inform his mother* by the *information*, that the man who *employed him* in *employment*, or *em-*

ployed employment for him, fed him with meat, or fed meat to him, twice a week. His fellow laborer, struck with the singularity of such a letter, asked the question of him, or asked him by the question, how he could the conning of himself, or could himself with the cunning, to communicate such a communication to his friends, or communicate his friends and himself by such communication, and whether he did not himself in the deed, or did not the deed for himself, to eat the eating of meat, or eat meat for his eating, every day in the week?

The foreigner answered the answer to his companion, or answered his companion with the answer, "Poh! would you the will in yourself, or would you yourself by the will, to have me with the having, or have the having of me, to tell the telling of such a tale, or tell the tale by such telling, that my friends in Europe would never believe the belief of it, or believe it with their belief?"

Such a letter, of course, is not given as a specimen of fashionable elegance in modern practice; but, if any one, on perusing this kind of composition, should think it whimsically new, far fetched, or overdone, let him take a little time to examine it, and try the most doubtful words, by the substitution of others, of similar meaning, as, instead of "*employing* a man in *employment*," to employ him in *business*, or *furnish* him with employment. When this is done, let the expressions here used be compared with their prevailing contractions, which doubtless sound better, and, perhaps, may at first seem more correct, because they are more familiar.

"A man communicates, by letter, with his friend."

Communicates *what* with his friend? The communication which communicates, without the community of more *objects* than one, is much worse grammar, rhetoric, and logic, than any thing in the foreigner's letter, however singular that may appear: yet this communication, of *nothing* with *some thing else*, has become the established diction, and is one of the most trifling absurdities in the doctrine of unoperative actions, and neuter affirmations.

It is the purpose of grammar, properly conducted, to explain language, on rational principles; to show the reciprocal dependence and connection of words; ascertain what is vague; and supply what, for the sake of common sense, must necessarily be understood: for, if the scholarship of the civilized world is to be confined merely to teaching set forms or words, by rote, then it aims at nothing higher than children in all savage countries may learn from their grandmothers.

No other word is of so extensive use as the verb *to be*; and consequently none has so much need of relieving its monoto-

nous repetitions, by making its inflections irregular. No less than five verbs therefore are blended to make the parts of this one : for *be*, *am*, *is*, *are*, and *were*, are so many distinct radical terms. They have different shades of original meaning ; as *to live*, or *preserve one's self* in being ; *to assume* or *take some position*, *appearance*, or *form* ; *to exist*, *stand forth*, or *exhibit one's self* ; *to breathe air*, *enjoy it*, or *appear* in it ; and *to exercise vital powers* of body or mind. Most of the applications of the verb *to be* are the inferential meanings from the original ideas.

This verb is not of a different nature from others. The frequency of its use depends on its specific importance, and not on any thing distinctive in its verbal character. It expresses transitive action in every form of its use ; but that action belongs to itself, and is not employed to conjugate other verbs ; nor to make them either active or passive.

On the same principles which have already been explained, the verb *to be*, always has two objective words irresistibly inferred.

They *are*, or *breathe* air.

They *are*, or *air* themselves.

This verb has its first application in the manifest and highest qualities of living beings, and then, like other verbs, descends to inferior things, till the analogy can hardly be traced. No one can doubt that the verb *to be*, with its governed objects expressed, must appear remarkably new to those who never thought of such a thing before, and who take it for granted, that, if a word is not explained in their grammar or dictionary, it can only be because it never had any meaning. If, from unconscious and familiar use of the verb *to be*, we are inclined to overlook its important signification, the reflections of common sense ought to set us right ; for while we see so strong a tendency to omit all words which can be spared, how should this one be retained in more than half the sentences through the language ? The verb *are*, with its governed objects, has, indeed, a clumsy appearance in practice, because so little known ; but this can not alter its nature, nor the truth of its principle. Let the objector read the account of the English prisoners in the Black-hole dungeon at Calcutta, suffocating for want of air ; climbing over their dead and dying companions, and gasping for breath, at the scanty aperture, and he will have a better idea of the verb *are*, as connected with the question of life and death. The twenty-three persons who survived that scene of horror, would easily have understood and felt the explanation of this word, and would not have considered it either awkward, unmeaning, or entirely new.

In the practical use of verbs, the variations are often very

great. From one original and strict meaning, they pass, by easy transitions, to very diversified, analogous, and figurative uses. One striking circumstance in the employment of verbs, is the number of different agents to which the same verbal action may be referred.

Mr. Jones has a new grate in his front parlor, in which he burns Liverpool coal.

His new *grate burns coal* very well.

The *coal burns* handsomely.—(burns itself.)

The *fire burns* well.—(burns the coal.)

The *servant burns* too much coal.

Mr. Jones *burns coal* in preference to wood.

The same kind of action frequently assumes very great variety in its relations, both to *agents* and *objects*.

All verbs have objects alike ; but, as it happens with other words, it becomes an elegant practice to omit these objects, when they are sufficiently understood to answer the purposes of discourse without them. Whether they are to be used, or omitted, does not belong to any possible rule to explain ; but it is entirely a question of fashion and good taste.

The verb *to feed*, to supply with *feed* or *food*, is in very familiar use. A moment's attention will show how differently the same action in its literal and strict sense is performed in relation to different objects, as applied to their nature and wants. *To feed a babe*, is to put feed into its mouth : *to feed a horse*, is to fill the rack or manger before him : a man, who carries on large business, and employs a hundred workmen, *feeds them* and their *families* effectually, by sitting in his office, and signing a bank check, for the amount of their wages, when it becomes due.

To run, is one of the verbs which frequently, by custom, has its object omitted. This is particularly the case, when the fact is, that the agent *runs himself*, and the accompanying circumstances are such, that no other object is likely to be understood. Any necessary distinction, or particularity, requires the objective word, in this self action, to be expressed, and this is to be determined by the sense, and not by arbitrary rule.

Two men were engaged in argument. The believer in intransitive verbs, sat out to *run his opponent* into an evident absurdity, and, contrary to his expectation he *ran himself* into one. Leave out the objects of this verb, *run*, and the sense is totally changed. He sat out to *run* into an *evident absurdity*, and he *ran* into one : that is, he did the very absurd thing which he intended to do.

To run signifies to advance some thing by continued progress from one place to an other, and generally includes the idea of rapidity.

In general, a word has only one meaning, and all apparent varieties in its use, are but extensions, not perversions, of the original and strict import.

"The man soon *ran himself* into discredit by his mismanagement." "We chased the deer till we *ran ourselves* out of breath." "The horse *ran himself* to death." "The pirates *ran* their vessel into a small creek." "We determined to *run* our ship ashore, and *betake ourselves* to the boats." "The profligate *runs* a dreadful career." "They were compelled to *run the gauntlet*." "He *ran* the spear through him." "He *ran* him through the body." "The captain *ran* his men to rescue them from the enemy." "The whale *ran* out fifty fathoms of line." "The glass has but a few more sands to *run*." He *ran* a godly race." "The company *run* their steam boat every day." "They *run* three lines of stages." "The drivers *run* their horses, trot, or walk them, according to circumstances." "He *ran* his head against a post." "He *ran* a sliver into his finger." "The still *runs* a puncheon of whiskey a day." "The distance was seven miles, and he *ran* it in twenty minutes." "The barrel *runs* emptyings." "We *ran* the squirrel up a tree, and *ran* the rabbit into his burrow." "The wheel and reel *ran* off forty runs of yarn, and which yarn *runs* forty knots to the pound." "Run that calico off, and see if it holds out measure." "Run the account over, and see if it is right." "The brokers *run* the bank severely." "The note *overran* its time." "He *out ran* all his competitors."

"SURPRISING FEATS OF ACTIVITY."

For the second time in America !!!

Mr. Skipalino *will appear* and *perform* on the slack rope at the Goose and Gridiron Hotel, on Tuesday evening next. He *will walk, dance, balance, and turn*, first on his head, and then on one foot, with the cord in full swing. He *will lie* crosswise and lengthwise on the rope; *volt* instantly to an erect posture; and *stand* balanced on his head, four feet above the floor.

Mr. S. has had the honor to *exhibit* with great applause to the admiring nobility and gentry, at Saddlers' Wells, and other principal gymnastic theatres, and his *astonishing feats* of *activity* and *skill* have surprised and delighted the most fashionable circles of Europe.

N. B. *Performance to commence at 7 o'clock.*

Which exhibits the greatest "*science*," the rope dancer *who performs all these feats*, or the men who make rules to express them all, by verbs expressing no action, and having no objects implied?

The following remarks upon the verb *to be*, from Cardell, will be valuable to the inquisitive and reflecting student.

First in importance, and first in frequency of use, is the *Word of Words*, the *Verb To BE*.

From the impossibility of explaining language by grammar rules, without knowing the meaning of terms, a slight exposition of the different parts of this verb will be given; confining the elucidation to plain English, instead of adducing proofs from foreign tongues.

am, signifies to possess and exercise liveliness, or the acting principle; to *continue*, to *sustain*, to *vivify*, or *uphold one's self*; to *retain vitality* and *enjoy its attributes*.

This verb can be used only in the first person singular, of the present tense; that is, by the person actually uttering it at the time. It therefore has not the least variety in manner of application; but is always confined to the same literal fact. No being can state a falsehood in saying *I am*; for no one can utter it, if it is not true. *Am* always denotes action of the highest kind; but it is self action in the strictest form: and not that which, except from the unavoidable nature of actions, extends its effects to secondary objects.

be, signifies to *live*, to *breathe*; to *exercise the qualities and functions of animal life*; and when applied by analogy to matter, to *take, possess, or hold some state of being*, among *existing things*. It is the same word, slightly altered, as the first syllable in *bi-ography*, which means a history of a person's *life*.

air, are, art, these are the same word, which in modern practice, is slightly and conveniently modified in form; but without any alteration of meaning. Thou *art* is contracted from thou *arest*.

"*They are*," means first, they *air*, or *are themselves*; they *supply themselves* with *air*: they *vivify, inspirit*, and *preserve themselves* by means of *air*; and applied to the lower ranks of creatures, they *continue themselves* in *air*; or the regions of *air, light, or being*.

is, Second. They *are air* ; they *inhale* or *imbibe air* ; as they *drink drink*, *sleep sleep*, or *breathe breathe* ; they enjoy the *enlivening* influence of *air* ; and inferior things do something as nearly analogous to the same *action* as their various natures and circumstances will admit. signifies to *exist*, being a contraction from the same radical word ; to *stand forth* ; to *exhibit one's self* : to *take*, or *hold* some *stand*, or *position*, in the universe of *existing things*. *Is*, always denotes *self-action*. One person does not *exist* an other person, and the *actor* is one of the *objects*.

Is, like other verbs, has a verbal noun, or the equivalent idea, necessarily implied ; as, It *stands its standing* ; it *exists its existence* ; it *holds its place*, and *acts its acts*, among the actors, living and dead, throughout the Creator's works.

Were, *wert*, *werth*, *worth*, *word*, "In the beginning was the *Word*, and the *Word* was with God, and the *Word* was God." These are all but the variations of one term, signifying *spirit* ; the *enlivening power* ; the *vital*, or *life giving principle* ; "They *were* ;" they *inspired themselves*, they *possessed vitality* ; and as applied to the minor gradations of *being*, they *possessed* and *exercised* those *acting powers*, analogous, by receding degrees, to *animal life*, which acting powers pervade every portion of the material *world*.

was, is from the same radical word as *were*, and with the same meaning.

"Is the theory of the word *to be*, as both a noun and an active verb, exemplified in practice ?"

"And God said, 'Light *be* ;' and light *was*."

If it was any *action* to create the sun and stars, with their attendant orbs, that *action* is signified by the short sentence above ; and if the sentence denotes *action*, it is "*expressed*" entirely by the verbs *be* and *was*.

be, imperative verb, *exist* ; *spring into being* ; *assume position*, *order*, and *acting influence*, in the system of wheeling worlds.

was, indicative verb, past tense, denoting that the fiat of Almighty power and wisdom, "Light *be*," was instantly obeyed.

And GOD said unto Moses, "I AM THAT I AM ; and thus

shalt thou say unto the children of Israel ; I AM hath sent me unto you."—*Exod.*

I AM the first, and I the last,
Through endless years the same ;
I AM is my memorial still,
And my eternal NAME.

Doct. Watts ; Hymn 45.

The compounded word which, through its varying forms, we call the verb *to be*, though in all its parts both noun and verb, and exceedingly significant as such, has been so long unexplained, and, by the force of tradition and habit, unconsciously used, that to develop its forcible, sublime, and true meaning, is necessarily to exhibit it in an *unfashionable* point of view.

"I am the am, or that I am."

am, verb, expressing self-action, the action of sustaining one's self in life. Never having any variation in its *object* it is unnecessary to express it, for the sake of perspicuity, or distinction. No word therefore is retained in use for this purpose. In parsing, it is only necessary to have the principle well understood, without dwelling upon it in practice.

the I AM ; Vitality itself ; uncreated, boundless, unending Being ; Life-giving Power ; Self sustaining Existence ; the eternal, uncontrolled, unassisted self acting Principle of Life.

I am, as here used, is taken together, as a noun ; and such a noun as never had a parallel in expression. It could not be translated, from the original, into any language, without greatly lessening its force.

I am, as a noun, could never be used, but by the *Ever-living God* ; and, without verbal reasoning upon it, the unavoidable necessity of the case shows that it can be taken only as a *nom-inative word*, or as the *actor* : because that, as the Supreme Being has no "variableness or shadow of turning," and is above all influence of inferior *actors*, he can not in strictness be contemplated as the *object* of any *action* ; for the nature of action is unavoidably to produce change in that on which it operates.

In the use of language, the *name* of the *Deity* frequently becomes the object of a verb ; but this mode of expression is to be understood as growing out of the necessity of the case, and the mere *relative* and limited conceptions, which finite beings must have of the Sovereign Lord.

For similar reasons, no *past participle* can ever apply to the Supreme Being, for what he *absolutely* is. We can say, *rela-*

tively, of the Most High, "He has *been* our Protector, ever since we had existence:" but, in all which pertains to his own Divine Attributes, it can not be said that he ever has *been* any thing which he is not now; because the *past participle* in every possible form of its use, denotes the resulting *effect* of action or change.

"City of New-York, ss. The People of the State of New-York, to Timothy Trusty, Greeting:

We COMMAND YOU that, all and singular business and excuses being laid aside, you *BE* and *APPEAR*, in your proper person, at the next court of common pleas, to be held at the City Hall of the city of New-York, on the third Monday of January next, at ten o'clock in the forenoon of the same day, to testify all and singular, what you may know, in a certain cause now depending in the said court, then and there to be tried, between John Doe plaintiff and Richard Roe defendant, of a plea of trespass on the case; and *this* you are *not to omit*, under the penalty of two hundred and fifty dollars.

Two hundred and fifty dollars *penalty* for not *performing* the *action* of *being* in court at the time commanded.

You *be* and *appear*, that is, you *have*, and *present*, *yourself*.

Almost thou persuadest me to *be a Christian*: to *make a Christian* of myself, to *turn or convert myself* into a Christian. The best way for a man to seem to *be any thing* is really to *be what* () he would to *be*.

PART III.

SUBJECTS FOR EXERCISE.

THEN Judah came near unto him, and said, O my lord, let thy servant, I pray thee, speak a word in my lord's ears, and let not thine anger burn against thy servant : for thou art even as Pharaoh. My lord asked his servants, saying, Have ye a father, or a brother ? And we said unto my lord, We have a father, an old man, and a child of his old age a little one ; and his brother is dead, and he alone is left of his mother, and his father loveth him. And thou saidest unto thy servants, bring him down unto me, that I may set mine eyes upon him. And we said unto my lord, The lad cannot leave his father ; for if he should leave his father, his father would die. And thou saidst unto thy servants, Except your youngest brother come down with you, ye shall see my face no more. And it came to pass when we came up unto thy servant my father, we told him the words of my lord. And our father said, go again, and buy us a little food. And we said, We cannot go down : if our youngest brother be with us, then will we go down : for we may not see the man's face, except our youngest brother be with us. And thy servant my father said unto us, Ye know that my wife bare me two sons : and the one went out from me, and I said, Surely he is torn in pieces ; and I saw him not since : and if ye take this also from me, and mischief befall him, ye shall bring down my gray hairs with sorrow to the grave. Now therefore when I come to

thy servant my father, and the lad be not with us ; seeing that his life is bound up in the lad's life ; it shall come to pass, when he seeth that the lad is not with us, that he will die : and thy servants shall bring down the gray hairs of thy servant our father with sorrow to the grave. For thy servant became surety for the lad unto my father, saying, If I bring him not unto thee, then I shall bear the blame to my father forever. Now therefore, I pray thee, let thy servant abide instead of the lad a bondman to my lord ; and let the lad go up with his brethren. For how shall I go up to my father, and the lad be not with me ? lest peradventure I see the evil that shall come on my father.

MOUNT AUBURN.

So far as we ourselves are concerned, it matters not where our corruptible bodies are deposited after death. No sequestered spot—no perfumed air—no balmy breezes, can save our flesh from the worm of the grave. Whether placed in consecrated ground, or deposited by the public highway, we are alike subjected to the horrors of that 'narrow house, prepared for all the living.' Whether entombed beneath the lofty columns, or whether our grave be made within the watery waste, 't is all the same—the same decay and change awaits us. To us, it matters not : but to those near and dear friends who may survive us, it is different. To those we love, we look with different feelings. When we see father, mother, brother, sister, or friend, to whom we are bound by the tender cords of affection, consigned to their last, long home, in a neglected spot, left with 'no stone to tell where they lie,'—left, exposed to the rude tread of the stranger, to be forgotten—their graves, perhaps, to be made the place of the jest and the song, how poignant

are our feelings—how repugnant to our natures are the thoughts which come rushing on the mind. At times like this, how do we wish that some lone spot, consecrated to the memory of the departed, was at hand, in which we might deposit the last frail relics of those in whom we have centered all our affections—where they should not be forgotten; but where their memory might be blessed with the tear of the passer-by—where they could be consigned to the grave amid the fragrance of nature, and where roses might bloom over them, as fit emblems of their virtues and decay—where no rude footstep should pollute the ground thus made sacred by their remains, but where all would be led to contemplate with awe and respect, the home of the dead.

Such a place is Mount Auburn! Consecrated to the memory of the dead, by the first and master spirits of the age, it is ‘Holy Ground.’ There is not, perhaps on earth, a place so well calculated for its present purpose as Mount Auburn. The celebrated and far-famed *Pere La Chaise*, in the vicinity of Paris, so far as nature is concerned, is as far inferior to it, as pigmy mountains to the towering Alps. Nature has made this romantic—art has made it beautiful—the Creator has made it lovely—Man has made it sacred! Here are to repose the remains of Talent, of Virtue and Love—Here will much that is fair, much that is beautiful, take up its abode, ‘until the last trump shall sound, and the graves shall yield up their dead.’

ORIGIN OF WAR.

ON what principle in the nature or condition of man, does the advocate for war found its necessity? He has been defined to be a religious animal. But who will find the cause or the necessity of wars in

man's religion? Every relation he sustains to his Creator—every light in which he can be viewed, as connected with his final Judge, leads to an opposite conclusion. He is a reasonable being. Wars are inseparably connected with the highest acts of ingratitude, revenge, cruelty, and crime. Apply the epithet reasonable to these acts, and you have a string of solecisms.

War, it is said, is necessary, because it has been the business of the world,—because it has afforded occupation for one half of the population of the earth in all ages. War is useful, because it has made nearly all the great men that ever lived. 'Take away, they exclaim, from the history of the species, all that appertains to war and conquest, and what an uninteresting, barren, desolate retrospect have we left! Some eminent lawyers and physicians, a few profound divines and learned judges, here and there a great orator—doubtful if they would have been so, but from the excitements growing out of the events of war! Now and then a good poet—questionable even this, if they could not have sung of arms!

Thus men think, talk, and declaim; and thus are cheated to believe that wars cannot be prevented. But where is the man who has undertaken by fair and legitimate deduction, from any principles applicable to human conduct, or from the nature of things, to prove that war is necessarily entailed upon the race of man? What moralist has ever come to this result? What writer, upon the nature or history of man, has ever shown that a love of war is born with him, interwoven in his very nature, instinctive and incorrigible?

Bigelow.

MILTON'S LAMENTATION FOR THE LOSS OF HIS SIGHT.

HAIL, holy light! offspring of heaven first-born!
Or of th' Eternal, co-eternal beam!

May I express thee unblam'd. Since God is light,
And never, but in unapproach'd light
Dwelt from eternity—dwelt then in thee,
Bright effluence of bright essence increate.
Or hear'st thou rather, pure ethereal stream,
Whose fountain who shall tell? Before the sun,
Before the heavens thou wert, and at the voice
Of God, as with a mantle didst invest
The rising world of waters dark and deep,
Won from the void and formless infinite.
Thee I revisit now with bolder wing,
Escap'd the Stygian pool, though long detain'd
In that obscure sojourn; while in my flight,
Through utter, and through middle darkness borne,
With other notes, than to the Orphean lyre,
I sung of Chaos and eternal Night;
Taught by the heavenly muse to venture down
The dark descent, and up to re-ascend,
Though hard and rare. Thee I revisit safe,
And feel thy sovereign vital lamp—but thou
Revisitest not these eyes, that roll in vain
To find thy piercing ray, and find no dawn;
So thick a drop serene hath quench'd their orbs,
Or dim suffusion veil'd. Yet not the more
Cease I to wander where the Muses haunt,
Clear spring, or shady grove, or sunny hill,
Smit with love of sacred song—but chief
Thee, Zion, and the flowery brooks beneath,
That wash thy hallow'd feet, and warbling flow,
Nightly I visit—nor sometimes forget
Those other two equall'd with me in fate,
So were I equall'd with them in renown,
Blind Thamyras, and blind Mæonides;
And Tiresias, and Phineus, prophets old:
Then feed on thoughts, that voluntary move
Harmonious numbers—as the wakeful bird
Sings darkling, and in shadiest covert hid,
Tunes her nocturnal note. Thus, with the year,
Seasons return—but not to me returns
Day, or the sweet approach of even, or morn,
Or sight of vernal bloom, or summer's rose,
Or flocks, or herds, or human face divine;
But clouds instead, and ever-during dark
Surround me, from the cheerful ways of men
Cut off, and, for the book of knowledge fair,
Presented with an universal blank
Of nature's works, to me expung'd and raz'd,
And wisdom, at one entrance, quite shut out.

So much the rather, thou, celestial light,
 Shine inward, and the mind, through all her powers,
 Irradiate ; there plant eyes ; all mist from thence,
 Purge and disperse ; that I may see and tell
 Of things invisible to mortal sight.

TO-MORROW.

1. To-MORROW, didst thou say ?
 Methought I heard Horatio say, To-morrow.
 Go to—I will not hear of it—To-morrow !
 'T is a sharper, who stakes his penury
 Against thy plenty—who takes thy ready cash,
 And pays thee nought, but wishes, hopes, and promises,
 The currency of idiots—injurious bankrupt,
 That gulls the easy creditor !—To-morrow !
 It is a period no where to be found
 In all the hoary registers of Time,
 Unless perchance in the fool's calendar.

2. Wisdom disclaims the word, nor holds society
 With those who own it. No, my Horatio,
 'Tis Fancy's child, and Folly is its father ;
 Wrought of such stuff as dreams are, and as baseless
 As the fantastic visions of the evening.
 But soft, my friend—arrest the present moment :
 For be assur'd they are all arrant tell-tales :
 And though their flight be silent, and their path
 Trackless, as the wing'd couriers of the air,
 They post to heaven, and there record thy folly.
 Because, though station'd on th' important watch,
 Thou, like a sleeping, faithless sentinel,
 Didst let them pass unnotic'd, unimprov'd.
 And know, for that thou slumb'rest on the guard,
 Thou shalt be made to answer at the bar
 For every fugitive : and when thou thus
 Shalt stand impleaded at the high tribunal
 Of hood-wink'd Justice who shall tell thy audit ?

3. Then stay the present instant, dear Horatio,
 Imprint the marks of wisdom on its wings.
 'Tis of more worth than kingdoms! far more precious
 Than all the crimson treasures of life's fountain.
 O! let it not elude thy grasp; but, like
 The good old patriarch* upon record,
 Hold the fleet angel fast until he bless thee.

Cotton.

VANITY OF POWER AND MISERY OF KINGS.

1. No matter where; of comfort no man speak:
 Let's talk of graves, of worms, and epitaphs:
 Make dust our paper, and with rainy eyes
 Write sorrow on the bosom of the earth.
 Let's choose executors, and talk of wills:
 And yet not so,—for what can we bequeath,
 Save our deposed bodies to the ground?
 Our lands, our lives, and all are Bolingbroke's,
 And nothing can we call our own, but death;
 And that small model of the barren earth,
 Which serves as paste and cover to our bones.

2. For heaven's sake, let us sit upon the ground,
 And tell sad stories of the death of kings:—
 How some have been depos'd, some slain in war;
 Some haunted by the ghosts they have depos'd;
 Some poison'd by their wives, some sleeping kill'd;
 All murder'd;—

3. For within the hollow crown
 That rounds the mortal temples of a king,
 Keeps death his court: and there the antic sits,
 Scoffing his state, and grinning at his pomp;
 Allowing him a breath, a little scene,
 To monarchize, be fear'd, and kill with looks;
 Infusing him with self and vain conceit,—

* See Genesis, chap. xxxii. 24—30.

As if this flesh, which walls about our life,
Were brass impregnable; and humor'd thus,
Comes at the last, and with a little pin
Bores through his castle wall, and—farewell king!

4. Cover your heads, and mock not flesh and blood
With solemn reverence; throw away respect,
Tradition, form, and ceremonious duty,
For you have but mistook me all this while:
I live with bread like you, feel want, taste grief,
Need friends:—Subjected thus,
How can you say to me—I am a king?

Shakspeare.

HOW TO TELL BAD NEWS.

Mr. G. Ha! Steward, how are you my old boy?
how do things go on at home?

Steward. Bad enough, your honor; the magpie's
dead.

Mr. G. Poor Mag! so he's gone. How came he
to die?

Stew. Over-ate himself, sir.

Mr. G. Did he, faith? a greedy dog; why, what
did he get he liked so well?

Stew. Horse-flesh, sir; he died of eating horse-
flesh.

Mr. G. How came he get so much horse-flesh?

Stew. All your father's horses, sir.

Mr. G. What! are they dead, too?

Stew. Ay, sir; they died of over-work.

Mr. G. And why were they over-worked, pray?

Stew. To carry water, sir.

Mr. G. To carry water! and what were they car-
rying water for?

Stew. Sure, sir, to put out the fire.

Mr. G. Fire! what fire?

Stew. Oh, sir, your father's house is burned down to the ground.

Mr. G. My father's house burned down! and how came it set on fire?

Stew. I think, sir, it must have been the torches.

Mr. G. Torches! what torches?

Stew. At your mother's funeral.

Mr. G. My mother dead!

Stew. Ah, poor lady, she never looked up after it.

Mr. G. After what?

Stew. The loss of your father.

Mr. G. My father gone too?

Stew. Yes, poor gentleman, he took to his bed as soon as he heard of it.

Mr. G. Heard of what?

Stew. The bad news, sir, and please your honor.

Mr. G. What! more miseries! more bad news?

Stew. Yes, sir, your bank has failed, and your credit is lost, and you are not worth a shilling in the world. I made bold sir, to come to wait on you about it, for I thought you would like to hear the news!

THE LITTLE THIEF.

I TELL with equal truth and grief,
That little Kitt's an arrant thief:
Before the urchin well could go,
She stole the whiteness of the snow;
And more—that whiteness to adorn,
She stole the blushes of the morn;
Stole all the softness *Æther* pours
On primrose buds in vernal showers:
There's no repeating all her wiles—
She stole the Graces' winning smiles;
'Twas quickly seen she robbed the sky,
To plant a star in either eye;

She pilfered orient pearl for teeth,
 And stole the cow's ambrosial breath ;
 The cherry steeped in morning dew,
 Gave moisture to her lips and hue.
 These were her infant spoils, a store
 To which, in time, she added more :
 At twelve she stole from Ciprus' queen
 Her air and love-commanding mien :
 She sung—amazed the Sirens heard,
 And, to assert their voice, appeared :
 She played—the Muses, from their hill,
 Wondered who thus had stole their skill :
 Apollo's wit was next her prey,
 And then the beams that light the day ;
 While Jove, her pilfering thefts to crown,
 Pronounced these beauties all her own ;
 Pardoned her crimes, and praised her art ;
 And t' other day she stole—my heart.

RODERICK DHU AND MALCOLM.

- TWICE through the hall the chieftain strode ;
 The wavings of his tartans broad,
 And darkened brow, where wounded pride
 With ire and disappointment vied,
 5. Seemed, by the torch's gloomy light,
 Like the ill demon of the night,
 Stooping his pinions' shadowy sway
 Upon the nighted pilgrim's way :
 But, unrequited love, thy dart
 10. Plunged deepest its envenomed smart,
 And Roderick, with thine anguish stung,
 At length the hand of Douglas wrung ;
 While eyes that mocked at tears before,
 With bitter drops were running o'er.
 15. The death-pangs of long-cherished hope,
 Scarce in that ample breast had scope,

- But, struggling with his spirit proud,
Convulsive heaved its checkered shroud,
While every sob—so mute were all—
20. Was heard distinctly through the hall ;
The son's despair, the mother's look,
Ill might the gentle Ellen brook ;
She rose, and to her side there came,
'To aid her parting steps, the Graeme.*
25. Then Roderick from the Douglas broke ;—
As flashes flame through sable smoke,
Kindling its wreaths long, dark, and low,
'To one broad blaze of ruddy glow,
So the deep anguish of despair
30. Burst, in fierce jealousy, to air—
With stalwart grasp his hand he laid
On Malcolm's breast, and belted plaid ;
" Back, beardless boy !" he sternly said,
" Back, minion ! hold'st thou thus at naught
35. The lesson I so lately taught ?
This roof, the Douglas and that maid,
Thank thou for punishment delayed."
Eager as grey-hound on his game,
Fiercely with Roderick grappled Graeme ;
40. " Perish my name, if aught afford
Its chieftain safety, save his sword !"
'Thus as they strove, their desperate hand
Griped to the dagger or the brand ;
And death had been—But Douglas rose,
45. And thrust between the struggling foes
His giant strength : . . . " Chieftains, forego !
I hold the first who strikes, my foe.
Madmen, forbear your frantic jar !
What ! is the Douglas fallen so far,
50. His daughter's hand is deemed the spoil
Of such dishonorable broil ?"

* Pronounced *Graeme* ; *a* as in *late*.

- Sullen and slowly they unclasp,
 As struck with shame, their desperate grasp ;
 And each upon his rival glared,
55. With foot advanced, and blade half bared.
 Ere yet the brands aloft were flung,
 Margaret on Roderick's mantle hung ;
 And Malcolm heard his Ellen's scream,
 As faltered through terrific dream.
60. Then Roderick plunged in sheath his sword,
 And veiled his wrath in scornful word.
 " Rest safe till morning ; pity 'twere
 Such cheeks should feel the midnight air !
 Then may'st thou to James Stuart tell,
65. Roderick will keep the lake and fell,
 Nor lackey, with his free-born clan,
 The pageant pomp of earthly man.
 More, would he of Clan-Alpine know,
 Thou canst our strength and passes show.
 Malise, what, ho !" his henchman came ;
70. " Give our safe conduct to the Graeme."
 Young Malcolm answered, calm and bold,
 " Fear nothing for thy favorite hold.
 The spot an angel deigned to grace,
 Is blessed, though robbers haunt the place !
75. Thy churlish courtesy for those
 Reserve, who feel to be thy foes.
 As safe to me the mountain way
 At midnight, as in blaze of day,
 'Though, with his boldest at his back,
80. Even Roderick Dhu beset the track.



GOD'S UNIVERSAL DOMINION.

1. HARK ! the song of Jubilee,
 Loud as mighty thunders roar,
 Or the fullness of the sea,
 When it breaks upon the shore :—

Hallelujah ! for the Lord
God omnipotent shall reign ;
Hallelujah ! let the word
Echo round the earth and main.

2. Hallelujah ! hark ! the sound,
From the depth unto the skies,
Wakes above, beneath, around,
All creation's harmonies :
See Jehovah's banner furled,
Sheathed his sword : he speaks,—'tis done ;
And the kingdoms of this world
Are the kingdoms of his Son.
3. He shall reign from pole to pole
With illimitable sway :
He shall reign, when like a scroll,
Yonder heavens have passed away :—
Then the end ;—beneath his rod
Man's last enemy shall fall ;
Hallelujah ! Christ in God,
God in Christ is all in all.

THE END.




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